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In itself nothing but a new way of seeing things, it made of a monotony that had seemed 
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 In “After Scotland:  Irvine Welsh and the Ethic of Emergenc ,” the author’s objective is 
to mirror what he argues is the Scottish writer Irvine Wlsh’s objective:  to chart out a future 
Scotland guided by a generative life ethic.  In order to achieve this objective, the author lays 
open and reengages Scotland’s past, discovers and commits to neglected or submerged materials 
and energies in its past, demonstrates how Welsh’s work is faithful to those and newly produced 
materials and energies, and suggests that Welsh’s use of those materials and energies enables 
readers to envision a new Scotland that will be integral to n alternative postmodern world that 
countervails one ruled by late capital. 
 Each chapter builds toward a Marxist ethic of emergence, which is composed of four 
virtues uncovered in Scotland’s historical-material fabric:  congregation, integration, emergence, 
and forgiveness.  To bring these virtues to the surface, the author historically grounds Welsh’s 
novels and short stories—Trainspotting, Glue, Porno, Filth, “The Granton Star Cause,” “The 
Two Philosophers,” and Marabou Stork Nightmares.  Through this historiographical process, 
each virtue is uncovered and analyzed in the context of a particular historical period:  medieval, 
Reformation, Enlightenment, and postmodern.  Each context pr sents a unique set of materials 
and energies; each also presents an epistemological and ethical focus.  The author brings the first 
three contexts and virtues together to formulate the ethic of emergence within the postmodern 
context.  Throughout, the author stresses how this ethic and each of its virtues are embedded in 
Welsh’s work and in Scotland’s historical-material fabric.  The author then suggests what he and 
Welsh hope will emerge from that fabric according to such an ethic. 
 Because Welsh is a contemporary writer who has gained relatively little attention from 
literary scholars, another aim of this study is to situate Welsh’s work by connecting it with 
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literature produced inside and outside of the Scottish and postmodern contexts:  e.g. Gaelic 
prehistorical and epic literature, Chaucer, morality plas, Robert Burns, and the modern mystery 
genre.  
 The author concludes the study with an afterword, relating his project to recent events 




If it wasnae for the weavers what would we do? 
We widnae hae clothes made o' woo, 
We widnae hae a coat neither black nor blue, 




All social life is essentially practical.  All mysteries which lead theory to 
mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the 
comprehension of this practice. . . .  The philosophers ave only interpreted the 




Irvine Welsh?  L’enfant terrible of Scottish letters?  The schemie bairn turned junkie, 
turned construction worker, turned college student, turned MBA, turned civil servant, turned 
writer, turned charity boxer?  Scotland’s postmodern prophet of postmodern decay?  The writer 
who says that he does not write but just tells stories?  The guy who has published a collection of 
twisted tales, a collection of “chemical romances,” an exposé on the half-baked schemes of 
heroine addicts, a tragic saga of government-housing kids’ live , case studies on 
environmentally-induced schizophrenia and psychosis, and most recently, a sardonic 
combination of all these in a novel dealing with pornography?  The Irvine Welsh who includes 
some sort of animal mutilation in almost every novel?  The left-leaning writer who enjoyed a 
brief stint as a diarist for the right-wing British Daily Telegraph?  The man whose books are 
dominated by “cunts,” “gadges,” and “punters”?  The one who rites in a Scottish underclass 
dialect that puts the daunting invented English syntax of Anthony Burgess’s A Clockwork 
Orange to shame?  Yes, that Irvine Welsh. 
                                               
1 David Shaw, “Wark o’ the Weavers,” performed by Ewan McColl, Four Pence a Day:  British Industrial 
Folk Songs (Stinson 1993).   
2 Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (New York:  Penguin, 1992) p. 
423. 
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Welsh is the most significant writer for Scotland at the present time because he has 
proved to be the best able to connect Scotland to the humans who compose it, connect Scotland 
to readers (and moviegoers) who know little or nothing about it, connect Scots who never read to 
reading, connect Scotland to an alternative Scottish future, and ultimately connect Scotland to an 
alternative postmodern global probability.  I do not make light of downplaying the work of 
Welsh’s contemporaries, such as Janice Galloway, James Kelman, A. L. Kennedy, and Duncan 
MacLean; however, Welsh has so far proved to be the most literarily, socioculturally, 
philosophically, and politically profound.  In many ways, he is more than a writer; he is what I 
refer to as a conduit.   
The term “conduit” might seem strange in a literary and theoretical context, but it is the 
most appropriate term to use when describing a historical-material understanding of the role of 
the artist in artwork.  Extending Theodor Adorno’s coneption of artists’ relationship with 
artworks, I view a “good” writer as a conduit of historical, material, and cultural elements and 
energies, which means that an artist is neither a transcendent master nor a mere stenography 
machine.3  A conduit, on the one hand, is a medium.  It transfers energy or materials from one 
location to another.  An artist certainly does this.  Saying so might come across as an insult to 
artists.  It is not an insult, but it does countervail the notion that an artist has a position of 
privilege in the artistic process.  If an artist is a medium, he or she is on par with ink, paint, 
costuming, lighting, and celluloid.  To a great extent, this is true.  Nevertheless, a conduit is a 
medium with a creative aspect.  Instead of being a mechanism that just transfers something from 
one location to another, a conduit is also the dynamic within which various materials and 
energies converge and mix.  In modern chemical engineering, for instance, a conduit is 
commonly a multi-valve chamber where a variety of processes continuously take place and 
                                               
3 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (Minneapolis:  U of Minnesota P, 1997) pp. 148-53, 168-73. 
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where transference is ongoing.  In electrical engineerig, a conduit is a site of energy 
convergence, redirection, and dispersal—a junction.  One fu ction of a conduit, therefore, is to 
serve as a converter or transformer.   
A wool dyer, for example, creates various colors by mixing dyes in a receptacle.  The 
dyer is at this point not the master of the receptacle, but integrally interacts with the receptacle.  
His or her energy, along with the dyes, flows into the tool; consequently, the tool realizes the 
dyer’s labor.  Dyer and receptacle become int rimplicated to convert individual dyes into a new 
dye.  However, the dyer at this point is not yet a conduit, only a conduit in waiting.  He or she 
has not yet produced anything because he or she has not connected the new dye to anything.  The 
conduit realizes itself not only in conversion but also in transference—hence one connotation of 
trans-formation, the movement of forms.  To become more than just a mechanism that holds a 
new color, the dyer is a means of distributing the dye onto the wool that will then be transferred 
to another person, the weaver, and then to another, the wearer.  The needs of the weaver and the 
wearer are provided for by the dyer, and the dyer is realized through providing for them.  And 
they glorify the dyer when they weave with his or he yarn and wear the sweater produced from 
it.  Only through such a social network do any of their individual activities or needs take on 
significance.  A conduit, therefore, is not just a medium; a conduit is also a means of generation 
and connection.  A conduit is an integral but not superior poetic (i.e. transformative) aspect in a 
process.  An artist is just such an aspect in an artwork. 
All writers arguably fulfill the role of conduit, and postmodern Scotland undeniably has a 
growing number of remarkable writers.  Nevertheless, Welsh practically sets out to be such a 
conduit instead of an author of novels.4  To expand the textile metaphor introduced above, which 
                                               
4 Welsh aligns himself more with the storytelling tradition than the official writing culture:  “I grew up in a 
place where everybody was a storyteller, but nobody wrote. It was that kind of Celtic, storytelling tradition: 
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is evocative of Scotland’s deep historical connection to textiles, Welsh is a weaver who 
creatively and exhaustively channels and combines threads gathered from the materials of the 
world to produce a truly vibrant fabric.  What he produces, therefore, is of the world, but the 
product—the commodity—he produces presents the world in an uusual, scintillating way to 
those who live in it.  In effect, his work is a historically-materially informed, living, prophetic 
map.   
Weaving, however, does not always result in a comfortable blanket, a utilitarian bag, a 
flattering shirt, or an inspirational tapestry.  In the case of Welsh, the textiles he produces are 
often rough on the skin of the mind, rubbing off its old scab  nd opening it anew.  But his fabric 
is unexpectedly medicinal, too:  it breathes, allowing previously poisoned blood to be drawn out 
and diffused so that healing and movement can occur with new vigor.  In other words, Welsh 
works in good faith with the materials he has, and his work often has a healing effect despite its 
harsh truths.   
Even though Welsh is now a member of the middle-class literati, he spent his formative 
years in Edinburgh’s government housing schemes and mean streets, f om which he garnered 
many of the experiences and insights that inform his novels’ characters, plots, and themes.  The 
hodgepodge of working-class mores, lumpenproletariat despondency, middle-class aspirations, 
unemployment, poverty, substance abuse, domestic violence, cynical worldliness, bigoted 
provincialism, deep-fried diets, and vicious soccer fanaticism are not exotic to Welsh.  These 
                                                                                                                                             
everybody would have a story at the pub or at parties, even at the clubs and raves. They were all so interesting. Then 
I'd read stories in books, and they'd be dead.”  He continues, “I used to sort of socialize with the [writing] crowd in 
Edinburgh, but we never really regarded ourselves as writers.”  Moreover, he indicates that writing is less a 
professional role and is more a mediatory process:  “There's a tension between excitement and intellect [in writing]. 
Again, going back to The Acid House, I wanted to write something that was exciting, that turned pages, but also 
hopefully made people think about things. But it had to turn pages. There's a tradition in novel writing that's self-
consciously intellectual rather than intelligent. The two aren't often the same. It's not knowledge and ideas for their 
own sake, it's story and character. Posturing and posing, doing that intellectual dance, isn't really serving plot or 
character.”  See Irvine Welsh, interview with Dave Weich, Powells.com, 12 June 2001, 13 Aug. 2005 
<http://www.powells.com/authors/welsh.html>. 
 5 
form the reality that he and a great number of Scots call home.  He does not throw out this rough 
flax and impure wool; in fact, his fabric is dominated by the rough and impure because most of 
the materials he has at hand are rough and impure. 
Welsh’s fabric would not be the kind used to make a brilliant t rtan for one of Scotland’s 
great clans, even if it does contain some of the same threads.  Nor would Welsh’s fabric be the 
clothing of choice for the heaven-taught ploughmen and balladeers of the Highlands and 
Borders, even though its texture retains impassioned honesty.  His weaving might most often 
take place in the context of millennial Edinburgh, where he employs the materials piled in its 
historical storehouses, but what he weaves is not the velv t that might have been worn by the 
eighteenth-century literati who filled Edina’s salons and clubs or roamed the halls of its esteemed 
university.  No, his fabric is the tartan of a Scotland fter the Scotland of kilted chieftains and 
lairds, after the Scotland of rustic songsters, and fter the Scotland of cosmopolitan geniuses 
who supposedly brought us the modern world.5  His tartan cannot help but retain the old filial 
relations, the old folk wisdom, and the modern epistemological revolution.  In fact, the presence 
of the past cannot help but be apparent because, in his work, the threads of the past are shaken 
from their tight and seemingly complete formations, their ends pulled and then threaded into the 
fabric of the present.  But the past does not repeat itself:  Its materials are threaded differently 
than before, and new threads are added; consequently, new intersections emerge, new patterns 
materialize, and new materials are produced.6 
                                               
5 The latter claim—that the Scots brought us the modern wold—is most notably made by Arthur Herman, 
How the Scots Invented the Modern World:  The True Story of How Western Europe’s Poorest Nation Created Our 
World and Everything in It (New York:  Three Rivers, 2001).  Though frequently informative and astute, Herman’s 
work is frequently in the service of neoliberal triumphalism.  Historian Michael Lynch indicates that such neoliberal 
revisionism actually threatens Scotland’s historical significance by “shifting concentration towards the dramatic 
impact that the [Enlightenment Scotland in particular] made nd away from the storehouse of existing ideas on 
which [that Scotland] drew” (Scotland:  A New History [London:  Pimlico, 1992] p. xvii). 
6 “Artworks derive from the world of things in their performed material as in their techniques; there is 
nothing in them that did not also belong to this world and nothing that could be wrenched away from this world at 
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Tartans are not some colorful plaid skirts that bagpipers wear for thrills—they are 
multidimensional historical and genealogical maps.  Each major Scottish family or region has a 
unique fabric, like a fingerprint.  What color intersects with another, how a distinct line interacts 
with a field, and which hues are used all signify family namesakes, regional ecology and 
weather, battles, and sociopolitical affiliations.  Welsh, though, is a postmodern tartan maker 
originally from Scotland’s groundless, clanless lumpenproletariat, who drifted into the middle-
class world that he despised and that he now practically works to expose and to implode.7  So, 
the tartan he weaves cannot help but be rough and unrefined, according to received standards.  
But again, this does not mean that it is bad, that no attention is paid to pattern or to tone or to 
history.  Indeed, Welsh is highly sensitive—tuned in—to everything in Scotland.   
Weaving anything is both physically and psychologically demanding work.  Weaving a 
tartan is even more so.  Weaving a postmodern tartan for postmodern Scotland takes the work’s 
intensity to the extreme.  Like the tartans made by the weavers of old, the tartan that Welsh 
weaves is infused with tears shed for lost comrades and a country’s conflicts, the tinctures of the 
time and location that envelop him, as well as the blood that he himself has spilled and lost.  
Welsh does not omit the less than glorious events, the unflattering stains, or the self-inflicted 
                                                                                                                                             
less than the price of death. . . .  Art desires what has not yet been, though everything that art is has already been.  It 
cannot escape the shadow of the past.  But what has not yet been is the concrete” (Adorno 134). 
7 My use of the term “lumpenproletariat” in this instance and elsewhere throughout this study will probably 
be greeted with suspicion by more “orthodox” Marxists.  But as with other terms, I intentionally employ it to bring 
alive its provocative energy.  Indeed, my understanding of the term does not differ that much from the one that Marx 
gives in Capital:  A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes, vol. 1 [New York: Penguin, 1976] p. 797. 
Nevertheless, the position of the lumpenproletariat in the empire of late capital is integral instead of peripheal, as it 
arguably was during the era of modern capital.  I agree with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri when they write:  
“ the poor, every poor person, the multitude of poor people, have eaten up and digested the multitude of proletarians.  
By that fact itself the poor have become productive.  Even the prostituted body, the destitute person, the hunger of 
the multitude—all forms of the poor have become productive.  And the poor have therefore become ever more 
important:  the life of the poor invests the planet and envelops it with its desire for creativity and freedom.  The poor 
is the condition of every production. . . .  The discovery of postmodernity consisted in the reproposition of the poor 
at the center of the political and productive terrain” (Empire [Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard UP, 2000] pp. 158).  
Implied in my understanding of “lumpenproletariat,” therefore, is that the old delineations and roles of the classes 
must be reconceived—from the ground up. 
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wounds.  Added to this, he does not serve the courts of chiefs, lairds, kings, Ministers of 
Parliament, or CEOs.  He serves those on whose shoulders courts are built, a heretofore faceless 
and alienated multitude.  He would, therefore, do this multitude a disservice if the tartan he 
weaves does not honestly tell their historical, materil, and cultural biography.  More 
importantly, he would do Scots a disservice if he does not give them a fabric that is theirs, from 
which they may continue to weave.  Welsh, as the following chapters will demonstrate, does 
anything but a disservice. 
  Welsh’s weaving produces maps that bring about some understanding of contemporary 
Scotland, but because both his work and Scotland are inextricably connected to—interwoven 
with—the rest of the world, his maps lead to engagement with the current global situation.  
Ultimately, they are maps that uncover an alternative ethical probability on the debatable land of 
postmodernity.  As a consequence, they are maps that enable, inform, and inspire the objective of 
this study:  to chart out a future Scotland guided by a generative life ethic.  In order to achieve 
this objective, I will 1) lay open and reengage Scotland’s past, 2) uncover and commit to 
neglected or submerged materials and energies in its past, 3) demonstrate how Welsh’s work is 
faithful to those and newly produced materials and energies, and 4) suggest that Welsh’s use of 
those materials and energies enables readers to envision a new Scotland that will be integral to an 
alternative postmodern world that countervails the one currently ruled by late capital, which is 
also known as multinational or postmodern capitalism. 
Because I am dealing with the work of a strange sort of weaver who makes maps that are 
far from prescriptive, are descriptive, and are certainly open-ended, I am effectively put in the 
position of being a weaver-mapper, too.  I have to mirror Welsh’s process as well as produce 
something from what I find or connect to in his work.  The map I produce will, consequently, 
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add at least one more dimension to Welsh’s.  Therefore, as a good cartographer would, I need to 
provide a key to help us keep our bearings as we proceed.  
 After signifies place and process.  The more obvious meaning is adjectival, implying a 
thing or event occurring subsequent to something else.  “After,” in this sense, can occur 
temporally or spatially (or both) following another position in time or space.  In this study, both 
the temporal and spatial aspects will be in play.  On the other hand, there is an adverbial 
meaning, implying that something is actively being sought or followed.  This connotation, too, is 
valid in the current context.  Thus, “after” signifies both descriptive spatiotemporal location and 
analytical movement, making it a perfect term for dialectical historical-material study and 
construction.  I, following Welsh, will lay out Scotland, but to do so means that I must chase 
after what Scotland has been as well as what it is.  Ultimately, I will be in pursuit of its future 
probabilities, as Welsh is. 
 Scotland is not as simple as it might seem because it signifies a lack of coherence, not an 
autonomous, unified state.8  Indeed, Scotland the country is stateless; even calling it a unified 
nation stretches historical-material reality.  From its very beginnings as an identifiable entity, 
Scotland’s sociocultural diversity has been apparent.  Its very name literally means “land of the 
Irish,” deriving from a Latin word that the Romans applied to the Irish, Scoti.  However, the 
Gaels that came over to Scotland from around the Ulster region of Ireland, the Dál Riata 
(Dalriada in Scottish Gaelic), were by no means the majority.  In fact, they were not a strong 
presence until around the fourth and fifth centuries AD.  The Britons (i.e. Welsh) and the Picts, 
who were more than likely distant Brythonic cousins of the Britons, dominated, respectively, the 
                                               
8 This claim is an extension of Tom Nairn’s assertions concerning Scotland’s lack of a truly modern 
national phase.  See Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London:  Verso, 1981) pp. 
92-195; and Nairn, Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited (London: Verso, 1997) p. 180.   
 9 
south and north of what we today call Scotland.  Then added to the mix were the Norse, the 
Anglo-Saxons, and later the Normans.   
Efforts to create a unified kingdom that connected Northumbria, the Lowlands, the 
Highlands, and the Islands did not ever really succeed, except nominally.  The Romans failed to 
subdue Scotland.  The Holy Roman Empire did not fare much better because Scotland—along 
with various parts of Ireland, England, and Wales—did not uneq ivocally adopt Roman 
Catholicism.  Celtic Christianity preceded the arrival of the official Roman Church, and it held 
sway through much of the first millennium.  Where Scotland did adopt Roman Catholicism, it 
favored the monastic instead of the diocesan form of church structure, which perhaps explains its 
general resistance to episcopal governance, a top-down m del dominated by bishops, until the 
Scottish Reformation.  Only at the beginning of the second millennium (c. 1018-1153 AD)—
under Malcolm II, Malcolm and Margaret Canmore, and their son David I—did Scotland seem to 
consolidate.  Nevertheless, when a Scottish kingdom was nominally established, the reality was 
that Scotland (whether called Caledonia or Alba or Scotland) was really a loosely-knit multitude 
that shared similar social structures, as well as pre- and post-Christian cultural traditions.  Even 
after David I and his primarily Norman associates introduce  feudalism into Scotland, the new 
sociopolitical system just did not take.  Feudal estates merely peppered a terrain dominated by 
clanships, self-sustaining agricultural communities, and the like. The feudal powers did manage 
to create a burgh system.  This brought about a network of larger towns, in which mercantile and 
ecclesiastical power could be consolidated.  Even so, feudal lor s, their ecclesiastical partners, 
and the burgh fathers confronted extreme difficulty when it came to gaining control of what was 
a diverse and loosely-connected population.  It would not be until early modernity that 
Highlanders, Borderers, Islanders, and even constituencies in large rural areas of the Central Belt 
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between Aberdeen and the River Tweed would be sufficiently subjugated.  This subjugation was 
facilitated by a Scot, James (Stewart) VI of Scotland, who became James I of England.  It was 
through the 1707 Union of Parliaments under James’s crown that Scotland would become an 
officially subordinate “nation” within the United Kingdom, remaining so until 1997’s devolution 
referendum.  Even after 1997, Scotland would still remain practically subordinate.  During most 
of modernity, Scotland’s internal incoherence had been contained, but it actually proliferated 
internally:  most common Scots were displaced, transported to British colonies, and effectively 
imprisoned in mines, shipyards, poverty-stricken urban centers, and land-lorded rural wastelands.  
Therefore, Scotland has never been, according to dominant historical standards, what one could 
identify as an autonomous, coherent, or modern nation-sate.  This status as non-state might 
explain why one major perception of Scotland resigns it to failure. 
 Like so many other subordinate and “underdeveloped” countries throughout the world, 
Scotland, the reasoning goes, is such a minor player now in global politics and economics 
because it has historically failed to organize itself in a way that would have allowed it to benefit 
from the undeniable movement of Western progress—whether sociopolitical, ecclesiastical, 
cultural, national, or economic.  Subsequently, its subordinate status in the United Kingdom and 
now in a global capitalist empire is just deserts.  To use Mark Renton’s words from Welsh’s first 
novel, Scotland is a mass of “failures in a country ay failures . . . colonised by wankers,” which 
makes Scots the “lowest of the fuckin low, the scum of the earth.  The most wretched, servile, 
miserable, pathetic trash that was ever shat intae cretion.”9  What right do Scots have to 
complain?   
 Despite Renton’s apt though defeatist analysis of one Scotland, historical-material reality 
evinces an alternative Scotland and, paradoxically, a promising one at that.  If the sociopolitical, 
                                               
9 Welsh, Trainspotting (New York: Norton, 1996) p. 78. 
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ecclesiastical, cultural, global, and economic hegemony of today’s America is supposed to be the 
culmination of “Western Civilization,” then Scotland and countries like it throughout the world 
might prove to be a saving grace—not just despite of but becaus  of their lesser status.  The 
threats of perpetual war, government of and for moneyed power elites, exponential destruction of 
ecosystems, homogenization of cultural life, sophisticated theocracy, and political 
disenfranchisement promised today are exactly the things Scotland has historically encountered, 
resisted, and to some extent exorcized over the last two millennia.  Although seemingly 
powerless and backward according to modern and postmodern standards of progress, subordinate 
Scotland emerges from a ground rich with historical materials and energies.  It is, therefore, not 
the failure that some, including plenty of Scots, might assume.   It is because of Scotland’s 
particular situation—its historical-material genealogy—that Scotland may prove well-equipped 
not only to weather but to emerge from the daunting, uncertain global situation that will play out 
over the next millennium.   
Even with that note of hope being struck, I do not accept another Scotland that is 
becoming increasingly popular.  In order to counter a Scotland characterized as a historical 
aberration, if not failed abortion, a growing number of c mmentators have hitched onto the 
Scottish Enlightenment as if it were a Nietzschean phoenix that left in the ashes a barbaric 
Scottish past.  Their Scotland is not only a neoliberal paradise; it is also the source of much of 
the West’s, particularly America’s, ability to ascend to gl bal hegemony.10  If such is the case, 
then Scotland is responsible for postmodern capitalist imperialism, which is something that Scots 
might not want to own.  I certainly agree that Scotland is not and has never been a hopeless 
                                               
10 To the list containing Herman, add Duncan A. Bruce, The Mark of the Scots:  Their Astonishing 
Contributions to History, Science, Democracy, Literature, and the Arts (New York:  Citadel, 1998); Robert W. 
Galvin, America's Founding Secret: What the Scottish Enlightenment Taught Our Founding Fathers (New York:  
Rowan and Littlefield, 2002); and Michael Fry, How the Scots Made America (New York:  Thomas Dunne, 2005). 
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failure; in fact, I think of it as a site of alternative postmodern potential.  However, any serious, 
good-faith study of Scottish historical-material reality makes preposterous any claim that 
Scotland is or has ever really been a great source of and the  beneficiary of modern and now 
postmodern capital, whether in its sociopolitical, cultural, or economic forms.  Do those who are 
the descendants of people forcibly displaced, betrayed by others and themselves, exploited, and 
subjugated under modern and now postmodern imperialism really want to turn around and 
celebrate it?  If so, the historical-material bad faith nd self-sacrifice involved severely 
undermine any supposed triumph.  There are, though, alternativ s to such ahistorical 
sophistication. 
The Scotland that will be pursued here is one aft r the Scotland cast off as a congenital 
failure and after the Scotland remade as Western Civilization’s carefully hidden secret society of 
savages-turned-savants.  This Scotland fter those Scotlands is their countervailing postscript, 
and it is the detective on their case.  To pursue this after-Scotland will, therefore, entail 
confronting and analyzing the others.  This will not mean repeating them, but it will mean 
emerging from them while never pretending to transcend them.11 
The Scotland that precedes the Scotland that Welsh is pursuing and that we will be 
pursuing with him is a situation.  “Situation” connotes a terrain of being.12  Within this terrain—
which I will also refer to as a “context,” “ground,” or “fabric”—are all the materials and energies 
of human life.  A situation, therefore, is the social space from which humans can produce and 
emerge.   
                                               
11 Such a view reflects an understanding of Marxism as an “‘untranscendable horizon’ that subsumes . . . 
antagonistic or incommensurable critical operations, as igning them an undoubted sectoral validity within itself, and 
thus at once canceling and preserving them” (Frederic Jameson, The Political Unconscious:  Narrative as a Socially 
Symbolic Act [Ithaca, NY:  Cornell UP, 1981] p. 10). 
12 See Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. Peter Hallward (London:  Verso, 
2001) pp. 129-31. 
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Ethics has become one of those terms that can mean whatever someone wants it to mean; 
therefore, it has become hollow, propagandistic, and self-parodying.13  The very fact that the 
words “business” and “ethics” are even joined in the context of postmodern capital is a good 
indicator of how insubstantial ethics has become.  Moreover, ethics has been conflated with such 
strange creatures as “moral values.”  For the most part, b rring the philosophers and theologians 
who are sincerely engaged in exploring and deepening ethics, ethics is effectively just a 
commodity zipping along in the currents of capital.  This commodity’s rapid exchange gives the 
patina of legitimacy to capital’s systems and their managers, which are only interested in 
accruing more materials and energies—more power—with no interest in the just distribution of 
power to those who produce it.  As a capitalist commodity, ethics serves as a tool of 
rationalization that lubricates and thus quickens alienat o , expendability, and the consolidation 
of power—a phenomenon illustrated time and again throughout Welsh’s body of work.  
Particularity has become the idolatry of the postmodern, signifying the sev re anemia of 
ethics.  Inadvertently, the avatars and defenders of difference—poststructuralist, deconstructivist, 
postcolonialist, feminist, postmodernist, and so forth—have ctually produced for capitalism its 
ethical veneer.14  Their work gives legitimacy to nihilistic self-abandon  the one hand and 
                                               
13 According to Badiou, what is today called ethics is really a “return of ethics” as a theme instead of as an 
integral part of human life and thought—a sort of coping mechanism that “governs how we relate to ‘what is going 
on,’ a vague way of regulating our commentary on historical situations (an ethics of human rights), technico-
scientific situations (medical ethics, bio-ethics), ‘ocial’ situations (the ethics of being-together), media situations 
(the ethics of communication), and so on. . . .  This norm of commentaries and opinions is backed up by official 
institutions, and carries its own authority:  we now have ‘national ethical commissions,’ nominated by the State.  
Every profession questions itself about its ‘ethics.’  We even deploy military expeditions in the name of ‘the ethics 
of human rights’” (2).  He concludes, therefore, that today’s “theme of ethics,” which has subordinated integral 
ethics, is “compatible with the self-satisfied egoism of the affluent West, with advertising, and with service rendered 
to the powers that be.  Such are the facts” (7). 
14 The most pointed indictment to this effect is made by Badiou (4-38).  A more sympathetic response to 
the various ethics of difference comes by way of Hardt an  Negri (Empire 135-59).  Badiou, Hardt, and Negri are 
tapping into one of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’s insights:  “Individuals have always proceeded from 
themselves, but of course from themselves within theirgiven historical conditions and relations, not from the ‘pure’ 
individual in the sense of the ideologists” (The German Ideology including Theses on Feurbach and Introduction to 
the Critique of Political Economy [Amherst, NY:  Prometheus, 1998] p. 87).   
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egoistic individualism on the other.  To privilege a finite “other” or an absolute “Other” drives 
alienation from the self by projecting power toward a sociocultural fragment or to an ambiguous 
ideal.  Such an ethics of difference, which demands the acrifice of the self, fosters a kind of 
masochistic solipsism, if it does not ultimately foster an escapist nihilism.  On the other side of 
the same coin, making an idol out of one’s identity—whether cultural, sexual, religious, or 
racial—reduces one into an easily exchangeable fragment, paradoxically defusing one’s power to 
compose and assert autonomy.  In both cases, humans are cut off from composing practical and 
mutually enriching connections or alliances.  This might explain why many in and out of 
academia have blamed moral relativism on the diverse theorists and theories that fall under the 
postmodern label.  However, the blame is typically misplaced because making idols out of 
particularities is a symptom, not a cause of the fragmentation of ethics.  Capitalism is the culprit.   
That being said, though, difference, dissensus, and so forth negatively testify to an 
undeniable, disturbing truth.  For too long, the West, itself a particular set of particularities, has 
waged war on other particularities, typically in an effort t  accumulate economic, religious, 
social, and cultural power for whatever particular interests that it, the West, as a particularity 
espouses at a particular time.  This march toward consolidating all other particularities for the 
sake of one religious doctrine, supreme sovereignty, private property, a military-industrial 
complex, a master-narrative, global capitalism, or the end of history is responsible for practically 
erasing or liquidating human autonomy.  The ground that people depend on and produce from 
has been ripped from underneath them and then is parceled out to them for the dear price of 
sweat, blood, and love.  If particularity—whether called s xual difference, cultural identity, 
nationality, the West, or something else—is left alone a d taken as an end in itself, then it 
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promises the destruction of true individuality, subjectivity, and political power.15  However, if 
particularity implies particular individuals in a cooperative process, then it promises the 
emergence of the whole human being and political power.  Therefore, when I refer to a 
“particular human” or to a “human individual,” I will be implying the potentiality of a whole 
human being, not the egoistic, isolated individual. 
Vibrant individuals, uniqueness, cultural identity, sexual empowerment, and freedom are 
only probable in healthy and just social networks of constituents—a multitude. 16  Along with 
“autonomous human being” or “autonomous human individual,” “constituent” is a term that I 
will use when referring to a whole human being, a particular individual who has realized him- or 
herself in cooperative social involvement with others.  One cannot be an individual, different, or 
self-actualizing without being connected to and actively engaged with others and the social 
forces that intersect in oneself.  The dialectical process of bringing about the constituent and the 
multitude runs this way:  
A multitude depends on the interaction of autonomous constituents, and such 
constituents are sustainable only through cooperative connections—multitude-
building.  Consequently, a global multitude depends on the interaction of 
autonomous particular multitudes (constituencies), and such constituencies are 
sustainable only through their cooperative connections. Constituents and 
constituencies dialectically sustain, enliven, and expand the whole multitude 
                                               
15 “But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.  In its reality it is the 
ensemble of the social relations” (Marx, Early Wrings 423). 
16 My understanding of “constituent” and “multitude” comes by way of the recent visionary work of 
Antonio Negri, Insurgencies:  Constituent Power and the Modern State, rans. Maurizia Boscagli (Minneapolis:  U 
of Minnesota P, 1999); with Michael Hardt, Empire; and with Hardt, Multitude:  War and Democracy in the Age of 
Empire (New York:  Penguin, 2004).  Of course, Negri is extending a line of thought that began with Marx and 
Engels:  “Only within the community has each individual the means of cultivating gifts in all directions; hence 
personal freedom becomes possible only within the community. . . .  In the real community the individuals obtain 
their freedom in and through their association” (86-87). 
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through their cooperative interaction; conversely, the dialectically-produce , 
growing multitude nurtures each constituent and constituency through ongoing 
distribution of materials and energies.  
In this process, the whole or autonomous human individual realizes in him- or herself a whole 
network of other autonomous human individuals, and that network realizes each autonomous 
human individual.  In other words, an individual is whole when he or she incorporates the whole 
multitude and when he or she recognizes him- or herself in very facet of the multitude.  
According to Marx, this is called species-being.17  A vital ethics in our time, counter to the empty 
vessel called ethics these days, will not only have to incrporate but will need to perpetually 
emerge through this dialectical process of the multitude. 
Whenever I am confronted with an entity, practice, or concept that has been all but 
obliterated for the sake of power-accumulation and injustice, I am not one to let it “go gentle”: 
ethics, like Scotland, is a case in point.  There must be a way to connect to and build with its 
fragmented materials in order to unleash its buried energy.  Thanks to Francis Hutcheson, David 
Hume, Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Walter Benjamin, Jean-Paul Sartre, Raymond Williams, 
Michel Foucault, Edward Said, Alasdair MacIntyre, Alain Badiou, and Gilles Fauconnier—a 
strange alliance indeed—I have been directed to a method, which is both analytical and poetic:   
Take something out of circulation, rub it against what is uncritically taken as 
common sense, shake loose its rigidified fabric, locate a still vibrant fiber, and 
then begin composing anew and differently from that particular point with the 
materials that have been shaken loose.   
In the instance of ethics, I am fortunate enough to havean tymological hint to make this 
task go easier.  A Greek word from which we derive “ethics,” ethos, literally means “use.”  
                                               
17 Marx, Early Writings 234, 328-29, 347, 350-51. 
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Unraveled to this fiber, therefore, ethics is concerned with how one uses something, how one is 
used, and how one uses oneself and others.  The charm of ethics is, nevertheless, also its curse.  
It is a seemingly neutral process.  This, perhaps, is why it is so easily ab-used.  An individual or 
group can come up with a system and call it ethical even if it “justifies” torture, rape, murder, 
genocide, or even eternal damnation.  Ethics, however, is concerned with activity in and of itself.  
Herein whispers the secret that those who abuse ethics want to neutralize:  ethics is about the 
perpetuation, generation, and enrichment of life, pure and simple.  Any attempt to alienate, 
subordinate, liquidate, or obliterate life contravenes ethics.  Still, when I speak of “life,” I am not 
speaking of the issues of biological reproduction that hypocritical theocrats and moralists-for-
hire have highjacked.  I am speaking of life as a holistic, interconnected web of human activity.  
Life is social practice—praxis. 
Throughout most of the history of ethics, praxis is a submerged generative aspect; as long 
as it is submerged, practical and generative ethics is impossible.  Practice is not the same as 
custom or habit.  Practice works toward a creative, burgeoning movement.  At its core, ethics is 
predisposed to emergence.18  Consequently, I reassert this radical aspect of ethics by presenting 
an ethic of emergent praxis—the ethic of emergence.  This ethic defies rigidity, mere 
performativity, simple consumption, and so on. 
However, I do not want the ethic of emergence to be misconstrued as some explosive, 
undisciplined theory.  Indeed, it consists of the interaction of four historical-material virtues 
                                               
18 Emergence is not to be confused with transcendence as it is generally understood in a bourgeois 
framework.  Emergence indicates a historical-material movement beyond what has been or what is—by engaging, 
wrenching free, and producing something new out of what has been or what is, not escaping from historical-materil 
reality.  Marx uses the term “transcendence” in his writing to imply both the harmful alienation effected by 
capitalism and the historical-material revolution that e envisions.  When I use the term “emergence,” I am 
intensifying the latter connotation, and I am making a direct reference to Marx’s most explicit use of the term 
“emergence”:  “the whole of what is called world history is nothing more than the creation of man through human 
labour, and the development of nature for man . . . palpable and incontrovertible proof of his self-mediated birth, of 
his process of emergence” (Early Writings 357). 
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submerged in Scotland’s ground:  congregation, integration, emergence, and forgiveness.  A 
virtue is a dynamic, indispensable aspect of an ethical system—the ethic of emergence in this 
context.  A virtue arises from a particular sociocultural ground; therefore, it is not automatically 
universal in application, even though it may be translated into other situations or adopted and 
incorporated by other ethical systems.19  In Scotland’s case, I have uncovered the four virtues 
mentioned above. 20  The first three virtues form the “machinery” of the ethic of emergence, and 
the last virtue is the “spirit” of the ethic.  I briefly offer here a glimpse of these four virtues, 
which I will explore in greater detail as this study progresses.  Congregation brings emergent 
materials and energies together.  This convergence, however, is impossible without the human 
individual who can integrate these materials and energies into his or her being.  Integration 
connects emergent materials and energies to the individual so that he or she may enter into the 
cooperative process of congregation with other individuals.  These two interrelated processes, 
though, are not by themselves necessarily productive.  Incorporating and sharing materials might 
not produce alternatives to the status quo of a situation.  The virtue of emergence brings about a 
constructive dynamic when it enters into relation to the other two virtues.  When integration and 
congregation are connected to emergent force, a creative navigational process begins, in which 
alternative probabilities begin to materialize.  The virtue of forgiveness does not exist 
independently of congregation, integration, and emergence.  Th se three apparently mechanical 
virtues and the productive ethic to which they give rise produce something non-mechanical but 
                                               
19 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue:  A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, Ind.:  U of Notre Dame P, 
1984) pp. 220-25. 
20 Some will notice an affinity between the approach I am charting here and the “medieval system” of 
interpretation that Jameson sketches out and is inspired by in The Political Unconscious:  interpretation of 
something occurs on different “levels” or “senses”:  i.e. anagogical, moral, allegorical, and literal.  Jameson, though, 
intentionally begins and ends with interpreting interpretation, putting off an “exploratory projection of what a vital 
and emergent political culture should be and do which Raymond Williams has rightly proposed as the most urgent 
task of a Marxist cultural criticism” (10).  Therefore, instead of the present study being a reflection or continuation 
of Jameson’s project, it is an emergence from it, moving toward the probability—an “exploratory projection of what 
a vital and emergent political culture should be and do”—that he envisions but does not pursue. 
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nevertheless integral to them.  Forgiveness is not a spirit that we can insert into the tripartite 
praxis that makes up the ethic of emergence; it is one that this praxis brings into being.  Even so, 
forgiveness cannot be taken as a given.  In order to continue as an emergent practice, the process 
that gives rise to forgiveness must continue to intentionally reincorporate forgiveness into every 
aspect and thus into the whole. 
Each of the three “mechanical” virtues is tied to a certain way of knowing—to an 
epistemological aspect.  In the following chapters, I will draw lines between congregation and 
mythos, integration and pathos, and emergence and logos.  “Mythos” has many connotations, but 
we will operate under the notion that it is genealogically original, evocative, volatile, and 
metaphorical knowledge that attests to a historical-material world that might be shrouded but is 
not completely buried.21  This aspect informs and is informed by the other two aspect , logos and 
pathos.  However, it resists predetermined knowledge, thus unlocki g epistemological 
probabilities.  Information gathered from mythos compels the logos to expand or to reconfigure 
knowledge in order to accommodate it.  Moreover, mythos maintains a strong connection to 
pathos as logos downplays, to its detriment, its connection to pathos.   Logos is the authorial 
reasoning aspect.  This aspect archives information gathered from events, analyzes what has 
occurred and is occurring, and weaves together knowledge—an pistemological map—out of the 
materials that it and the other two aspects accrue and produce.  Pathos is the emotional and 
sensorial aspect.  This aspect embodies and sensually informs the other two, thus enabling them 
                                               
21 Bringing mythos into the fray means to touch on a very h ated category of epistemology; nevertheless, I 
do so in a historical-materialist manner.  As I will touch on in chapter 2, my approach owes much to Walter 
Benjamin’s understanding of history and his appreciation of what is called mythological knowledge, which he 
viewed as a crucial part of any historical-material process and subsequent analyses.   The logocentric bias, 
particularly after the Enlightenment, has allowed philosophers to treat knowledge as an abstraction, thereby allowing 
them to segregate and then hierarchize logos, mythos, and by extension, pathos. This has restricted epistemology 
and has, as we will venture in chapters 4 and 5, contributed to alienating knowledge from the multitude.  For an in-
depth argument along these lines, see Phillip Stambovsky, Myth and the Limits of Reason (Lanham: University P, 
2004) pp. 45, 55-89.  
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to have meaningful, practical existence.  Moreover, it is the bridge which connects mythos and 
logos to each other and across which experiential, sensorial data travels to them. Pathos is also 
the connective tissue of bodies politic—the permeable membrane through which mythos and 
logos can pass to and from the world and through which humans can connect to other humans.  
Taken together, mirroring and informing their respective virtues, these ways of knowing create 
an integrated epistemological basis for ethos.  Therefore, they are integral to the ethic of 
emergence presented here. 
Greatly informing this study of Welsh’s work and the construction of the ethic of 
emergence are the monumental cultural theories formulated by Antonio Gramsci and Raymond 
Williams.  Discussing both Gramsci and Williams in a study concerning Scotland is appropriate:  
Gramsci has greatly informed Scottish socialism, and as a British national, Williams was 
certainly intimately aware of what occurred to people throughout Britain, including Scotland.22  
Both twentieth-century theorists brought Marx to bear on p pular culture.  In effect, they led the 
way—along with Benjamin, Adorno, Louis Althusser, and Pierre Bourdieu—toward 
understanding how economics, class consciousness, and revolution are not restricted to the 
factory, union halls, or city barricades.  The classroom, the church, the painting, the novel, and 
the song are also where the conflicts occur between capitalist human alienation and socially-
enabled human autonomy.  In other words, Gramsci and Williams made evident that all aspects 
of human life are up for grabs.   
Gramsci observed that popular common sense is capable either of settling into bad 
(folkloric) sense or of producing revolutionary good sense.23  In environments where human 
                                               
22 Jonathan Hearn, Claiming Scotland:  National Identity and Liberal Culture (Edinburgh:  Polygon, 2000) 
p. 21. 
23 See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Cultural Writings, eds. David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-
Smith, trans. William Boelhower (Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard UP, 1985) pp. 188-95, 420-21; and Gramsci, 
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autonomy would threaten an elite’s accumulation of power, an uncritical, disengaged acceptance 
of the status quo is encouraged by the dominant social institutions.  Hence, a common sense 
geared toward conservatism, acquiescence, and provincial opinion is promoted.  In such a 
situation, the alternative, good sense, becomes not only a nuisance but a threat.  In a capitalist 
situation, for instance, good sense will be diffused by cultural productions which relegate it to 
the level of spectacle, fantasy, naiveté, idealism, and so forth.  Good sense is presented as alien 
or impractical so that it can be dismissed.  Or, as is the case in post-9/11 America, it is not 
presented at all.  As Gramsci saw first hand, creative energies aligned with good sense are also 
appropriated by bad sense in order to diffuse and neutralize good sense.  Because bad sense 
becomes natural (or hegemonic), humans will consume themselves and thereby neutralize their 
own productive power for the sake of the systems that dominate them.  Nevertheless, bad sense 
can never totally obliterate good sense because it still depends on some of the energies and 
materials of good sense to sustain itself.    
Williams uses different terminology to explain this process.24  Humans’ productive 
energies are degraded to the level of residual culture (henceforth called residual force), which 
allows for those now fragmented and contained energies to be managed and used for the 
accumulation of power.  Creativity paradoxically becomes a means of rigidification.  As with 
good sense, though, the probability of something else occurring is always present, no matter how 
submerged it might be.  The materials and energies indicative of emergent force promise 
alternative, generative probabilities.25 
                                                                                                                                             
Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (New York:  
International, 1971) pp. 323-43, 348-51, 419-25.  For a masterful exposition of Gramsci’s theories on common 
sense, see Marci Landy, Film, Politics, and Gramsci (Minneapolis:  U of Minnesota P, 1994) pp. 73-98. 
24 See Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford, UK:  Oxford UP, 1977) 121-27. 
25 Emergent practice, therefore, “is never only a matter of immediate practice; indeed it depends crucially 
on finding new forms or adaptations of form” (Williams 126). 
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It is, therefore, by synthesizing the currently submerged aspects of Scotland, ethics, and 
common sense that a Scottish ethic of emergence becomes the philosophical and practical heart 
of this study.  As I will argue, this is also the heart of Welsh’s work.  What has submerged 
Scotland and ethics is the manner in which they have been used; likewise, what have 
subordinated most humans to the systems that dominate a d steal life from them is how humans 
have been used and, more importantly, how they have used themselves and each other.  
Nevertheless, a Scotland after Scotland, ethos, good sense, and emergent energies and materials 
cannot help but suggest alternatives, one of which I will further elaborate and systematize 
throughout the body of this study. 
The map key I have provided here is by no means exhaustive.  Throughout the study, I 
will expand and elaborate each of the concepts introduced so far.  Moreover, other key concepts 
will emerge as we proceed, which I will accordingly flesh out.  Presently, though, we have 
enough to begin exploring Welsh’s maps and to begin weaving our own. 
The weaving-mapping figure I have employed indicates that the map before us has many 
layers, connecting points, and knots.  Accordingly, I have chosen a method of study that reflects 
this reality.  Each chapter will be characterized by a particular historical-material context, an 
epistemological aspect, at least one literary genre, and a virtue that emerges from the Scottish 
ground.  Therefore, each chapter is itself a small-scale m p feeding into the larger map of the 
study.   
 In chapter 2, “Medieval Thread:  Outlaw Congregation,” the virtue to be arrived at is 
congregation.  I will focus on what I call Welsh’s trainspotting books:  the novels Trainspotting, 
its sequel Porno, and Glue, the figurative and literal glue between the other two.  They permit 
access to mythos.  These texts practically establish the prehistorical or mythological fabric of 
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Welsh’s Scotland.  They also disclose the medieval historical-material strands that run through 
postmodern Scotland.  The narrative technique Welsh uses in these books strengthens these 
links.  The three novels are written in modes similar to what one finds in ancient Gaelic lays, 
Scottish wonder tales, early British historical chronicles, and Gaelic sagas—Fenian literature in 
particular.  Consequently, we will explore how Fenian outlaw morality still figures greatly in 
Scotland’s society and culture.  We will also explore how Welsh’s trainspotting books can be 
linked to the Highland caterans, the Border reivers and the Celtic hristians that have nearly 
been forgotten by history.   
 In the third chapter, “Reformation Thread:  Covenant of Integration,” the virtue to be 
arrived at is integration.  Two texts will serve as touchstones:  a novel, Filth, and a short story, 
“The Granton Star Cause.”  As a whodunit turned psychological thriller, Filth is a postmodern 
twist on the modern mystery genre.  The novel’s subject mat er explicitly uncovers the bad sense 
unleashed by the Reformation as a historical and philosophical rupture, and it implicitly cries for 
the good sense of Calvinism to emerge before the bad sense of ultra-Calvinism all but obliterates 
it.  “Granton Star” is a postmodern, Calvinist morality play that has passed through a Kafkaesque 
looking-glass.  In it, Welsh turns on their heads the presumed nature of God and humans’ 
relationship with him.  Both stories confront humans’ inab lity to understand or control the 
secular and religious gods of their own making, their inability to identify generative instead of 
self-destructive virtues, and their inability to reconcile with themselves and with each other.  
These stories cannot be adequately understood without discussing the Reformed theology of, 
primarily, John Calvin and John Knox.  Admittedly, the tocratic bent of Calvinism in general 
and Scottish Calvinism in particular has overshadowed their radical democratic aspects; 
moreover, aspects of Calvinism have been appropriated by capitalism to rationalize the 
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neutralization of human autonomy and the liquidation of human life.  To help illuminate and 
chart a way beyond overwhelming Reformation evil and its readful impact on individuals and 
society, Francis Hutcheson and his concept of a “moral sense” will prove crucial to redeeming 
generative energies that emerged from the Reformation. 
Then, in chapter 4, “Enlightenment Thread:  Mapping Emergence,” the virtue to be 
arrived at is emergence.  I will enter a short story from The Acid House, “The Two 
Philosophers,” into a dialogue with a Robert Burns’s poem, “The Twa Dogs.”  The genre of the 
two tales is in the estate satire tradition, both tales employing the pilgrimage technique most 
famously used by the medieval English poet Geoffrey Chaucer in The Canterbury Tales.  
Seemingly anachronistic in both the modern and postmodern contexts, the pilgrimage estate 
satire is extremely timely.  The effects of unequal distributions of sociocultural power are as 
pressing, if not more so, than they were during the later Middle Ages, when the bourgeois classes 
were just emerging.  More importantly, Burns’s and Welsh’s tales bear directly on what occurred 
in the eighteenth century, the modern epistemological crisis.  They are deeply concerned with 
what has been and still is being passed off as reality in situations dominated by truly disturbing 
historical-material forces.  As a consequence, they sek alternative probabilities.  Because 
empirically knowing the difference between what is probable or not probable is a major concern 
of this chapter, I will focus here on the epistemological aspect of logos.  It is no coincidence, 
then, that David Hume’s epistemological and moral theories form the philosophical touchstone 
and problem of this chapter.  Welsh homes in on and liberates something that Hume had 
uncovered in his theories of knowledge but had progressively sidelined in his moral philosophy 
and personal life:  the best way to enable alternative probabilities is to take what is, produce 
anew with it, and then imaginatively build towards the alt rnative probabilities that emerge 
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during the process.  Welsh taps into this Humean good sensethat, remarkably, is also 
substantiated by recent cognitive science.  Accordingly, Gi les Fauconnier’s work in the area of 
mental mapping (or cognitive construction) will serve a vit l role in building toward the ethic 
that this study uncovers in Scotland by way of Welsh.    
In chapter 5, “Postmodern Loom:  Emerging through Forgiveness,” the virtue we will 
arrive at is forgiveness.  As far as genre goes, Marabou Stork Nightmares fits into one of the 
oldest literary traditions, the epic.  It will seem, therefore, that the study ends before where it 
started, particularly when I draw a line connecting an unmistakably postmodern novel to a 
literature that is even older than the Fenian literature discussed in chapter 2.  The protagonist of 
Nightmares, Roy Strang, is surprisingly evocative of the Ulster Cycle’s hero Cúchulainn and the 
ambiguous Gaelic goddess Morrígan.  However, when one takes into account that many of the 
Gaelic sagas and epics, such as the Ulster Cycle, were pr sumably written during periods of 
monumental historical-material and sociocultural upheaval, the connection is not fanciful.  We 
are in such a period ourselves.  The connections between Nightmares and tales about Cúchulainn 
are not just literarily analogical.  There are battles in both between a society based primarily on 
generation and one based primarily on destruction.  What will not be surprising, though, is which 
type of society has proved dominant.  Even after the Christian and the later socialist 
revolutions—or perhaps because of them—the progress of what is effectively an empire of death 
has gone almost unchecked.  To arrive at an alternative fu ure informed by forgiveness, the 
various threads that have been untangled and engaged in the preceding chapters will be brought 
together to weave a map towards an emergent postmodern Scotland.  This Scotland will open 
way for conceiving a global alternative probability.  Such a view reflects Marx’s conviction that 
the emancipation of one particular situation—Germany in Marx’s case, Scotland in ours—is the 
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emancipation of all people.26  A world built on that conviction could be one that countervails the 
empire of late capitalism.  Such a world would be a world after Scotland, after Colombia, after 
Vietnam, after Algeria, and so on. 
Finally, in an afterword, I will re-ground this whole project in recent political events that 
have occurred in Scotland and the rest of Britain, and in my personal rationale for taking on this 
topic.
                                               
26 Marx, Early Writings 257. 
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Chapter 2 
Medieval Thread:  Outlaw Congregation 
The past is all forgotten now 
This is a young, modern land 
Fit for zeros 
     
      —The Proclaimers27 
 
“. . . and the friendship that you have not found up to now, y u shall now have.” 
 
      —Acallam na Senórach28 
 
Alan Johnson-Hogg replies over the phone to Spud, “this is a badly written celebration of 
yob culture and of people who haven’t achieved anything notewor hy in the local community.”29  
Johnson-Hogg is the director of a major Scottish publishing firm, Scotvar Publishing Ltd., who 
unexpectedly receives a call about a form-letter rejection he had sent to Spud.  The manuscript 
rejected:  Daniel “Spud” Murphy’s history of post-1920 Leith, “a history ay Leith fae the merger 
[with Edinburgh] tae the present,” as told by the people of Leith themselves, “the real 
characters” (Porno 147, 260).  The method of writing such a history:  “Start oaf in 1920, n 
maybe go back a bit, then forward again, like aw they fitba-player biographies” (Porno 147).  
The first reason for writing such a history:  “Leith wis sucked intae Edinburgh against the 
people’s will.  That was when aw the problems pure started, man!  Four-tae-one against, man, 
four-tae-one against” (Porno 185).  The second reason:  “Aw that info, aw that history, even if 
it’s selectively written by the top cats tae tell their tales. . . .  But ah reckon thit thir’s other 
stories thit kin be teased oot” (Porno 257).  The ultimate reason for writing the history:  “Yuv 
goat the Scottish Office at one end and yuv goat the new Parliament at the other.  
Embourgeoisement, man, that’s what the intellectual cats c ll it.  Ten years’ time, there’ll be nae 
                                               
27 Craig Reid and Charlie Reid, “A Land Fit for Zeros,” performed by The Proclaimers, Persevere 
(Nettwerk America 2001). 
28 The Tales of the Elders of Ireland (Acallam na Senórach), trans. Ann Dooley and Harry Roe (Oxford, 
UK:  Oxford UP, 1999) 172.  Henceforth, I will refer to this text as Acallam. 
29 Welsh, Porno (New York:  Norton, 2002) p. 380. 
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gadges like me n you [Begbie] left doon here. . . .  They want us aw oot in schemes oan the edge 
ay toon, Franco, ah’m telling ye, man” (Porno 261).  As nonplussed as Johnson-Hogg is by 
actually receiving a phone call from a rejected writer—a taboo which all professional 
intellectuals obediently do not violate—Spud is shocked by the crass insincerity of the rejection 
letter after he has contacted the undeniably pro-establishment Tory operative or New Labour 
hack or kailyard Scottish Nationalist (all amounting to the same).  He throws his manuscript into 
the fireplace, watching that “wee part ay ma life go up in smoke like the rest ay it” (Porno 380). 
It is difficult to pick just one reason for why Spud’s book is rejected, at least according to 
the established publishing standards of our time.  Let us, neverth less, begin with style.  Spud’s 
stated method of historical narrative is to start off from a specific historical point “n maybe go 
back a bit, then forward again.”  This indicates a more elliptical than linear approach to narrative.  
Spud demonstrates his awareness that a point in the past is not he past, and in order for a point 
in time to be historically meaningful at all, one must show from what contextual materials and 
energies it emerged.  In effect, the genealogy of a particular historical event must be charted 
before the import of that moment may be recognized, as W lter Benjamin illustrated in his 
monumental, incomplete project on the arcades of Paris.30  Moreover, all that proceeds from a 
particular historical moment certainly affirms and transforms the significance of that moment, 
which is never totally finished or absorbed.  Like Peter Pan’s shadow, the past lives on in the 
present and future, even if that past is an ambiguous one.  The type of narrative that Spud will 
write, therefore, will be a helix whose spirals will emerge from a common point (Figure 2.1), 
never losing their bond with it. And to complicate things further, such a narrative will constantly 
                                               
30 Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, rans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap, 1999). 
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draw connections between the spiral that leads to the central historical moment and the one that 
proceeds from it (Figure 2.2).  Thus, Spud’s history will be a living constellation. 
 
     
 
 
Figure 2.1     Figure 2.2 
Most popular and academic publishers would reject outright a historical manuscript written in 
such a way.  It would be accused of lacking focus, coherenc , li earity, readability, and so forth.  
But Spud would never think of writing his history any other way; he probably could not.  His 
history of Leith is not so much a history of or about Leith; it is a living Leith given back to itself 
in all its richness and complexity.   
There is another intricacy involved in Spud’s historiography.  Whereas most historians 
write to summarize, elucidate, or formalize for posterity the actions and events that have affected 
a certain group of people or people in general, Spud tries to write into life humans who have 
practically been erased by history:  in historical practice, they have been subordinated, and for 
the sake of narrative practicality, they have been muted.  To write such a life means to 
effectively write in a different language, the language of the “the real characters,” the “no ones.”  
Therefore, the narrative methodology of Spud’s project alone is equivalent to rupturing 
established narrative with its own submerged materials.   
Therefore, how could Spud’s rejection be anything but inevitable? 
Fortunately, Welsh has overcome rejection, and the phenom al success of his novel 
Trainspotting, along with the success of its movie adaptation, has secured him relatively safe 
passage in the publishing world.  And because he submits his work as fiction, he does not have to 
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abide by the standards confronting historians.  Hence, Welsh ha  found a way to do what Spud is 
not allowed to do by Johnson-Hogg:  to tell the history of the no ones by sneaking it into fiction.  
Welsh not only knows “thit thir’s other stories thit kin be teased oot”; he knows how to weave 
those stories together and deliver them.    
However, he is not just any kind of storyteller.  He has a very serious agenda.  We 
already know what it is because it is the same as Spud’s.  One key difference is that Welsh 
attempts to do for all of Scotland and all human beings what Spud attempts and fails to do for 
Leith.  Like Spud, Welsh chooses Leith and Edinburgh as his tarting point and construction 
yard, but Welsh’s scope is global.  If we look at what connects Trainspotting, Glue, and Porno, 
we might understand why Welsh cannot restrict his vision for Scotland, even though his works 
are certainly Scottish in origin. 
The three trainspotting novels, as I will call them, are connected by the characters’ 
collective, overwhelming sense of not belonging anywhere.  This sense culminates in the general 
impression that Scotland is a non-place.  Technically, home for the trainspotters of Trainspotting 
and Porno is, as Spud’s manuscript attests, Leith.  Nevertheless, Spud’s attempt to bring this 
place to historical life negatively indicates that Leith is nonexistent to most people outside of it.  
Historically, the life of Leith was virtually evacuated from it when “Leith wis sucked intae 
Edinburgh against the people’s will.”  Any life that now exists in the non-place of Leith is being 
pushed “aw oot in schemes oan the edge ay toon.”  The same goes for the hooligans in Glue, 
who hail from the schemes of Edinburgh, not the glorious Edinburgh to which academics and 
festival-goers typically flock.  Widening the scope, Mark “Rents” Renton concludes that the 
Scotland that he and the others inhabit is “a place fill ay nosey cunts who willnae mind their ain 
business.  A place ay dispossessed white trash in a trash country fill ay dispossessed white trash.  
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Some say that the Irish are the trash ay Europe.  That’s shite.  It’s the Scots.  The Irish hud the 
bottle tae win thir country back, or at least maist ay it” (Trainspotting 190).  He goes even further 
when he angrily responds to Tommy’s kailyard nationalism in the film adaptation of 
Trainspotting:   
I hate being Scottish.  We’re the lowest of the fucking low, the scum of the earth, 
the most wretched, servile, miserable, pathetic trash that was ever shat into 
civilization.  Some people hate the English, but I don’t.  They’re just wankers.  
We, on the other hand, are colonized by wankers.  We can’t even pick a decent 
culture to be colonized by.  We are ruled by effete arseholes.  It’s a shite state of 
affairs and all the fresh air in the world will not make any fucking difference.31 
The message in all cases is that Scotland does not exist, at least not a viable Scotland.   
Scotland’s peripheries, therefore, are windows through which to ascertain the whole 
Scottish situation.  By way of the peripheral narrative windows that Welsh gives us, he indicates 
that there is certainly a historical terrain on which Scots exist, but its topography is inconclusive.  
Welsh resists even negatively affirming Scotland as a nation-state, as a unified sociocultural 
entity, or even as an “imagined community,” to use Benedict Anderson’s famous term.  Welsh 
illustrates that Scotland is a non-place.  Coincidentally, it is not surprising that Welsh would 
couch his characters in the schemes of Leith and Edinburgh, non-places within a non-place 
called Scotland:  non-places of dispossessed no ones in a no -place full of dispossessed no 
ones.32 
                                               
31 John Hodge, Trainspotting (New York:  Hyperion 1996) p. 46. 
32 The architect and theorist Paul Virilio has theorized such absent or emptied spaces in his work.  See, for 
example, Paul Virilio, The Aesthetics of Disappearance (Cambridge, Mass.:  MIT P, 1991); Lost Dimension 
(Cambridge, Mass.:  MIT P, 1991); and Open Sky (London:  Verso, 1997).  
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Scotland’s historical-material status over at least the last half-dozen centuries begs the 
question about its national existence in terms that modern p rceptions might recognize.  
Arguably because Scotland has never actually recognized itself as an actual, homogenous, and 
autonomous historical reality, Scotland has proved so susceptible to being reduced to a catalogue 
of kailyard nationalist fetishes—i.e. a fantastic place of fresh air, craggy vistas, kilted parades of 
noble-savage Highlanders, heaven-taught Lowland ploughmen, single malt whisky, and golden 
oatmeal—or of being abstracted to the level of a neolibera utopia—i.e. Edinburgh-land as a 
source of modern Western Civilization’s triumph over Dak Age barbarism. 
 Welsh is most certainly not a kailyard nationalist or Edinburgh-land neoliberal.  In his 
work, Welsh refuses to employ the essentialist identity politics and neoliberal truisms that have 
done more to subordinate Scotland than anything else.  National identity and bourgeois ideology 
are abstractions that have excluded the majority of Scots, “the real characters.”  These 
abstractions are occlusive master-narratives “selectively written by the top cats tae tell their 
tales,” not generative narrative sites in which to engage the actual “shite state of affairs.”  Welsh 
refuses to follow the lead of the “fuckin parasite politician[s] that ever stood up and mouthed lies 
and fascist platitudes in a suit and a smarmy smile” (Trainspotting 228).  In fact, one could easily 
argue that he is extremely concerned about the present and future of Scotland—not as an ideal 
place, but as a vital, empowered terrain of no ones which can connect to and cooperate with 
other domains of no ones.    
Even though Welsh practically documents Scotland’s status as a non-place, and even 
though he does not buy into either reduction of Scotland, Welsh is not anti-Scottish.  Some of the 
few commentaries on Welsh mistakenly claim that he is because they get too distracted by 
Renton’s authoritative tone, forgetting that Renton is perhaps the least trustworthy of all Welsh’s 
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characters, including Simon “Sick Boy” Williamson.33  Renton is undoubtedly a fantastic 
diagnostician of the current “state of affairs,” but his jadedness, lack of compassion, and inability 
to commit to anything or anyone, including himself, undercuts his ability to produce anything 
like hopeful alternatives.  Renton is probably anti-Scottish; however, this would be so mainly 
because he hates himself and, as a result, feels disconnected from anything or anyone outside of 
himself.  Welsh, however, is not Renton, and again, he is not anti-Scottish.  If Welsh were anti-
Scottish, he would contradict his whole objective:  to locate a vibrant Scotland and map it out.  
Perhaps it is best to think of Welsh as a writer who has an “outlaw” understanding of Scotland.  
From the margins, he observes what Scotland could be beneath th  bad sense that has 
overwhelmed it.   
Welsh does not assume that there is a healthy preexisting community to which Scotland’s 
dispossessed may simply return:  a primal, ethnic, or national Ur-state.  “But we can never have 
what we had,” Carl “N-Sign” Ewart tells himself, “it’s all gone:  the innocence, the lager, the 
pills, the flags, the travel, the scheme . . . it’s all so far away from me.”34  Through the mouths of 
practically all his characters, Welsh indicates that e abstractions of self, home, community, and 
nation condemn humans to creating for themselves “a smokescreen of bullshit and baubles” 
(Glue 463).  Nevertheless, Welsh explicitly or implicitly returns to the idea that amidst all the 
injustice, bullshit, and death, “something [hangs] in the air between [us].  There [is] just 
something, some kind of second chance” (Glue 455).  Amidst all the chaos that Welsh discloses 
in his books, he illustrates how a new history and life—a living biography—is realizable through 
congregating apparently disparate materials and energies within an undoubtedly bleak context, 
such as a Scotland, on the margins of postmodern capitalism’s empire.  He does not just sense an 
                                               
33 See, for example, Grant Farred, “Wankerdom: Trainspotting As a Rejection of the Postcolonial?” South 
Atlantic Quarterly 103.1 (2004):  215-26. 
34 Welsh, Glue (New York:  Norton, 2001) p. 418. 
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alternative world, existing somewhere in the genes or in the ether; indeed, he recognizes it as 
existing within Scotland’s historical-material fabric.35  This alternative, though, is deeply 
submerged, and the representatives of it are elusive because they live on the margins. 
In this chapter, therefore, we will hypothesize that Welsh is, in fact, put in the position of 
creating a prehistory for Scotland from which he can thenbuild towards an alternative Scottish 
history.  To build this hypothesis, we will first look at what sorts of stories Spud fails to have 
published, which are the sorts of stories that Welsh does tell in his three interrelated trainspotting 
novels.  Then, we will look at the literary tradition and epistemological category within which 
Welsh is arguably working.  That will enable us to uncover affinities which Welsh’s Scots have 
with specific marginal groups of medieval Scots.  As a consequence of our hypothesizing and 
analysis, we will arrive at the virtue of congregation. 
2.1  First Medieval Strand:  Outlaw Tales 
The following synopses of Welsh’s trainspotting books might give an indication of what 
Spud’s history recounted before being burned. 
Mark “Rents” Renton went through school, and he did well.  He went through a trade 
apprenticeship, but mass unemployment made that an absurdity.  So, he went to Aberdeen 
University for a couple of terms, majoring in history.  He could have done well, but he detested 
the culture of deception that it represented:  a middle-class culture of spiritual anemia masked by 
physical appearances, of lies veiled as truths, and of sadomasochism veiled as Civil Society.  
Then, when we actually meet Renton in Trainspotting, he has turned to heroin, “smack,” because 
it is “an honest drug, because it strips away these delusions. . . .  It doesnae alter yir 
                                               
35 This is a Benjaminian position which Joseph Mali masterfully elucidates:  “Benjamin conceived of origin 
(Usprung) in genealogical rather than in biological terms, contending that it was not to be found in the moment of 
intuition but rather in that of recognition” (“The Reconciliation of Myth: Benjamin's Homage to Bachofen” Journal 
of the History of Ideas 60.1 [1999]: pp. 165-6). 
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consciousness.  It just gies ye a hit and a sense ay well-being.  Eftir that, ye see the misery ay the 
world as it is, and ye cannae anaesthetise yirsel against it” (Trainspotting 90).  
But the world of delusions, the middle-class world, is dominant, and Renton cannot fend 
it off, perhaps because of his drug addiction.  He makes a few attempts to go clean, to be a 
contributing member of society.  The first time that he attempts to go clean, he takes methadone 
for awhile, but then he squanders the detoxification drug by abusing it.  He makes a visit to 
Mother Superior, a major Edinburgh narcotics guru, to break his heroin fast.  Renton takes a bad 
hit, and he ends up in the infirmary.  As a result, his parents place him under house arrest so that 
he can make a clean break.  This is the turning point for Renton, which has dramatic impact on 
him and his ragtag collection of friends:  most notably, Spud, Simon “Sick Boy” Williamson, 
and Francis “Franco” Begbie—a saintly junky, a sadistic con artist, and a raging psychotic, 
respectively.  The world that Renton detests has broken him, and it has done so through the very 
people it has subjugated:  his working-class parents, his hapless friends, and the destitute scheme 
culture as a whole.   
Despite the bold declaration he makes midway through Welsh’s first novel—“Well, ah 
choose no tae choose life,” as in the “life” prescribed y capitalist bourgeois-liberal Western 
society (Trainspotting 188)—he hatches a plot, within a drug plot hatched by Sick Boy, to make 
his escape from the Scottish lumpenproletariat.  He steals thousands of pounds that he, Second 
Prize, Spud, Sick Boy, and Begbie make off a major drug deal. Renton abandons his comrades, 
slipping off to Amsterdam, the Netherlands.  They go to prison, flee to London, or fall back into 
the government housing-schemes of Leith, on the outer edge of Edinburgh.  After Renton crosses 
the North Sea, we discover in Porno that he owns and runs a lucrative discotheque.  Again, 
despite his bold declaration, he does choose the life of “societal reward . . . sustained by the 
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socially-supported condoning of wealth, power, status, etc.”(Trainspotting 186).  Thus, he 
presumes, that free from his friends “for good, he could be what he wanted to be.  He’d stand or 
fall alone” (Trainspotting 344). 
 Things do not go much better throughout most of Glue, which is a tragicomic love story.  
A core group of four childhood friends grow away from each other—Carl Ewart, “Juice” Terry 
Lawson, Billy Birrell, and Andy “Gally” Galloway.  This dissolution occurs, as it does in 
Trainspotting, because of betrayal.  Except here, the betrayals tht accumulate for a span of 
nearly thirty years are rarely intentional or terminal, just recurring.  Whereas Terry, Billy, and 
Gally take for granted a lumpenproletariat code of posse comitatus among Scotland’s 
dispossessed, Carl figures that abiding by strict alliances to his childhood friends imprisons him 
and them.  He decides that their affiliation perpetuates th  cycle of self-destruction which a 
foundationless postmodern world is more than willing to accommodate.  Ironically, to achieve 
his dream—to be a world-renowned rave DJ—he will have to abandon what amounts to a pre-
modern existence in Edinburgh and delve into the very heart of the postmodern world that feeds 
off the perpetual self-destruction of people like him and his mates.   
Deeply intimate, loyal relationships are a hindrance to success in the age of late capital, 
but they are also what can keep humans from becoming totally groundless.  Nevertheless, in 
Carl’s mind, he cannot continue to enable the egocentric sex addict and con artist, Juice Terry.  
He cannot continue to worry about the introverted boxer, Billy, who lives under his older 
brother’s and organized crime’s shadow.  And Gally is too harsh a check on reality:  he is the 
embodiment of working-class Scotland’s social, cultural, and economic decay; consequently, he 
is the embodiment of psychological and sociological anomie.  A life of petty crime, alcoholism, 
soccer hooliganism, and psychological denial has contributed to their all being dominated by 
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what Juice Terry calls “the grey,” which consists of the “scheme, the government employment 
scheme, the dole office, the factory, the jail” (Glue 456).   Carl must escape this abject situation 
and his comrades so that he may make a lucrative career out of staging escapist pseudo-events at 
nightclubs—weaving hypnotic beats, cascading sounds, digitally hybridized recordings, and 
entrancing light effects.   
However, as the disjointed series of episodes in Glueprogresses, something almost 
imperceptible happens.  Even after moving to New South Wales, Australia, Carl cannot escape, 
and he ultimately does not want to.  Carl is, in fact, no  the primary gravitational force in his 
world.  He realizes that his future as a human individual, not to mention as an artist, is 
impossible without Terry, Billy, the memory of Gally, as well as the adoration of his parents and 
the socialist-Presbyterian ethic they represent.36  Carl returns to Edinburgh as a result of this 
realization.  Upon the little tribe’s reunion, the former street scruffs not only save a dried-up pop 
star’s musical career; the friends of thirty years reaffirm their bond by reckoning with personal 
and sociocultural ghosts, even though this puts them back on the margins of postmodern success.  
Learning from their friend Gally, who “apprenticed [them] all to loss” and who died because he 
could not love “himself as much as he loved the rest of the world,” the three remaining friends 
ultimately try to love each other and the world as much as they loved themselves (Glue 418). 
 So, what happens when we meet the schemies of Trainspotting and Glue in the early 
twenty-first century—who are now more or less off hard narcotics, who are now in their thirties 
and forties, and who want to make a legitimate mark on the world?  Porno.  One could use Sick 
Boy’s words to understand the surface narrative of Welsh’s fifth novel:  “an erotic tease, but with 
extended hard-core fuck scenes . . . inserted into it” (Porno 90).  The book is a “tease” because it 
plays on its readers’ expectations; likewise, the “fuck s enes” have more to do with readers being 
                                               
36 Welsh, interview. 
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confounded than with sexual arousal.  Welsh practically carries out a social experiment, 
exploring what happens when people like Renton, Sick Boy, and Juice Terry enter the middle-
class world.  The fantasies that are enabled by owning a discotheque, running a bar, prostituting 
in a massage parlor, and making B-grade pornography videos will not prove at all exotic against 
bourgeois norms:  a little money to put away, a chance to travel, funds for college tuition, 
gaining notoriety amongst peers, and power.   
After returning from years in London following the drug plot in Trainspotting, Sick Boy 
decides to enter the mainstream by buying an Edinburgh bar and run ing a porno film business 
on the side.  His business scheme and the narrative plot of P rno are mirror images of 
Trainspotting’s.  As was the case with its predecessor, Welsh employs a well-worn story along 
the lines of Chaucer’s The Pardoner’s Tale in order to ironically disclose a deep set of serious 
problems.  When individuals are reduced to and segregated by their private desires and faults, 
they are destructive.  They become mutually destructive and, therefore, self-destructive.  
Since he betrayed and abandoned his mates in Tra spotting, Renton is certainly alone at 
the beginning of Porno, even though he has been successful as a club owner and has had a 
relatively “normal” domestic relationship with a German woman.  His solipsism has increased, 
though; consequently, he has become an almost obsessive traitor.  Spud is in worse shape than he 
was before—more drug-addled, more emotionally broken, and more needful of comradeship 
than ever.  He wants love, friendship, and truth, a combined desire which does more to alienate 
him from those around him as they pursue accumulation of power.  Sick Boy’s sadism has 
evolved into sociopathy.  The thrill of making the “next big deal” in one of his many self-
described schemes is no longer good enough.  An increase in others’ suffering must correlate 
with any increase in personal success.   Juice Terry has become a parody of himself:  no longer 
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Carl’s manager, he is literally reduced to a broken penis, the result of starring in Sick Boy’s 
films.  The already vicious, psychotic Begbie has become viol nce incarnate, hell-bent on 
exacting revenge against the traitorous Renton for a decade-long stint in prison after the drug 
deal in Trainspotting.  When Begbie is released, Sick Boy orchestrates a nearly fatal 
confrontation between the former soccer hooligan and his betrayer.  Nikki Fuller-Smith appears 
as Welsh’s first serious female character.  She hailsfrom the middle class that Renton, Sick Boy, 
and Juice Terry are trying to enter.  This in itself is important, for she demonstrates that being in 
the middle class is far from a cure for lower-class subordination.  To keep herself in university, 
she makes money on the side by giving handjobs to professinal men in a salon.  She is also 
bored:  hence her love affair with an abusive, risk-taking Sick Boy, her stint as a porn star in his 
films, and her ultimately betraying him by running off to America with Renton, all the porno 
money in tow.  All that Porno seems to prove is that humans cannot help but abuse and be 
abused. 
Despite the morose character of these novels, the basic plot of all of them seems simple 
enough:  a boy gets tired of his home and friends, leaves, nd returns somewhat wiser.  However, 
depending on a plot to understand Welsh’s books really leads nowhere.  The way a story is told 
is everything to Welsh, and he rarely takes a simple path.  Second only to the difficulty a non-
Scot might experience with the Lowland Scots language that permeates much of Welsh’s fiction 
will be the difficulty one might experience because of the dialectical interaction of many 
particular narrative strands.  In the case of the three trainspotting books, immediately apparent is 
the absence of a consistent spatiotemporal location and authoritative voice.  The reader is taken 
in and out of various narrative levels, which coincide with different states of consciousness and 
alternative spatiotemporal dimensions.   
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The movie Trainspotting is quick to stress this disjointedness.  It opens with a scene in 
which Renton (Ewan McGregor) dives into a pub toilet to re rieve a suppository, and the world 
he enters is an aquatic dreamscape.37  He reemerges from the toilet with suppository in hand  
then, soaking wet, exits the pub.  In view of this and many other instances in that movie and the 
novels, it would not be an exaggeration to link Welsh with the magical realism most commonly 
associated with Latin American writers.  Moreover, the reader, or movie spectator, hitches a ride 
with a given character, who might or might not be narrating his or her experiences and thoughts.  
Then, once a reader has become accustomed to one character or narrator, he or she will probably 
experience what linguists call a “rough referential shift,” as another character or narrator abruptly 
enters into focus.   
The books’ section and chapter titles imply some sort of coherence, but they also signal 
the disjointed situation that the novels uncover.  For example, in Trainspotting we may discern 
some sort of historical progression from the section titles:  “Kicking,” “Relapsing,” “Kicking 
Again,” “Blowing It,” “Exile,” “Home,” and “Exit.”  Within most sections, however, we are 
confronted with a virtual cacophony of chapters, which are formally and conceptually different.  
“Exile,” for instance, is composed of the chapters “London Crawling,” “Bad Blood,” “There Is a 
Light that Never Goes Out,” “Feeling Free,” and “The Elusive Mr. Hunt.”  Renton narrates 
“London Crawling,” which covers what he experiences and the observations he makes during 
one of his escapes to London.  Renton narrates differently at different times in the trainspotting 
books.  In this instance, he employs a thick Scots dialect nd adopts the posture of a decidedly 
streetwise Scottish junky and hooligan.  Elsewhere, he adopts a more measured, middle-class, 
and generally British tone.  “Bad Blood” seems completely unrelated to the rest of the chapter 
                                               
37 Trainspotting, dir. Danny Boyle, perf. Ewan McGregor, Ewen Bremner, Kevin McKidd, Jonny Lee 
Miller, and Robert Carlyle, Miramax, 1996. 
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and novel.  It is narrated from the perspective of Davie Mitchell, a character not directly 
connected to the trainspotters.  He is HIV positive and plots revenge on the man who gave him 
AIDS by raping Mitchell’s girlfriend.  Both “There Is a Light that Never Goes Out” and “Feeling 
Free” are set in the same pub on the same night, but they seem unrelated because of their 
differing narrative perspectives.  Like a movie camera, the omniscient narrator of “There Is a 
Light” moves from observing at a distance a pub and pub culture to going deep into the activities 
and conversations within.  And for a rare moment, we see Spud, Begbie, and Renton together as 
a group, as if in a snapshot photograph.  Spud narrates “Feeling Free.”  This story is consistent 
with Spud’s rhetoric in most of his other stories:  a blend of self-deprecating internal monologue, 
gregarious banter, elegy, psychological analysis, social commentary, and negotiation.  Finally, in 
“The Elusive Mr. Hunt,” which takes place in another pub at a different time, an omniscient 
narrator serves as a vehicle for an old bar joke:  a double entendre based on a phone call to a 
bartender who subsequently calls out to someone with a sexu lized name, “Mark Hunt” (“more 
cunt”) in this case.  But despite the comic relief, the narrator permits us to observe one of the few 
instances in which Renton is forced to move out of his egocentrism to acknowledge the feelings 
of others.  
Moreover, the stories are meaningless without sociocultural context.  Welsh takes us into 
the underworld of Edinburgh’s schemes, and we follow the characters as they trek around Britain 
and the globe during what many would characterize as a keyperiod of cultural and economic 
transition in global, as well as Scottish, postmodern history—the 1970s to present.38  The rave 
culture emerging during the early 1980s of Trainspotting becomes dominant, along with its drugs 
of choice, heroin and ecstasy.  Discotheques and super-heroic DJs come to replace concert arenas 
                                               
38 This is of course a simplification of complex economic history.  See, for instance, Giovanni Arrighi, The 
Long Twentieth Century (London:  Verso, 1994); and Robert Brenner, The Boom and the Bubble (London:  Verso, 
2002). 
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and larger than life punk rockers.  The dysfunctional Scotland under Margaret Thatcher’s neo-
imperial United Kingdom becomes the slightly devolved, dysfunctional Scotland under Tony 
Blair’s neoliberal, US-controlled Britain.  The government social projects, such as public 
housing developments (schemes), that came about during and following the World Wars have 
disintegrated, displacing further the working and lower classes and the communities that they 
had developed.  With the passage of a little over three decades, the claustrophobic tinge that 
consumes the trainspotters and hooligans wherever they go begins to disperse, and by the end of 
Porno, seeping in is the recognition that globalization is a euphemism for the global 
dispossession of the working class and lumpenproletariat.  But along with this recognition is 
anticipation—that, to borrow from Welsh’s epigram by Nietzsche, a festival may emerge from 
the cruelty.39 
It is the preceding recognition that will help us to better understand how Welsh tells these 
tales and why he tells them the way that he does.  The task that Welsh has set before himself, 
therefore, is to artistically break the hegemony of the general anti-social and, thus, anti-human 
terrain of “nastiness,” as Spud calls it:   “ma nastiness is like a kind ay passive nastiness, a sortay 
nastiness by omission, by no daein anything cause ah dinnae really care aboot anyone strongly 
enough tae sortay intervene” (Porno 284).  This terrain of nastiness is a virtual burial ground for 
Scotland and human life in general.  Welsh’s trainspotters and hooligans fuel this nastiness by 
their self-destructiveness and lack of concern for thei fellow dispossessed.  Welsh, however, is 
not interested in just laying out the terrain of nastiness and indefinitely chastising his characters.  
That terrain, along with the people on it, is the place from which to begin.  Instead of abandoning 
Scotland because it is a site of defeat, betrayal, subordination, and alienation, Welsh turns to a 
                                               
39 The epigraph from Friedrich Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals that prefaces Porno reads, “Without 
cruelty, there is no festival. . . ” (ix). 
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seemingly hopeless Scottish situation so that he may discover the alternative potential—the good 
sense—buried under the nastiness. 
  Superficially, Porno obliterates whatever reconciliation could have occurred after 
Trainspotting and whatever hope could be emerging in the last chapters of Glue.  Superficially, 
the third trainspotting book is a farce with a comic ending; n actuality, it is a tragedy of the 
deepest, most classical proportions.  One could conclude, therefore, that taken together, all three 
novels are an open and shut case on betrayal and failure.  We should be suspicious of such a 
conclusion, though.  Using unorthodox narrative techniques, W lsh is after something else:  a 
world where “real choice” overwhelms “consumer choice,” where injustice is not obscured by 
society but eradicated by it, where “all you need tae dae in life” is to just “be yourself” (Glue 
386, 462-63, 367).  However, when one is a working-class heroin addict, thief, football hooligan, 
con artist, or idealist, a world in which one can “be yourself” would certainly be a world beyond 
most people’s comprehension.  The dispossessed already do not exist in the mainstream mind.  
Moreover, if we just look at what is explicitly present d in the novels—frenetic tales recounting 
the half-baked schemes and total failures of delinquents, misfits, and the lumpenproletariat in 
general—then we will miss what Welsh is envisioning through his tales:  an alternative world 
that bubbles up in the gaps and on the fringes of what seems to be a hopeless situation peopled 
by hapless and worthless individuals.  What would such an altern tive world look like? 
Such a world will, to the post-Enlightenment mind, seem to exist in a dream, nightmare, 
fairyland, or myth.  As Carl and other Welshian characters understand, though, making any 
alternative “unnatural” or “unrealistic” is exactly how a dominant society maintains its 
superiority.  We can safely assume, therefore, that Welsh understands that there “is no document 
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of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.”40  The true barbarism:  
civilization silencing all opposition to itself.  Dominat society shuts out alternatives by dropping 
a veil between so-called fact and so-called fantasy, by “setting up a smokescreen.”  This 
segregation of knowledge reflects a deeper process of alienation:  the segregation of being into 
useful being (practical, civilized) and un-useful being (impractical, barbaric).  This divorce at the 
very root of human life opens the way for all kinds of divisions, which Welsh’s trainspotters and 
hooligans certainly demonstrate.  The world can be broken into ever-increasing fragments.  On 
the one hand, bonds between thought and action, dream and re lity, self and other can be 
dismissed as superstition, naïveté, or idealism.  On the other hand, as capitalism has sublimated 
its exploitation, these bonds have been made so elusiv  that they become siren songs luring 
humans further away from engaging directly in cooperative, autonomous historical-material 
production.41  Therefore, an alternative world where these bonds are the rule and not the 
exception—where “being yourself” is not something you might attain only through ard work 
but is the foundation, means, and end of the whole world—will seem mythological.   
As Welsh reminds us time and again throughout his work, and as Marx asserted almost 
two-hundred years before Welsh, the duplicity of this process is astounding.  The so-called real 
world of bourgeois capital founded itself on making unreal the bonds between human practice 
and thought, human society and the human individual, and human power and what that power 
can produce.  Nevertheless, this duplicity—this bad sense—dominates modern and now 
postmodern common sense.  So, we cannot help but proceed under the mythological label.   
What we can do, though, is assert a very specific understanding of the mythological, a 
historical-material understanding.  We will operate under th  notion that mythos is original, 
                                               
40 Benjamin, Illuminations:  Essays and Reflections, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: 
Schocken, 1968) p. 256. 
41 Marx, Early Writings 378. 
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evocative, and metaphorical knowledge that attests to a historical-material world that might be 
shrouded but is not totally engulfed by “a squalid stink of low expectation which could choke the 
life out of you if you let it” (Glue 456). 42  Unlike essentialist mythologies that grew to 
dominance from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, historical-material mythology is not 
interested in retroactively predetermining a biological legacy for the sake of domination.  
Instead, it is committed to teasing out how materials and energies have been used, unused, or 
abused in the past and, consequently, how those materials and energies might be used to produce 
a vibrant future based on something other than alienation and domination.  In effect, a historical-
material mythos is not so much a settled category of knowledge as it is an epistemological space 
in which people may construct, in the present, a prehistory in which to ground, in the present, an 
alternative future.  As a consequence of historical-material mythos opening up a living history, 
human engagement in historical production is reopened instead of alienated.   
The presence of such a mythos is certainly reflected in Welsh’s work.  Welsh is not 
interested in maintaining preexisting mythologies, “these trivial things, they petty jealousies” 
(Trainspotting 190).  He is interested in unlocking their emergent materials and energies in order 
to work towards a world where we have learned “tae love oorsels” and are “drawn by a greater 
need, the need to belong to each other, to hold on to whatever force has fused” us (Trainspotting 
272, 263).  
                                               
42  In Illuminations, Benjamin observes that in modernity’s rational historicism there is the tendency to 
content “itself with establishing causal connection betwe n various moments in history.  But no fact that is  cause is 
for that very reason historical [i.e. “real”].  It became historical posthumously, as it were, through events tha  may be 
separated from it by thousands of years”; alternatively, the historical-materialist parts ways with this official 
historicism and “stops telling the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary.  Instead, he grasps the constellation 
which his own era has formed with a definite earlier one.  Thus he establishes a conception of the present as the
‘time of the now’ which is shot through with chips of Messianic time” (263).  If history is recognized as living—
“filled with the presence of the now” (261)—then it will probably seem unreal and, therefore, mythological because 
it defies the bourgeois-liberal conceptions of normalcy nd progress.   
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By employing mythos in such a way, Welsh effectively sets out to open up a truly 
“medieval” space.43  I am not referring now to the historical medieval, as in the Middle Ages.  
We will get to that soon enough.  Instead, as I did with “eics” in the Introduction, I am 
returning to an etymological meaning of the term “medieval”—“mid-age/period/phase”—and 
linking it to mythos in order to reawaken the emergent and generative aspects of both “medieval” 
and “mythos.”  Such a space is not unlike the “thin places” of Celtic pre-Christian myth and 
Celtic Christian spirituality, in which one can glimpse another world that exists in the midst of 
this world, a place in the middle of another.   
Is Welsh alone in trying to work in such liminal, marginal locale with the materials and 
energies that dominant society has cast off?  No.  In fact, he is in league with a very old literary 
tradition, which is native to both Ireland and Scotland by wa of the Gaels. 
2.2 Second Medieval Strand:  Fenian Scéalta44 
Welsh does not exaggerate when he aligns his writing with a “kind of Celtic, storytelling 
tradition,” in which “everybody [is] a storyteller.”45  Closer evaluation of the trainspotting books 
within a Scottish context reveals that far from being avant garde, as it were, Welsh works 
squarely within an ancient, still active, though critically overlooked literary tradition native to 
Ireland and Scotland:  Fenian storytelling.46  Fenian literature is by nature an amalgamation of 
oral and literary history, legend, wonder tale, and elegy concerned with the life of a marginal 
                                               
43 By positing such an emergent and generative connotation of “medieval,” and by claiming that Welsh 
opens up a “medieval” space, I have discovered that Welsh’s work is in line with Benjamin’s description of one who 
practices “materialistic historiography”:  such a person operates according to a “constructive principle,” taking “a 
revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past.  He takes cognizance of it in order to blast a specific era out 
of the homogeneous course of history” (Illuminations 263). 
44 The word scéalta is Gaelic for “tales.” 
45 Welsh, interview. 
46 See Joseph Falaky Nagy, The Wisdom of the Outlaw:  The Boyhood Deeds of Finn in Gaelic Narrative 
Tradition (Berkeley:  U of California P, 1985) pp. 7, 57.   
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constituency antagonistically linked to the dominant sociocultural centers of Gaeldom.47  Even 
the most comprehensive embodiment of Fenian narrative, the twelfth-century Acallam, is “a 
loosely framed anthology of Fenian stories, poems, and trivia,” a “potpourri.”48  Though 
interesting and rich, the Acallam is far from a smooth read if one approaches it according to 
modern narrative standards.  Multiple temporalities exist side by side, a situation which is 
accentuated by an ancient Fenian meeting and accompanying Saint Patr ck (c. 389-c. 461) 
hundreds of years after he should be dead.  Celtic mythology and Irish history interweave.  Pre-
Christian and Christian religious beliefs exist side by side as well; oftentimes, they intersect and 
illuminate each other.  Narrative perspectives are in perpetual flux.  The legendary Fenian poet 
Caílte is able to, through his incredible poetic abilities, bring the past into the present, thereby 
bringing Finn and other major Fenian figures to life.49  Alternatively, Patrick is virtually guided 
through the past to witness ancient events and meet legendary figures for himself.  
“‘May victory be yours, Caílte, with my blessing,’ said Patrick.  ‘You have lightened our 
spirits and our mind, even though our religious life is being disrupted and our prayers 
neglected.’”50  The Patrick who is so diplomatically chastising Caílte is none other than Saint 
Patrick of Ireland.  Caílte is none other than the leg ndary Fenian poet.  Approximately three 
hundred years after they should be dead, Caílte and Oisín,the son of the legendary Fenian Finn 
mac Cumaill, inexplicably emerge in fifth-century Ireland.  They are the last remaining Fenians.  
Their heroic powers significantly reduced, the two Fenians part ways.  Caílte comes across 
Patrick and his fellow monks.  From that point, the Acallam is a collection of tales about the 
“elders,” the heroic but liminal Fenians of pre-Christian times, that are told by Caílte at Patrick’s 
                                               
47 Nagy writes, “Cultural realities . . . are reflected in these tales in forms that may strike us, and may have
struck their original audiences, as fantastic” (13). 
48 Nagy 4. 
49 Ann Dooley and Harry Roe, Introduction, Acallam xvii-xxiii. 
50 Acallam 11. 
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request.  This all seems straightforward enough.  As noted, though, the truth of the matter is quite 
different.  The Fenian tradition is far from straightforward, and its subject, the Fenians 
themselves, is not an easy one to pin down. 
The very small passage from the Acallam quoted above is indicative of what kind of 
literary tradition and subject material we are confronting.  When Patrick says, “victory,” he could 
feasibly mean a few things.  As the official representative of Christianity, he may mean “glory,” 
as in “God’s glory.”  Because the Acallam was an attempt by the twelfth-century Irish church to 
subsume pre-Christian traditions under Christian hegemony, such a conclusion is appropriate.  
However, context is everything, and the context of the Acallam is dominated by Caílte 
recounting stories about pre-Christian battles, hunts, ad expeditions that occurred centuries 
before.  In view of that, Patrick may very well be giving Caílte and the Fenians his best wishes as 
they enter into those battles, hunts, and expeditions—for things that they have already done!   
Because of its polylogical and multi-temporal characteristics, an agenda deeper than pure 
entertainment is not evident when one first reads the Acallam.  Much the same could be said of 
Welsh’s work.  However, closer evaluation indicates that a very serious agenda is afoot.51  By 
literarily making synchronous the materials and energies of the prehistorical and historical past 
with those of the present, the writer of the tales “r leases the text and allows it to convey 
meanings of a more up-to-date kind.”52   One can aptly extend this understanding of Acallam’s 
style to argue that its writer is trying to convey meanings of a more prophetic kind.  Is the writer 
(more likely writers) of the Acallam unique in his or her methodology?  All indications are that 
                                               
51 Dooley and Roe xx. 
52 Dooley and Roe xxi. 
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the Acallam is far from an original form of Fenian literature, just a more comprehensive instance 
of it.53  
Indeed, the Fenian genre is a well-established genre and had been before and after Acallam’s 
inscription; nevertheless, it is a genre which, like its subject matter, is a liminal one that cannot 
be attributed to one “author” or to a specific “folk” within Gaelic history.54  Fenian literature is 
both extremely longstanding in duration and democratic in spirit.  Therefore, when we return to 
Welsh’s narrative method, as illustrated in his work and practically described by Spud, we can 
see that he is tied to a formal tradition in which “at any given point in its historical span or 
throughout that span, every story has something to say about every other story within the 
tradition . . . every story, in both a thematic and a structural sense, ‘flows into’ every other.”55  
Or as Spud might put it, every story starts off in one place, “n maybe [goes] back a bit, then 
forward again.”  
The stylistic aspects of the Fenian tradition allude to a profound sociocultural force in 
Gaeldom.  Let us return again to the above quote from the Acallam in order to uncover that force.  
Patrick follows his wish of good will to Caílte with this:  “‘You have lightened our spirits and 
our mind, even though our religious life is being disrupted and our prayers neglected.’”  Patrick’s 
statement is equivocal, to say the least.  On the one ha d, he is grateful for what Caílte has given 
to him and his fellow monks.  The poet has enriched their liv s with pre-Christian, prehistorical 
stories.  Nevertheless, almost out of guilt for enjoying the Fenian tales so much, Patrick points 
out to Caílte that he has disrupted the life of the official world, the hegemonic Christian world 
that the twelfth-century scribes were retroactively tescoping into the fifth century.  As isolated 
as this incident might seem, it is socioculturally momentous.  Christendom had not been as 
                                               
53 Nagy 4-7. 
54 Nagy 7. 
55 Nagy 15. 
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successful as it thought it had been in submerging alternative systems.  Moreover, this moment 
illustrates how the Fenians as a sociocultural force had always related to a dominant power. 
When Johnson-Hogg characterizes Spud’s history of Leith as “celebration of yob culture 
and of people who haven’t achieved anything noteworthy in the local community,” he could just 
as well have been describing the subject of Fenian literature nd society.  Fenian culture was yob 
culture among the ancient Irish and Scottish Gaels.  Composed of literal bastards, runaways, 
abused children, exiles, refugees, fugitives, misfits, and geeral outlaws, the fíana were what 
loosely translates into “war bands.”  However, “war b nds” is not a term that does adequate 
justice to what we should call “congregations of outlaws.”  Like Welsh’s trainspotters and 
hooligans, the fíana were by no means totally innocent outcasts; nevertheless, according to a rich 
folkloric tradition that exists to this day, as outlaws they were generally held to be marginalized 
members of society who had either become invisible within society, had been wronged by 
society, or both.  If “ye dinnae join in and tow the line,” Juice Terry observes, “yir a mug” (Glue 
200).  One can see the Fenian plight evident in the Scot J. M. Barrie’s Peter Pan stories, vis à vis 
the Lost Boys of Neverland, and in the Scottish nationl J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter stories, vis 
à vis the students at Hogwarts Academy.  Children who had been abandoned, abused, or 
ostracized entered into bands led by typically longtime, if not terminal, outcasts.   
To be a member of what the ancient Irish called a legitimate túath, or what the Scots 
called a clan, one had to have a clear genealogical relationship to a major family or chieftain.  
Only the most elite members of society could usually establi h such lineages, and according to 
ancient Irish law, lineages were only formalized upon becoming an “adult.”  Becoming an adult 
was synonymous with receiving one’s inheritance; this means that one had to have an inheritance 
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to receive in order to ever be considered a possible adult.56  So, for example, if one was not the 
first son in an elite family, if one was an illegitimate child in or out of the elite estates, if one was 
a daughter who bore a child out of rape or outside of a society-approved relationship, or if one 
was a member of the common majority who did not have an inheritance to inherit in the first 
place, then one was technically a fénnid, a Fenian.  In other words, practically everyone, barring 
a very few, were latent Fenians if they were not already active ones.  Not only were the 
chronological youths Fenians, as Finn mac Cumaill and his son Oisín can attest.  In fact, fíans 
(individual bands of Fenians) comprised a sociocultural limbo whose membership consisted of 
all those individuals wronged by society (typically chronologically, not legally, “adults”) and 
those people who had not transitioned or would never transi io  into adulthood (chronologically 
or legally “youths”).57   
The Fenian tradition of legend and mythology, therefore, a ose out of a very real 
historical phenomenon which arose out of the unequal distribution of sociocultural materials.  
Thus, historical Fenians were yobs who gave rise to the Fenian literary tradition, “a celebration 
of yob culture.”  The question now becomes whether or not this Fenian/yob phenomenon 
continued anywhere else outside of literature, as in the mor  concrete historical-material fabric of 
Scotland. 
2.3  Third Medieval Strand:  Historical Fenian Continuum? 
To accentuate further the importance of yob culture in Scotland’s fabric, it will help to 
expand our historical net—first to the secular and then to the ecclesiastical Scotland of the 
Middle Ages.  In medieval Scotland, there was a huge sector of Scottish society about which no 
historian has been able to uncover any substantial or unambiguous record.  Arguably, Scotland 
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has had a sizeable lumpenproletariat since at least the beginning of the Middle Ages:  its 
members were the “lowest of the fuckin low” in the peasant hierarchy, below husbandry workers 
and cottars, which is a good indication of where they were in the whole Scottish socioeconomic 
scheme of things.58  Images of some sort of Scottish pastoral and maritime utopia are the stuff of 
tourist brochures and Scottish National Party propaganda.  These people were more than likely 
serfs to servants, were migrant laborers, or were destitute and homeless.  If they had any 
affiliation at all, they might have had only the scarcest of clan affiliations, thus some form of 
social protection.  However, it is undeniable that the Scottish economy and social system could 
not have survived without them.59 
Enter the Highland caterans and Border reivers.  These wr  groups on both the northern 
and southern poles of Scotland who emerged from the unenviable social, economic, and 
geographical environment that Scotland presented to many of its inhabitants.  They are 
phenomena we can use to illustrate and historicize lumpenprol ta iat power in medieval 
Scotland.  This is not to say that all peasants—or even many—were directly associated with the 
caterans and reivers, just as the majority of today’s Scots are not heroin addicts, football 
hooligans, or porn actors.  But for us today, these two historical groups should be taken as 
symptoms of an underreported and sometimes romanticized force in Scotland’s biography.  They 
represent a Scottish multitude that is a substantial pregnant absence in official histories, not just 
“a bunch ay radges oot oan the piss” (Glue 229). 
What brings these two groups together as an indication of emergent force in the Scotland 
of the Middle Ages are their Fenian-like social structures, mores, and relation to dominant power 
                                               
58 See David Ditchburn and Alastair J. MacDonald, “Medieval Scotland, 1100-1560,” The New Penguin 
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centers in London, Edinburgh, and clan seats.  There is not much recorded about the caterans 
(ceatharn in Gaelic), barring most notably their involvement in a series of power grabs during 
the fourteenth century by one of the early Stewarts.  Alexander Stewart (1343-1405), the “Wolf 
of Badenoch,” “imposed himself on the Highlands and Islands” by depending almost completely 
on an “armed force of a most unruly and undisciplined kin .”60  The Stewart family, which was 
ascending at the time, was not closely connected to the clans in the areas that they were 
attempting to control because the Stewarts, along with some other ascending families, were 
Norman imports who began arriving under the auspices of David I (1124-53).  This observation 
points to why at least one Stewart depended on the caterans.  It also indicates that the Stewarts 
themselves had always effectively been outsiders within royal Scotland.61  There is another, 
deeper implication embedded in this area of medieval Scotland’s historical terrain:  while the 
Stewarts were not integral members of the Highland elites, th  mercenary groups that fought for 
them represented a powerful though incoherent native Highland class much farther down the 
sociopolitical hierarchy and therefore more alienated than eir Norman Scot leaders.  As with 
the fíana, this underclass must not have been as chaotic as some might assume.  Such a claim is 
not fanciful if we take into account nearly half a century of the Wolf’s military successes, which 
included the sacking of the Moray coast, a major power hub at the time.  Moreover, later 
stereotypes of Highland culture—as outrageously violent, bloodthirsty, wicked, disobedient, 
oversexed, and so forth—came as an unfair response from the Central Belt (i.e. Edinburgh, 
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Glasgow, and other Lowland power centers) toward the activities of the caterans under direction 
of the Wolf. 62    
Even though he was a Norman Scot tearing through the Highlands, Stewart was 
practically one of the Lowland’s own.  In other words, as a son of Lowland power, he hired 
members from a dispossessed Highland class to gain power in the Highlands and to be 
recognized by his Lowland contemporaries.  As a consequence, thes  outlaw Highlanders were 
estranged even further from their native lands; so were their clan-aligned compatriots, who were 
guilty by sociocultural association.  In addition to increased displacement, Highlanders in general 
were practically cut off from the emerging powerhouse to the south.  On the one hand, this 
situation planted the seeds for what would happen centuries later at Flodden (1513) and Culloden 
(1746); on the other, this is a true precursor in the Middle Ag s of the capitalist sleight of hand—
the alienation of labor power from the laborer—if there ever was one. 
Medieval Highlanders were not alone in their historical and political quandary.  To the 
south of the belt of ascending power in the Lowlands were the Scottish Borderers.  These were 
also a marginalized population nearly lost from official Scottish history, save for some popular 
ballads.  Borderers were people who gave royalty and each other fits during the thirteenth 
through sixteenth centuries.  The Borderers lived in the Border Marches between Scotland and 
England.  The southern Lowland Scots and the northern English claimed their respective sides of 
the Border, but they were anything but loyal to the governments in Edinburgh or London.  Also, 
they did not follow the patterns of the official Scots r English when it came to religion.  Until 
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the eighteenth century, they remained predominantly Catholic even after the Anglican 
movement, the Reformation, and the Presbyterian ascendancy.  They had complex, Fenian-like 
familial and community structures that were very similar to the Highland clans.  These 
affiliations could expand or contract, and they were not necessarily ethnically determined:  Scot 
could love or hate Anglo-Saxon or Scot, and vice versa.  Alliances and affiliations were 
constantly mutable and negotiable; negotiations were often facilitated through the theft of 
livestock and land.  Like the society of Welsh’s trainspotters, their “boundaries were invisible tae 
outsiders, but [if one was part of that society] you gained an intuitive feel for them” 
(Trainspotting 75).       
The Borderers, not unlike many Highlanders, were radically nomadic in both social and 
cultural terms.  One writer goes so far as to characte ize their life as “guerrilla living.”63  Mainly 
because the Borders were in perpetual chaos because of the conflicts between two kingdoms, 
“ordinary Borderers . . . learned to live on the move, to cut crop subsistence to a minimum and 
rely on the meat they could drive in front of them.  They could build a house in a few hours and 
have no qualms about abandoning it; they could travel great dist nces at speed and rely on their 
skill and cunning to restock supplies by raiding.”64  Moreover, the Border Marches—like the 
Highlands—were known for instances of abject brutality.  I  would be risky, therefore, to give 
the impression that these people were either some sort of pure anarchists or pure democrats.   
Indeed, the Borderers’ most radical element parallels th Highland caterans:  reivers—
whose name derives from a derogatory Broad Scots word connoting banditry, lawlessness, and 
so forth—were an important aspect of Border life.  Typically in opposition to the official Border 
Wardens appointed by London and Edinburgh, they shaped the legal and social environment of 
                                               
63 George MacDonald Fraser, The Steel Bonnets:  The Story of the Anglo-Scottish Border Reivers 
(Pleasantville, NY:  Akadine, 2001) p. 29. 
64 Fraser 29. 
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the region.  Border Law, as it was called, reflected th c aotic situation in which the Border 
Scots, along with English Borderers, found themselves.65   Altogether, we are definitely dealing 
with an always profound but frequently wretched phenomenon when we are dealing with the 
Borderers. 
There is another significant aspect of Scotland’s medieval history that indicates a Fenian 
strand deep within Scotland’s sociocultural fabric, the Celtic Church.  Celtic Christianity 
emerged after missionaries from the Near East and a newly-converted Rome visited Britain and 
Ireland during the first three or four centuries.  Neverth less, contact with the Continent and the 
Near East was scarce and inconsistent, which was reflected in the more monastic character of the 
early Christianity.  Subsequently, Christianity among the Celts took on a more local form, 
interweaving with the existing sociocultural fabric.  Monasticism in the context of early-
medieval Britain and Ireland contradicts the perception of monastic life most prevalent today.  
As the Scottish Saints Ninian (c. 360-c. 432) and Columba (521-97) demonstrated in fact, 
contrary to popular legend, monks did not live in terminal isolation, cloistered away in their 
home bases at Whithorn, on the island of Iona, and on the island of Lindisfarne.66  More 
important than composing such awe-inspiring texts as the Book of Kells and the Book of Durrow, 
Scottish monks were deeply involved in not only the religious life but also the political life of 
communities throughout a region that extended from today’s Yorkshire to beyond today’s 
Aberdeenshire.  
                                               
65 Fraser explains that the Border, “in a sense, was a bloody buffer state which absorbed the principle 
horrors of war.  With the benefit of hindsight, one could almost say that the social chaos of the frontier was a 
political necessity” (30). 
66 Daphne Brooke, Wild Men and Holy Places:  St. Ninian, Whithorn, and the Medieval Realm of Galloway 
(Edinburgh:  Canongate, 1994) 8-33.  Ian Bradley, Columba:  Pilgrim and Penitent (Glasgow:  Wild Goose, 1996) 
28-45.  Adomnán of Iona, Life of St. Columba, trans. Richard Sharpe (New York, NY:  Penguin, 1995).   
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However, Celtic Christianity had been marginalized since ts arliest days—not by non-
Christian Celts, but by other Christians.  In 431, at the Council of Ephesus, Saint Augustine of 
Hippo’s efforts to outlaw the theology of a British monk, Pelagius (c. 355-c. 425), succeeded.  
Pelagianism, as the heresy is known today, contradicted what would become the very basis of the 
early Roman Catholic Church and thus of practically all Western Christianity:  humans are born 
of sin and can only reconcile with God through a mediate faith in Christ by way of the Church.  
In effect, what Juice Terry says about the Tories could apply as well to the imperial form of 
Christianity arising during the fourth and fifth centuries:  the “biggest achievement” was “tae 
make huvin principles cost ye” (Glue 200).  Alternatively, Pelagius and his followers, like some 
Eastern Christians of the first millennium, held that God had always existed in all things and that 
Jesus Christ was the realization of this preexisting truth.67  As opposed to the abstract faith of 
Augustinian Christianity, Pelagian Christianity espoused a more practical, material, and 
immanent version of faith.  The Pelagians’ position reflected their affinity for the Gospel 
according to John, the Hebrew Psalms, and their interpretation of Paul’s letters to the Romans.   
Recent scholarship suggests that Augustine’s enmity toward Pelagius was more political 
than theological.68  The imperial impulse was arguably already well-established in Christian 
Rome.  Consequently, indigenous Christianities were a thre t to Rome’s ecclesiastical and, more 
importantly, political authority, which depended on a very st ict hierarchy controlled by “top 
cats,” a bishopric answerable only to Rome.  Even so, Pelagianism reflected a Christianity that 
existed in various degrees throughout what we today call the British Isles and Ireland.  The 
Acallam is, in part, a literary indication of the “unorthodoxy” of Celtic Christianity, which is 
                                               
67 Bradley, The Celtic Way (London:  Darton, Longman, and Todd, 2003) pp. 8-11.  J. Philip Newell, 
Listening for the Heartbeat of God:  A Celtic Spirituality (New York:  Paulist, 1997) pp. 8-22.  B. R. Rees, 
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68 Newell 20. 
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characterized by the interweaving of existing Celtic secular society and a Celtic spirituality based 
on perpetual regeneration with early Christianity’s practic l understanding of communion and 
eternal life.   
In contrast to Roman Christianity, indigenous British and Irish Christianity was not 
threatened by the pre-Christian or so-called pagan beliefs of the local Celts (Gaels, Britons, and 
Picts).  Alternatively, historical evidence indicates that the Celts had very little difficulty in 
accepting monotheism because they did not interpret it as a system of exclusion but as a system 
of integration.  Celtic Christians did not observe a binary opposition between monotheism and 
pantheism.  This perspective, which applied not only to the Celtic Christians but also to 
Christians in the East as well, is sometimes referred to as “panentheism”:  “the sense that God is 
to be found both within creation and outside it.”69  Spud echoes this Celtic theology when he 
suggests, “We’ll never likesay, learn tae love oorsels, until we kin look eftir weaker things, 
likesay animals n that” (Trainspotting 272). 
Two hundred years after Rome had outlawed Pelagianism, the Celtic Christianity of 
Scotland and much of the surrounding Celtic world remained strong.  Such was the case until, 
first, the Synod of Whitby in the seventh century and, second, the convergence of secular 
feudalism and ecclesiastical diocesanism in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.  In 664, Celtic 
Christianity and its monastic tendencies were officially ruled illegal.  Celtic churches persisted, 
but during the following centuries, they were increasingly marginalized by local governments 
and congregations aligned with the Roman Church.  Then, at the turn of the first millennium, the 
efforts of the Canmores—particularly Queen Margaret (1046-1093) and her son David I—
brought the Scottish Kirk into total line with the Roman Church, a process that coincided with 
introduction of European feudalism into Scotland.  The former venture was somewhat more 
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successful than the latter; consequently, Saints Ninian and Columba, as well as Saint Bride, were 
supplanted by the canonical Saint Andrew as the patron saints of Scotland.  Christianity became 
a state religion with its center planted close to the Continent, at St. Andrews outside of Fife.  
What was undeniably achieved by both the Synod meeting in 664 and the millennial Canmore 
dynasty was the alienation and submersion of Celtic Christianity as a viable spiritual and 
political force.  Perhaps, as some suggest today, traces of Celtic Christianity in Scotland are 
evident in the Presbyterianism and social structures that emerged from the Scottish 
Reformation.70  Even if this is so, Celtic Christianity is still an estranged emergent force—
virtually a Fenian Christianity.   
Taken together, caterans, reivers, and Scottish “panentheists” call attention to a marginal 
or outcast power deeply embedded in Scotland’s biography.  Most of the characters in Welsh’s 
trainspotting books are, therefore, the figural descendents of the medieval caterans and reivers.  
And one could easily perceive characters like Spud and Carl as devalued counterparts of Celtic 
monks.  As noted before, most Scots were and are still ignored or exploited by the power elites.  
And they have rarely been loyal to a given power elite.  It is in these secular and ecclesiastical 
medieval outlaws, therefore, that we can observe the very real historical existence of a Fenian-
like constituency that persisted and still persists in Scotland.  They arguably represent a large 
contingency of no ones who nevertheless enable and fuel the official history of the “someones.”  
In view of this historical background of Scotland during the Middle Ages, a key point to 
keep in mind is that one of the aspects of the historical fíana—who were mirrored by their 
Christian counterparts and whose legacy effectively continued in the later caterans and reivers—
was that they were an indispensable part of ancient Gaelic society, even though on its margins.  
                                               
70 Marcus Tanner, The Last of the Celts (New Haven:  Yale UP, 2005) p. 40.  John MacLeod, Highlanders:  
A History of the Gaels (London:  Sceptre, 1996) p. 49. 
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This is an aspect that Johnson-Hogg also gets wrong about “yob culture.”  The importance of the 
legendary and historical outlaw constituencies explains why Fenian lore remains, in one form or 
another, so culturally powerful in Ireland and Scotland.71  The big secret that was apparently not 
such a big secret to ancient Gaelic society was that if it were not for the outlaws intervening from 
their posts in the surrounding forests, hills, and islands, then Gaelic society would crumble under 
the weight of its oligarchic elites.  We observe, therefore, an almost invisible alternative 
sociocultural reality that was not as much out of bounds as it was a check on the bounds of 
hegemonic society.    
In other words, if it were not for the Fenians breaking the law—testing it, pointing out its 
faults, undermining it—then Gaelic society and culture would enter into a self-destructive 
process that would not only harm those within its bounds but wo ld also infect others outside its 
bounds.  Hence, Fenian resistance and intervention were not destructive in a broad sense.  They 
worked dialectically:  from deconstructing dominant society, to redistributing sociocultural 
power, and thus to promoting continued sociocultural life. 
The Foucauldian reader, however, might reasonably argue that the Fenians actually 
maintained the center of power by being its venting mechanism:  that, at most, the fíana were 
reforming agents and, consequently, were by no means revolutionary; that, yes, they might have 
contributed to society, but only inasmuch as they diffused internal resistance to dominant power.  
Sent to the margins, the argument might continue, Fenians actually secured Gaelic society’s laws 
by being a correlative “other” which served as a gauge for self-correction.  In effect, the Fenian 
exception negatively affirmed the hegemonic Gaelic rule, th reby maintaining and strengthening 
the rule.  There is, though, a significant blind spot in such a view.  The Fenians might have also 
positively alluded to an alternative sociocultural possibility that had been submerged under 
                                               
71 Nagy 1. 
 61 
hegemonic society’s dominance.  When, for example, a Fenian band would enter a village, rob it 
of prized cattle, and then deliver the cattle to another village which had been wronged by the 
other, the band was not necessarily enforcing established laws.  Indeed, the Fenians arguably 
demonstrated that laws passed down through custom or by ruling elites failed to address the 
needs of living human individuals and, therefore, of living human society.  Because Fenians 
were “below” the rank of a “citizen” (or in Gaelic society, below the rank of a fine, “family 
member”), they represented a concept of human social relationships that official Gaelic society 
tried to hide and that, by extension, future societies would continue to hide:  human individuals 
are social before they are members of an officially constituted family, village, clan, city, 
kingdom, or, later, state. 
It is with the latter, non-Foucauldian attitude that we can better appreciate the Fenian-like 
characters and tales in Welsh’s prehistory.  Welsh brings to ether life histories that initially seem 
bonded only by their “collective insanity,” the “grey [tha] gets in,”  “the rows [they] have about 
nothing at all,” and “a dynamic which will draw [them] right back into the slaughter” 
(Trainspotting 98, Glue 456, and Porno 139, 365).  The trainspotters’ and hooligans’ lives are 
virtually lives on the Borders and in the Highland hinterlands.   They are mercenaries up for sale.  
They are kin unified only by their marginality.  They are, as Renton describes his set, a “mutual 
coincidence of wants” (Trainspotting 321).  However, the real objective of Welsh’s weaving 
together their stories is to counter such common-sense bonds, which have hardened into bad 
sense, with the good sense they negatively affirm.  Their stories are altogether the generative 
social negation of an estranging egocentric negation of human life.72  What emerges as a result?  
   
                                               
72 Concerning the social negation of an alienating negation, see Marx, Early Writings 277-78, 349-50, 358.  
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2.4  Fourth Medieval Strand:  A Postmodern Medievalism 
 The preceding sections of literary and historical background are not digressive.  It would 
be more apt to describe them as archaeological or genealogical.  What we have uncovered is a 
rich stratum of materials and energies that have gone unused, have been abused, and have been 
silenced.  Knowingly or unknowingly, Welsh taps into this seam of castoff literary methods and 
historical materials in order to write his three trainspotting books. 
In Fenian-like fashion, Welsh confounds fiction-writing standards with his tendency to 
stow away his preferred genre in a dominant genre.73  As will become apparent in this and later 
chapters, Welsh’s mode of writing employs more contemporarily accepted forms of narrative in 
order to conduct less common and perhaps more “traditional” storytelling.  He takes, in effect, a 
viral approach to narrative:  a host genre delivers and is then consumed by a virus genre.  What 
seem to be straightforward plots driven more or less by a single protagonist are vehicles in which 
he, like Caílte, delivers a virtual multitude of stories, themes, and problems.  We noted above 
that when Caílte tells his stories to Patrick and his followers, the Fenian poet disrupts the life of 
the official world, the hegemonic Christian world that the twelfth-century scribes were 
retroactively telescoping into the fifth century.  To put it another way, Caílte ruptures a dominant 
situation by opening a space in it with materials and energies that the dominant situation had 
presumed to be subordinated.  Welsh and his work operate similarly; nevertheless, there is a key 
difference.  In the Acallam at least, Caílte brings apparently subordinated Fenian materials and 
energies into the present in order to gain legitimacy from the present, whereas Welsh dredges up 
subordinated historical-material elements in order to open up the emergence of an alternative 
probability, an alternative world in the future.   
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See Introduction, and see Williams 121-27. 
 63 
Historically, Scotland did not undergo the divorce between th  pre-modern and modern 
that the major players of the Western world presumably did.74  As will be stressed throughout 
this study, Scotland did not totally become caught up in the modern revolutions of the 
Renaissance and Reformation as they were experienced o the Continent and in England.  
Moreover, Scotland’s crucial role in the Enlightenment had more to do with its seemingly 
groundless nature than with its being a well-established modern nation-state.75  The reasons for 
this seemingly anomalous status are historical, cultural, economic, and political.  For instance, 
something that in bourgeois-liberal terms would probably be laudable today hindered Scotland’s 
movement into modernity as an autonomous nation-state:  its diversity.  Scotland’s greatly 
heterogeneous composition, which existed during and after the Middle Ages, was a detriment to 
Scotland when it came to forming a modern nation-state.  It was a hodgepodge of diverse pre-
feudal Celtic societies, Anglocentric feudal networks, international economic and political 
centers in the Central Belt, nearly anarchic Lowland Border societies, ethnic and linguistic 
variety, and so on.  Moreover, directly related to Scotland’s national identity problem was its 
political and economic relationship with England.  As a subordinate, Scotland became merely the 
southern kingdom’s northern appendage or hinterland, and Scotland’s development would 
ultimately have to be stunted in order for Britain to become a modern and modernizing force. 
Current symptoms of Scotland’s historical medievalism can be found in modern and 
postmodern Scotland.  Geographically, Scotland is a medieval construct, as a whole and in its 
constituent parts.  Legal and educational institutions stem fro  the medieval period, even pre-
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medieval in the case of Scottish law, which is a derivative of Roman law.  Scotland’s general 
lack of dissent and deviation during modernity—which arguably inhib ted “innovation, 
intellectual curiosity and enterprise”—indicates the persistence of stifling medieval residues.76  
Despite spurts of significant development, such as those of the eighteenth century (intellectual) 
and late-nineteenth century (industrial), Scotland has generally gone the direction of 
underdevelopment.   
This underdevelopment becomes evident in areas like health.  During much of the 
twentieth century, Scotland was reminiscent of the fourteenth century:  birth mortality was high, 
overcrowding and squalor were a norm, stairwells and street  were the places for human 
defecation.77  The last three facts frequently find their way into Welsh’s fiction.  Moreover, if we 
keep an eye towards medieval residues in postmodern Scotland, it might give us a unique insight 
into the fact that in a small country where middle-class emigration persists, over a million Scots 
live in poverty.78  This is not to mention that the loss of Scottish capital to the English continues 
even when Scottish capital increases.79  This is certainly a bleak picture, particularly if we look at 
it with well-established bourgeois assumptions.  However, Scots must have some power that has 
allowed them to endure, even if on the margins of power. 
Beyond the bleakness, one could argue that Scotland’s standing attachment to certain 
medieval materials and energies has been a matter of su vival.  What sustained Scotland in the 
absence of having substantial, unified control over a diverse population, sovereignty, religious 
institutions, natural resources, and economics?  Arguably, the various, seemingly chaotic social 
and cultural systems that had developed from the Neolithic Period onward maintained the 
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Scots.80  This does not imply that we should romanticize those sy tems, but it does imply that we 
should probably not ignore that there might be something positive or emergent in the Scotland of 
the Middle Ages.  And if this medieval something has been a source of power for the Scots, 
finding out what that energy is might prove instructive in the present and as we look forward 
(hence the rationale behind the “genealogical” section preceding this one). 
In such a light, Welsh’s task is undoubtedly monumental because the historical materials 
and energies with which he has to work are so heterogene us and volatile.  The Scotland of the 
historical Middle Ages does not provide much guidance, just rich potential, as he opens a 
generative “medieval” space in our midst.  It bears reite ating that Welsh has to first open a 
mythos-infused “medieval” space in which to work with heterogeneous materials and energies so 
that he may begin mapping an alternative Scotland.  Thus, Welsh’s “medieval” space is not just a 
window onto another Scotland but is, more importantly, a space from which to generate that 
Scotland:  it is a spatiotemporal domain in which the materials and energies of the past will be 
unlocked, redistributed to those people from whom those matrials and energies have been taken, 
and then used by those people to produce their future.   
For the trainspotters and hooligans and porn stars of Welsh’s three trainspotting books, 
such a space is necessary in order to persevere, as Spud comes to discover when he begins to 
write a history of Leith (Porno 181).  For them, there is effectively no such thing as Scotland, 
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just fragments and disappointments—nastiness and cruelty.  But frequently bubbling to the 
surface is the recognition that something else is possible. 
To combat the nastiness and cruelty, Welsh’s stories document the terrain of nastiness 
and cruelty so that we may, in negative relief, observe other possible terrain.  The gaps and 
conflicts between various characters’ accounts are fundamental to Welsh’s technique:  the 
potential for an alternative story emerges between individual characters’ stories, in their 
congregated interaction.  Furthermore, we are forced to constantly adjust our perspective on the 
larger situation.  Welsh’s stories persistently unsettle the historical-material ground of their 
telling, hence creating an environment in which despair and hope are in vibrant conflict.  Then 
after we read awhile, intersections among the stories materialize and an uncertain “something” 
emerges on the horizon.  In the trainspotting books, Welsh puts various narrative perspectives 
into interaction with each other—he congregates them—in order to demonstrate that the 
possibility of collectivity still exists despite the fragmentation.  These narrative characteristics, 
therefore, allude to another way of perceiving the world—an “outlaw way” to which our world 
of transparency, linear systems, consumption for the sak of consuming, and “going somewhere” 
might not be well-attuned. 
2.5  Medieval Virtue:  Congregation 
“Yip,” observes Spud in one of his soliloquies, “ah’m jistno a gadge cut oot fir modern 
life n that’s aw thir is tae it, man.  Sometimes the gig goes smooth, then ah jist pure panic n it’s 
back tae the auld weys” (Porno 63).  The “life” to which Spud is referring is not technically the 
world of Finn mac Cumaill, fifth-century monks at Whithorn and Iona, or of fourteenth-century 
caterans and reivers.  Obviously, the “modern life” to which Spud is referring is the world of late 
capital, and the gig is capitalism.  It is a world after Finn, after Ninian and Columba, after the 
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virtually nameless mercenaries who served the Wolf of Badenoch, and after Border bandits, who 
went by names like Kinmont Willie, Auld Wat, Geordie Burn, and Cleave the Crune.  But one 
can still question how close Spud and company are to this world, and one can still question how 
far away they are from the concerns of their figurative and literal predecessors.  As today’s no 
ones, do they not enter the “medieval” space or “thin place” of all no ones, where alternative 
worlds are submerged? 
As endearing or perhaps as pitiful as Spud might be, he com s across as something as 
near to a non-subject and non-author as possible.  He is not protagonist material.  “Even in his 
Ma’s womb,” muses Renton, “you would have had to define Spud less as a foetus, more as a set 
of dormant drug and personality problems” (Trainspotting 328).  In effect, Spud is neither a 
subject nor an object, just a collection of sociocultura refuse.  “Nothing had gone right for Spud.  
The world had shat on him, and now his mate had joined it,” an omniscient narrator continues 
after Renton has betrayed his mates near the end of Trainspotting (343).  Spud is truly liminal.  
This is why a reader might privilege the more “concrete” R nton, Sick Boy, Begbie, Juice Terry, 
Nikki, or any other character when, in fact, Spud’s liminality should draw more attention.   
Indeed, it is Spud’s marginal relation to society that also goes a long way toward 
explaining why his history of Leith is completely unacceptable to Johnson-Hogg.  Without 
intending to, Spud puts his finger right on the problem of legitimate historical narrative, whether 
it is Scotland’s or practically any other nation’s history.  It is a propagandistic master-narrative 
created by a hegemonic minority for the purpose of maintaini g the hegemony of that minority—
“Four-tae-one against, man, four-tae-one against.”  It is the reduction of the majority—the 
potential multitude—into a “people” or into an undifferentiated “mass,” a reduction which makes 
way for the sanctification of “top cats” who are supposedly responsible for the dominant 
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narrative’s success.  Consequently, so-called history is really about producing “identity,” 
“society,” “culture,” and “nationality” as too-easily consumed commodities or too-easily 
sanctified fetishes.  In such a situation, common humans’ histories are, using Renton’s words, 
degraded to “trivial things, they petty jealousies.”  Or as Spud demonstrates figuratively and 
literally, most of human history is marginal, prehistorical, and mythological.  It is “medieval” in 
the sense that it is between legitimate narratives of history.  Instead of being recognized as the 
active participants in the generation of and movement within their respective situations, most 
humans become personae non grata in an over-history or master-narrative that manages nd, in 
fact, profits from the reduction of common human life into petty concerns and trivia.81  
Historicalness—the active social production of materials and energies and life—is taken out of 
history; subsequently, history becomes nothing more than flattened, “homogenous, empty 
time.”82  All that is left are hegemonic state and corporate self-promotion narratives composed 
for the purposes of accumulating and containing historical a tivity, not for the purpose of 
generating history.  Many of Welsh’s characters tell us about this situation, but it is Spud who 
demonstrates it for us. 
So, what is Spud?  Spud, as we have noted, has a completely unorthodox relation to 
history and way of telling it, which directly reflects Welsh’s methodology in his three-volume 
prehistory of Scotland.  Without Spud, as well as Carl, Trainspotting, Glue, and Porno would 
arguably be disconnected fragments pasted into cardstock covers, lacking any real connective 
spirit or purpose.  Spud is a diffuse presence that connects all the fragments.  He is a figure for 
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the potential multitude.  And in Welsh’s fiction, his function is that of a conduit.  Through Spud, 
Welsh introduces us to an alternative world that is certainly connected to the dominant world, 
that is as complicated and troubled as the dominant world, but that is also one which challenges 
the dominant world’s legitimacy.  To elucidate further, lt us return to Johnson-Hogg’s rejection 
of Spud.   
Johnson-Hogg only gets things half right about yob culture, or perhaps he indicates the 
devaluation of the Fenian in our time.  He states to Spud that Leithers, both of yesterday and 
today, are people “who haven’t achieved anything noteworthy in the local community.”  
Historically, he begs the question.  In fact, during the lat nineteenth through the mid-twentieth 
centuries, Leith was the equivalent of a Glasgow East, a major shipbuilding hub and trade port 
between Edinburgh and the Continent.  The common Leithers w re who made it what it was, and 
the trainspotters of Trainspotting and Porno are their descendants.  Spud is attempting to 
congregate the materials and energies of them all in order to bring about the emergence of 
something better than the nastiness that has consumed hi and his friends’ lives.  
Like Welsh, Spud has set before himself a very difficult task.  Spud is the first to admit 
that when confronted with the hardships that he experiences under late capitalism, he goes back 
to his “auld weys,” which means descending further into drug-induced dementia.  He, like his 
mates, becomes a hopelessly isolated fragment of a hum n.  Unlike the hills, forests, and islands 
to which the fíana would go after intervening in the affairs of Gaeldom, the “auld weys” to 
which the trainspotters and hooligans run do not offer recup ration and regeneration.  Much is 
the same when compared to Scottish monks, who could retreat to their spiritual centers after 
having gone on difficult missions to Pictland.  Even when compared to caterans and reivers, who 
certainly lived in harsh circumstances, Welsh’s characters inhabit a world that does not even give 
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them a little credit for persevering.  The “auld weys” for Spud and company do not strengthen 
their resistance to late capital; they confirm and increase its dominion over them.   
Practically all of Welsh’s characters turn to some equivalent of a drug when confronted 
with the postmodern capitalist empire.  But they are f from alone.  Indeed, we can take drug 
abuse as a metaphor for the typical response to today’s c pitalist situation.  The use of drugs—
alcohol, pain killers, ecstasy, and heroin—are completely in keeping with postmodern 
capitalism’s religion of choice, which is parodied by Renton in Trainspotting: 
Choose us.  Choose life.  Choose mortgage payments; choose washing machines; 
choose cars; choose sitting oan a couch watching mind-numbi g and spirit-
crushing game shows, stuffing fuckin junk food intae yir mooth.  C oose rotting 
away, pishing and shiteing yersel in a home, a total fuckin embarrassment tae the 
selfish, fucked-up brats ye’ve produced.  Choose life.  (187) 
Despite Renton’s rebellious tone, his and other drug addicts’ choice “no tae choose life” is really 
their total concession to the bourgeois systems that they either despise or envy.   
“Choice,” the postmodern incarnation of a bourgeois-liberal conception of individual 
“freedom,” is actually a term that indicates labor power divorced from its source, the actual 
individual.  When this separation occurs, power becomes ephemeral.  This power becomes a 
ghost of itself that humans purchase and consume in ordert  momentarily make themselves feel 
as if they have regained it—by making a “choice.”  Like a vampire, this alienated power 
transforms into an entity that consumes the humans that originally created it; subsequently, this 
alienated power gains more control over them, making their own power increasingly alien.83  In 
such a situation, humans become trapped in a progressive (or is it regressive?) cycle of 
consuming and being consumed, as the characters of Welsh’s trainspotting books illustrate time 
                                               
83 Marx practically exclaims, “Commodities, in short, appear as the purchasers of persons” (Capital 1003). 
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and again.  Humans dislocate even more of their power every time they consume in the capitalist 
situation, mainly because they will work increasingly harder to consume more.  This power is 
“good junk,” and humans understandably want more.  Therefore, they will continue to go to their 
pushers—department stores, electronics outlets, frozen dinner aisl s, insurance salespeople, 
stock brokers, movie rental shops, fast food restaurants, d so forth—to perpetuate their habit.  
And rarely do humans concern themselves with the fact tht the commodities and services which 
they consume are stolen from their and others’ wages, made in sweatshops by virtual slave labor, 
made with less-than-par materials from exploited regions, and made to steal more power away.  
In such a situation, humans become increasingly isolated as individuals, leading to their 
increasing fragmentation.  Does anyone have time to be concerned about such things when 
choice calls?  Is there real freedom?  Is there freedom from “meaningless choice”? 
Where are the Fenians now? 
At the beginning of the Acallam, Caílte and Oisín part ways.  We have already 
discovered where Caílte goes.  What of Oisín, Finn mac Cumaill’s son?  Isolated from his fellow 
Fenians—the powerful congregation of outsiders, misfits, delinquents, outcasts, and abused—he 
retreats to the Gaelic Otherworld, Tír na nÓg.  However, he knows that he cannot continue in 
such a place.  It is not a place conducive to true comradeship—to true life.  Even though the 
Celtic Otherworld is lively when compared to other Otherworlds of antiquity, it is still the realm 
of the dead.  Living there is like living in a perpetual ecstasy or heroin trip.  Even though one 
might feel alive there, one is actually far removed from life.  Oisín decides to leave paradise for 
the trees, hills, plains, and most importantly, the fellowship of humans.  As he departs, he is told 
that his feet must not touch the ground of the outside world.  If he does, he will lose all his 
Fenian powers; in addition, he will lose the gift of eternal life that he gained when he entered Tír 
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na nÓg.  He continues, nevertheless.  When he enters the ouside world, he discovers that all 
Fenians are gone.  He travels alone throughout Ireland on his horse, and one day he hears 
hundreds of people crying to him, “‘Come over here and help us!  You are much stronger than 
we are!’”84  He sees a group of men being crushed underneath a huge slab of m rble.  The 
onlookers plead again, “‘Come quickly and help us to lift the slab or all these men will be 
crushed to death!’”  From his horse, Oisín is able to maneuver the flagstone off the men, but the 
buckle on his saddle breaks.  The Fenian jumps on the ground t  recover balance.  The instant he 
does, his strength leaves him, and his body shrivels to tha  of a frail old man. 
As with any mythic tale, the one that recounts the demis  of the last Fenian is 
overflowing with possible meanings.  In the present context, his story serves as an analogue for 
Spud’s situation.  Spud cannot afford to remain in a state of drug-induced fantasy.  It keeps him 
away from species-being, living a real life with fellow human beings.  He and his mates have got 
to engage “modern life” even if they do not feel cut out fr it, even if they “jist pure panic.”  
Oisín is obviously not “a gadge cut oot fir the modern life” of his time either.  Nevertheless, he 
does not panic and return to Tír na nÓg.  He saves human life.  Moreover, his coming down to 
the ground and becoming mortal is not a price or sacrifice as much as it is a realization of human 
species-life.  He already paid the dearest price when he had entered a supposed paradise, 
removing him from his fellow Fenians.  But what he gains when h  steps out of a static utopia 
and onto the land of the living far exceeds anything the Othrworld could have given him.  He 
enters into true connection with the Irishmen he saves, and one can be confident that his work 
will be glorified by them.  Like Oisín, Spud might suffer o  his efforts.  Indeed, his function in 
Welsh’s trainspotting books is not just to be a fellow Fenian-like historian, a virtual descendant 
                                               
84 Marie Heaney, “Oisin in the Land of Youth,” Over Nine Waves:  A Book of Irish Legends (London:  
Faber and Faber, 1994) p. 221. 
 73 
of Caílte; he is also the peacemaker in his fiction, which tends to get him emotionally and 
physically hurt.  Spud knows that if he does not touch the figurative ground and bring others 
together—as well as save their collective life in his history of no ones—then they will be 
“[s]ortay like the saber-toothed tiger,” extinct (Porno 63).  He recognizes that there is a power 
greater than drugs, violence, solipsism, and despair.  This power alludes to an alternative world 
that is neither a Gaelic fairyland nor neo-Darwinian dystopia. 
Carl negatively alludes to an alternative in Glue—a world free of “meaningless choice,” 
which would be a world of true autonomy—when he recognizes how the gig of choice operates: 
by the time you’ve made the token choice you’ve eaten up a bigger chunk of your 
allocated three score and ten than any drugs could have.  They try to con you that 
making that kind of choice day in, day out, makes you feel fr  or alive or self-
actualised.  But it’s shite, a lifebelt to stop us all from going fuckin mad at the 
lunacy of this fucked-up world we’ve let them shape around us. . . .  Freedom 
from meaningless choice.  (386)   
As has probably become apparent, Welsh does not explicitly state what this alternative free 
world looks like or where it might be located.  Beneath and between the surfaces lies the 
alternative world.  As recent astrophysics suggests, it is a mistake to base the existence of the 
universe on what can be seen but on what cannot be seen, which cosmologists call dark matter.  
Supposedly, the gravitational pull of dark matter is what holds the universe together, not just the 
gravitational pull of perceivable stars and planets.  Returning to the language of our study, the 
alternative world lies in the no ones as a collectivity—as an interconnected multitude.85   
                                               
85 This multitude, which is a body “beyond measure,” will bring about an “intensification of the common” 
by the interaction of the particularities who compose this body; consequently, the multitude will bring about “an 
anthropological transformation such that out of our struggles comes a new humanity” (Hardt and Negri, Empire 
392). 
 74 
According to recent Marxist thought, humans are constituents involved in cooperative 
social networks before they are subsumed under a constitutional entity.86  Any constituted 
society, therefore, proceeds only because of the constituents’ socially-realized work.  
Constituents—the particular members of the multitude below and on the edges of the surface of 
the official world—precede constitution—the surface.  Socially-engaged constituents, not a 
constituted society, are primary to generating any world.  Spud’s history “ay Leith fae the merger 
[with Edinburgh] tae the present,” as told by the people of Leith themselves, is nothing less than 
a testament to this fact, which is the actual reason behind Johnson-Hogg’s rejection of it.  The 
publisher—as a sentinel of dominant, constituted society—is relatively comfortable with the hoi 
poloi as long as they keep showing up to their jobs, taking the dole, rotting away in schemes, 
consuming bad drugs and bad food, and waging war on each other. However, the moment they 
attempt to be recognized as the source of human society and culture, then the Johnson-Hoggs of 
the world must cast them even further into the depths and onto the margins.  Spud intuits how 
this works, which he indicates when he exclaims to Begbie, “th re’ll be nae gadges like me n 
you left doon here. . . .  They want us aw oot in schemes oan the edge ay toon.” 
When Spud makes this warning about further historical-material estrangement on the 
horizon, he is not making some weak, egocentric call for self-preservation; nor is he raising 
undue alarm.  He is issuing a wakeup call to the overworked, underemployed, unemployed, 
supposedly faceless, and supposedly expendable:  Resist the antihuman erasure of the common 
multitude, and emerge as the practical foundation of human life.  
                                               
86 According to Negri, “The law and the constitution follow constituent power:  constituent power gives 
rationality and substance to the law.  Constituent power stands as a revolutionary extension of the human capacity to 
construct history, as a fundamental act of innovation, and therefore as absolute procedure.  The process started by 
constituent power never stops.  The question is not to limit constituent power, but to make it unlimited” 
(Insurgencies 24). 
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Spud’s whole objective in writing the history of Leith is effectively Fenian, which means 
that it is radically pro-social and pro-human.  Therefor , Fenian Spud is like the Fenians before 
him:  far from being anti-social, the fíana were extremely social, and individual Fenians were 
known to act cooperatively when it came to defending general sociality—species-being—against 
society’s injustices.  Accordingly, when Spud homes in on the fact that “Leith wis sucked intae 
Edinburgh against the people’s will,” he reflects the Fenian concern with rectifying the injustices 
of dominant society.  He is not interested in merely tlling subaltern tales to entertain or to make 
him and his mates feel better about themselves.  The stak s are too high for that.  He wants 
people like him, in Scotland and elsewhere, to “agitate for change” and to get back into 
producing human history (Porno 259).  He takes to heart what Renton, his best friend who 
double-crosses him, passes off as a convenient cliché:  one is “better making history than 
studying it” (Trainspotting 147).  Therefore, Spud’s history of Leith is not just an exposé on a 
little-known part of Scottish history; it is an attempt to reopen from a particular situation 
universal historical production.  He is calling for the congregation of the dispossessed. 
 Even though Welsh shows in his Scottish prehistory that an intense, well-established 
process of self-perpetuated alienation is hindering human individuals from productively short-
circuiting and emerging from the current situation, he continually points to a persevering mythos 
of submerged good sense and emergent force lurking in the background.  This persevering 
knowledge will not allow those who recognize it to give in to the “life” so provocatively 
described by Renton and Carl.  Spud in particular can no longer abide by the “auld weys.”  Even 
after Spud suggests that he is not “cut oot fir modern life,” he discovers in his historical research 
“that Leith’s motto is persevere,” and he consequently says to himself, “ah’ve goat tae dae jist 
that,” persevere (Porno 181).   
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All things considered, though, what is Welsh telling the potential Scottish multitude and 
perhaps the potential global multitude to persevere from or to persevere towards?  The first part 
of the question has been answered in the preceding pages:  persevere through low expectations, 
the grey, nastiness, weird symbiotic relationships, false freedom, and estranged life.  The second 
and most important part of the question is somewhat more complicated, but its answer has also 
been disclosed in the preceding pages:  in our alienated states, persevere together towards 
ourselves as true individuals.  To be more precise, congregate. 
 “Congregation,” in both its nominal and verbal forms, is an interesting concept which is 
similar to such concepts as “community” and “communion.”  However, it retains an aspect that 
those concepts have arguably lost.  Integral to any community or communion is the individual.  
As they stand today, though, “community” and “communion” have been practically emptied of 
this truth and, therefore, their practicality.  “Community” mplies a homogeneous, alienated 
state.  As such, it is narcissistic and segregationist.  This is perhaps why “community” is such a 
popular common-sense idea in the context of late capital.  On the terrain of late capital, 
communities are really just active or potential markets that will increase capital’s profit margins 
by diversifying patterns of consumption.  Perhaps because of its association with and centrality 
to established Christian institutions, “communion” implies as imilation:  i.e. one is permitted to 
be absorbed into an elect group.  Like “community,” “communion” falls in step with capitalism’s 
process of political neutralization through particularization.  Alternatively, “congregation” still 
strongly implies a historical-material process involving the convergence and active collaboration 
of multiple individuals.  “Congregation” connotes a process that does not abide by a predisposed 
set of affiliations.  To congregate is to first emerge as an individual, come together with other 
individuals, lay bare one’s individual materials and energies, collectively work with all presented 
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materials and energies, generate alternatives as a result, and thus enable further emergence.  
Institutional, economic, or societal acceptance is not what brings legitimacy to congregation; 
instead, congregation itself brings about its own legitimacy because the individual and the 
congregation realize themselves in the other.     
 Congregation is not, however, a matter of casting off differences and entering into a 
blissful embrace with fellow latter-day Fenians, caterans, reivers, or Celtic Christian monks.  
Congregation is not a matter of coming together despite differences.  Throughout his “medieval” 
Scottish prehistory, Welsh makes clear the self-destructive implications of not openly 
confronting and working through differences:  denial, neglect, violence, uncritical group-
thinking, and death.  These are what dominate Trainspotting, Glue, and Porno.  Congregation is, 
instead, a process of individuals bringing differences together, each individual seeing others’ 
differences as his or her own, cooperatively working through those differences, and thus 
producing the opening for further congregation. 
Despite overwhelming nastiness, Welsh is like Spud:  he cannot let go of hope.  To keep 
this hope alive for his characters and his readers, Welsh concludes each of the trainspotting 
books with instances of congregation.  Thus, he demonstrate  that congregation is here in 
waiting, but individuals have to bring it about.  As Renton is en route to Amsterdam, he glimpses 
the congregation he is leaving behind through the guilt he feels for betraying his friends 
(Trainspotting 342-44).  In the page before the three-page coda of Glue, Juice Terry, Billy, and 
Carl walk together across a park, “three men, three middle-aged men.  One looked a bit plump, 
the other muscular and athletic and the final one was skinny and dressed in clothes some might 
have considered a bit young for him” (464).  Welsh also implies that the memories of Gally and 
Carl’s father are with them, becoming the spiritual glue that keeps the group together.  In Porno, 
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three parallel but unexpected convergences occur, their common bond being the psychotic 
Francis Begbie, of all people.  Renton demonstrates a rare instance of loyalty in attempting to 
return Spud’s cat.  While Renton is on a payphone asking Spud to meet him for the cat, Renton 
observes Begbie crossing the street.  Renton knows that Begbie is coming to kill him.  As Begbie 
crosses the street, he is hit by a car.  Without hesitation, Renton runs over to a prostrate Begbie:   
I’m over there without consciously knowing what the fuck I’m doing.  I’m down 
at his side, supporting his head, watching his busy eyes blaze and jive, brimming 
with baffled malevolence.  I don’t want him like this.  I really don’t.  I want him 
punching me, kicking me.  –Franco man, ah’m sorry . . . it’soot ay order . . . ah’m 
sorry, man. . . .  I’m greeting.  I’m holding Begbie in my arms and I’m greeting.  
I’m thinking of all the old times, all the good times and I’m looking into his eyes 
and the rancour is leaving them, like a dark curtain being drawn back, to let in a 
serene light as his thin lips twist into a wicked smile. . . .  He is fucking well 
smiling at me.  Then he tries to talk, says something like:  —Ah eywis liked you, 
or maybe I’m just hearing what I want to hear, maybe there’s a qualification.  
Then eh starts coughing and a rivulet of blood trickles oot fr m the side of his 
mouth.  (Porno 470) 
After Renton has conned the conman Sick Boy once more, Sick Boy and Begbie converge while 
Begbie is in the hospital.  Begbie grabs Sick Boy’s wrist, “his hand is like a vice around it,” and 
when Sick Boy looks up, Begbie’s “eyes have opened and thoseblazing coals of enmity are 
staring right into [Sick Boy’s] lacerated, penitent self” (Porno 484).  Granted, these instances of 
congregation are inconclusive.  Even so, congregation does em rge from the terrain of nastiness.   
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These particular instances in the trainspotting books are indicative of hope.  That hope, though, 
does not come from the ether.  It is grounded.  It is not a hope based on denial or naiveté or 
idealism; it is a good-faith hope built from the very materials that have hitherto denied hope.  
Returning to Carl’s statement after his father Duncan’s death, this hope is “just omething, some 
kind of second chance” that materializes right when “pieces of the circumstances of . . . death” 
are coming together (Glue 455, 457).  The circumstances of death always originate  lif .  
Along with Spud and other Welsh characters that we will encounter, Carl realizes that those 
circumstances could be redirected toward life.  We can look at Welsh’s tales in the three 
trainspotting books as documents of those circumstances.  Taken alone, Welsh’s tales are 
fragments scattered on the terrain of nastiness, like the fragmented details we have about the 
Fenians, Scottish monks, caterans, and reivers.  As such, they are certainly testaments to 
solipsism, cynicism, defeatism, self-destruction, and estrangement—i.e. death.  Borrowing 
Spud’s words, they are “wee parts ay life going up in smoke.”  When taken together as a 
congregated whole, however, these tales from yob culture point to something significantly 
different.  The key to continuing congregation is not the perseverance of an isolated individual 
for him- or herself, as Spud discovers, but is the perseveanc  of multiple individuals for each 
other.  To persevere in the latter case, though, implies more than just coming together:  a deeper 
connection is involved.  Congregation, therefore, must work in conjunction with some other 







Reformation Thread:  Covenant of Integration 
 
“. . . for their worm shall not die. . . .”  
 
      —Isaiah87 
 
Meanwhile, the people were preparing the reaction against this splendid 
parasitism in the form of the Protestant Reformation. . . . 
 
      —Antonio Gramsci88 
 
In Porno, Begbie offers this explanation for why he has murdered Chizzie, a convicted 
child molester: 
But they tell ays thit the Bible says thit God made man in ehs ain image.  So ah 
take that as meaning thit no tae try tae be like God wid be a fuckin big insult tae 
the cunt, that’s the way ah see it.  So aye, ah wis playin God whin ah wasted the 
nonce cunt.  (Porno 409-10) 
Begbie directly associates himself with a certain kind of God:  a God who, with cold and brutal 
rationality, puts things into their rightful, preordained orer.  Acts of prejudice are their own 
justification.   
By situating himself this way, Begbie is able to rationalize his own brutal habits and 
subsequently to raise them to the level of paternal care because, according to him, he has “made 
the fuckin world a better place, cause they fuckin things deserv  tae die, that’s the wey thit ah 
fuckin well see it.  Too right.  The polis, if they wir bein honest, wid tell ye the same thing” 
(Porno 409).  Such care does not extend to appreciating or understanding that child abusers, for 
                                               
87 Is. 66: 24.  This and all subsequent biblical references come from The New Oxford Annotated Bible:  
New Revised Standard Version with the Apocrypha, ed. Michael D. Coogan (New York:  Oxford UP, 2001).  
88 Gramsci, Selections from Cultural Writings 230. 
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instance, are themselves typically the former recipients of child abuse, as was Chizzie’s case.  To 
be caring in the sense described, though, does not mean to sympathize.89   
 The terms “sympathy” and “sympathize” are often associated with sentimentalism.  
Empathy, therefore, has replaced sympathy as the appropriate way to express one’s appreciation 
of another’s situation.  In other words, one only has to afely imagine what another person is 
experiencing, not risk taking on as one’s own what another is going through.  One reason for this 
shift from “fellow-feeling” to “in-feeling” is arguably to reflect the significant insights of 
Modernism and existentialism:  that we are alone and incapable of actually knowing anything 
outside our individual selves.  But the bourgeois pedigree behind this insight is unmistakable.  
Solipsism is one side of a coin whose other face is self-sufficiency or “rugged individualism.”  
Then moving into the context of postmodern capital, the pot ntial moral consciousness involved 
in being an existential “alone-self” has been replaced by consumer-centered marketing.  
Loneliness, angst, and anxiety are now privacy and customer satisfaction.  Nevertheless, the 
change is only a superficial one; indeed, it covers a deep lack of pathos and thus a meaningful, 
feeling life.  Emptiness is where emotional bonds should be.  Juice Terry and Spud refer to this 
emptiness as “the grey” and “nastiness” (Glue 456 and Porno 284).  This emptiness is not 
outside of the individual; it emanates from fragmented individuals.  It seems to come from the 
outside, but it is perpetuated and expanded by human individuals.  In the case of someone like 
Begbie, this emptiness is intensified and redirected violently at others.  Begbie is an 
unsympathetic God. 
                                               
89 George Lakoff’s analysis of “strict father morality” (unmistakably Calvinist), which he argues is 
dominant in the Protestant United States, is also helpful when applied to the logic Welsh uncovers in a Scottish 
context.  See George Lakoff, Moral Politics: What Conservatives Know That Liberal’s Don’t (Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 1996) pp. 65-107. 
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Indeed, sympathy would hinder Begbie as he bolsters whatever ord r it is that he deems 
to be good.  Accordingly, he can come to this conclusion about murdering Chizzie:  “ye could 
say thit ah took fuckin pity oan that cunt, cause eh’s jist gaunnae git abused again, n the nick n 
that.  Best fuckin deal aw roond” (Porno 410).  According to such thinking, pity does not 
prohibit killing; in fact, pity might actually require it.  It is far removed from sympathy.  Pitying 
people is an act of leveling judgment on them so that the rig tful order of the world—strong over 
the weak and the elect over the reprobate—is maintained.  Justice must be served.  Therefore, the 
God that Begbie emulates is one that operates according to a strict righteousness, “righteousness” 
being the biblical term for “justice.”   
The way to maintain such justice is to keep people and their activities within well-defined 
boundaries.  While often a mystery to everyone else, these boundaries are well-defined to 
Begbie.  To shore up these boundaries, he enacts either preemptory or reactionary terrorism, in 
both physical and psychic practice.  In Trainspotting, for instance, he throws a pint glass into a 
pub crowd, purposely creating an antagonistic situation to sort out, “like a psychopathic detective 
oot ay an Agatha Christie whodunit, cross-examinin every cunt” (80).  In Porno, Begbie beats 
June, the mother of his first two children, because he wrongfully suspects that she has had sexual 
relations with Spud.  Begbie does not care for this woman or her children, whom he abandoned 
long before.  Nor is he particularly jealous of Spud.  What Begbie jealously guards is his control 
of everyone he encounters.  Without any regard for circumstances or facts or feelings, Begbie’s 
primary interest lies in reminding people of their place.  For this reason, Begbie is a jealous God.   
Begbie is also a vengeful God.  Begbie is interested in retribution and reprisal for “trivial 
grievances,” as Renton calls them (Trainspotting 21).  This is best demonstrated in Porno. 
Begbie is obsessed with finding Rents and making him physically pay for what Begbie himself 
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would have probably done—betray his mates and run off with the money that the Trainspotting 
gang made in their nearly twenty-thousand pound drug deal years b fore.  Furthermore, Begbie 
blames Renton for any harmful act that he has committed since, including the murder of a man, 
hence making Renton’s blood price even higher: 
Renton hud been muh mate.  Muh best mate.  Fae school.  And eh’d taken the 
fuckin pish.  It’s aw been Renton’s fault.  Aw this fuckin rage.  N it’s nivir 
gaunnae stoap until ah kin git that cunt back.  It’s his fuckin fault ah goat the 
fuckin jail.  That Donnelly goat wide, but ah widnae huv done um sae bad if ah 
hudnae been fuckin crazy about bein ripped oaf.  (Porno 129) 
For Begbie, this is also part of justice, making people pay with life and limb for theirs or others’ 
sins.  In Gaelic, a word for this is díoltas.  The Norse and early Anglo-Saxons had a term, 
wergild or “man-price.”  In Anglo-Scottish Border Law, it was called “cold trod,” to chase down 
a robber long after the robbery has occurred.  In today’s ironically less subtle terms, it is called 
“getting even.”  Regardless of the name, this is a powerful form of bad sense. 
 How in the world does Begbie get to this point?  His theological position is the exception, 
not the rule, right?  He has got Christianity totally wrong, does he not?  Is he not just using God 
as an excuse?  We will hold the first question for later nd now address the other interrelated 
questions. 
Historically, Begbie’s theology is in tune with major swaths of official Christian doctrine, 
which have been handed down to us from at least Saint Augustine of Hippo’s day.  When we 
consider Begbie in the context of Scottish Christianity, he is a well known type of Christian, a 
severe and self-righteous Calvinist.90  The ground from which such Christianity comes is a large 
                                               
90 See Robert Burns’s masterful parody of this kind of Scottish Christian, “Holy Willie’s Prayer,” Complete 
Poems and Songs, ed. James Kinsley (Oxford, UK:  Oxford UP, 1969) pp. 56-9. 
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and rich one, owing much to some of the more stringent strands of the Old and New Testaments:  
e.g. Leviticus, Ecclesiastes, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Proverbs, Matthew, and Revelations.  Perhaps most 
important, though, are three verses of one chapter in Saint Paul the Apostle’s Letter to the 
Romans: 
We know that in everything God works for good with those who love him, who 
are called according to his purpose.  For those whom he foreknew he also 
predestined to be conformed to the image of the Son, in orderthat he might be the 
first-born among many brethren.  And those whom he predestined he also called; 
and those whom he called he also justified; and those whom he justified he also 
glorified.91   
If one is looking for the most succinct biblical rationale behind the doctrine of predestination in 
the Reformed and Presbyterian branches of Christianity, th s is it.  But austere Calvinist 
theologians, pastors, and elders in France, Switzerland, Holland, and Scotland were by no means 
the first to fixate on this and similar other passages in the Bible. 
 In Book 5 of Saint Augustine of Hippo’s (354-430) monumental theological 
systemization of Christianity, The City of God, the quoted section of Paul’s letter to the Romans 
haunts practically every page.92  Indeed, this fifth book is part of what could arguably be called 
Augustine’s Ten Books to the Romans.  In it, Augustine counters the secular and pagan elements 
of the Roman Empire by arguing that the Christian God—not Greek or Roman gods, 
philosophers, or poets—informed and empowered Rome’s pre-Christian history.  From the very 
beginning, then, Augustine’s project demonstrates predestinarian logic.  In equally important 
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political terms, Augustine ensures that any great human achievement, such as the successes of 
empires, is not human in origin but is preordained by God.   
Practically in the middle of Augustine’s ten-book groundwork f  revealing the City of 
God, Paul’s verses make a somewhat veiled but incontroverible cameo appearance: 
In [God’s] supreme will resides the power which acts on the wills of all created 
spirits, helping the good, judging the evil, controlling all, granting power to some, 
not granting it to others.  For, as He is the creator of all natures, so also is He the 
bestower of all powers, not of all wills; for wicked wills are not from Him, being 
contrary to nature, which is from Him. . . .  For one who is not prescient of all 
future things is not God.  Wherefore our wills also have just so much power as 
God willed and foreknew that they should have; and therefore whatever power 
they have, they have it within most certain limits; and whatever they are to do, 
they are most assuredly to do, for He whose foreknowledge is infallible foreknew 
that they would have the power to do it, and would do it.93 
By way of an argument with none other than Cicero about fate and free will, Augustine’s 
interpretation of Paul goes something like this:  God is pure good from which all other good 
comes.  The difference between God’s goodness and mortal g odness is that God’s is untainted 
by creation, which he himself made, whereas mortals are tainted by creation.  Humans are 
formed by God, which means that they are good, but they are less than good because they were 
formed.  So, humans must conform their goodness as much as possible to pure goodness, as it is 
embodied in God, even though mortals cannot fathom God’s goodness. Those who are evil were 
never of God, so they never will be of God.  Those whoare good—whose conformity to God’s 
goodness is solid—are justified and are consequently guaranteed to nter into God’s pure 
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goodness.  This homecoming to the City of God will occur during the Last Judgment of 
Armageddon, according to Augustine.94 
 As authoritative as all of this may sound, it represents a strand of theology that is 
negligible in the four Gospels and is inconsistently present in Paul’s letters; nevertheless, it is a 
strong thread running throughout much of the Old Testament.  Perhaps this predestinarian aspect 
of Augustine’s theology owes more to Paul’s background as a Pharisee than to the gospel 
message at the center of his letters.  The Pharisees wer  Old Testament literalists, religious 
fundamentalists, and theocrats.  Including Paul (nee Saul) before his conversion to Christianity, 
they also happened to be the most troubled by the teachings of Je us of Nazareth; consequently, 
they caused him, his disciples, and the majority of their Jewish contemporaries the most trouble.  
Indeed, one of Jesus’ and then Paul’s most annoying habits, ccording to the Pharisees, was to 
violate the Old Testament by arguing for the inclusion of all people in the promise of 
unconditional love and everlasting life.   
 What might be surprising is that the theological father of the Roman Church, in many 
ways second only to Saint Peter as a patriarch, is far from refuted by the father of the Reformed 
Church, John Calvin (1509-64).  In his massive theological systemization of Protestant 
Christianity, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Calvin first signals his agreement with 
Augustine by reasserting that the “secrets” of God’s will, “which he has seen it meet to manifest, 
are revealed in his word—revealed in so far as he knew to be conducive to our interest and 
welfare”; then quoting Augustine, “‘We have come into the way of faith . . . let us constantly 
adhere to it. . . .  [I]f the last day shall find us making progress, we shall there learn what here we 
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could not.’”95  Not to be outdone by Augustine, Calvin asserts that predestination is not merely a 
reflection of God’s will but is a manifestation of his pleasure and mercy: 
We say, then, that Scripture clearly proves this much, that God by his eternal and 
immutable counsel determined once and for all those whom it was his pleasure 
one day to admit to salvation, and those whom, on the other hand, it was his 
pleasure to doom to destruction.  We maintain that this counsel, as regards the 
elect, is founded on his free mercy, without any respect to human worth, while 
those whom he dooms to destruction are excluded from access to life by a just and 
blameless, but at the same time incomprehensible judgment.96 
Calvin’s God takes pleasure in condemning people to eternal damnation without any indication 
of why.  In this way, the doctrine of predestination reflects a sadistic God, Begbie’s God.  
Nevertheless, Calvin’s claim to clear biblical justificaton of this doctrine begs the question about 
this doctrine’s validity.  Throughout an extensive, labyrinthine argument for predestination, he 
raises Hebrew laws concerning inheritance to declarative stat ments by God concerning 
predestination.  He also takes statements from Paul out of context, without qualifying them 
according to the unique situations that determined each of Paul’s epistles.97  This is not to 
mention that Calvin’s use of the four Gospels in his lengthy argument for predestination is 
unusually cavalier for a man who is otherwise extremely rigorous when it comes to interpreting 
scripture.   
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In Calvin’s theology, as well as Augustine’s, something suspicious is occurring.  When 
addressing the topic of predestination, two of Christianity’s greatest thinkers employ reasoning 
and rhetoric that would make a high school debater blush.  In  all fairness to Augustine and Paul, 
it would be wrong to reduce all of Augustine’s theology to the doctrine of predestination, and 
despite the views and actions of many of Calvin’s theological descendants, predestination is not 
central to Calvin’s theology.98  Nevertheless, the presence of this doctrine in theirmajor works 
and their bold defenses of it cannot be avoided.  Moreover, at the time of this writing—when 
ideas of religious, sociocultural, ethnic, historical, and economic election are at the base of 
almost every conflict on the planet—the doctrine of predestination appears alive and well in 
practice. 
In effect, if not in intention, Augustine and Calvin underpin the legitimacy of 
Christianity’s emergent force with a residual force:  the promise of universal love, equality, and 
peace is, to use Calvin’s adjective, “gratuitously” reserved for the elect.99  Thus, predestinarians 
neutralize Christianity’s emergent force.  As much as they might depend on Paul to buttress their 
arguments, predestinarians violate the ecumenicalism that dominates Paul’s missions to the 
Gentiles, of which his letters are a testament.  It is probably unnecessary, therefore, to say that 
their doctrine of predestination flies in the face of Jesus’ teaching and acts.100  However 
unintentionally, Augustine and Calvin place at the core of Christianity anything but a clear 
doctrine.  Instead, backed by disembodied scriptural passages and tautological arguments, they 
introduce a black hole of contradiction into a revolutionary spirituality of reconciliation.  The 
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implication of this move is not the glorification of God but the alienation and accumulation of 
power from humans. 
The effects of predestination’s ascendancy, not only as a theological doctrine but also as 
a sociocultural one, are starkly evident in Scotland’s history.  Using presbyterian structures,101 
which contrasted with the bishop-centered model that had dominated much of Europe before the 
Reformation, the Calvinist theologians who came to dominate the Scottish Church (Kirk)—such 
as John Knox, Samuel Rutherford, James Durham, James Frasr of Brea, John Brown of 
Haddington, and Andrew Melville, among others—recognized that formerly secular social 
institutions would be indispensable vehicles for gaining control of practically all aspects of the 
Scots’ lives.102  Education, which had always been a cornerstone of Scottish sociocultural life, 
became a means of indoctrination.  Most often in their parish sessions, presbytery meetings, and 
sometimes at the General Assembly, Scottish Presbyterians employed juridical power as a form 
of figurative and sometimes literal witch hunts.  During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
what various Kirk leaders and sects did with their newly gained secular authority virtually 
perfected the bad habits of Anglo-Saxon, Gaelic, and Catholic royals:  nepotism, narrow-
mindedness, self-service, domination, and gratuitous persecution.103  Morality as a theological 
concern turned into a political and juridical obsession; the Protestant Kirk became a vehicle of 
religious and secular repression.  Morality became the rationale and acid test for almost all 
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human activity between the late-sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.104  Therefore, what Martin 
Luther’s and John Calvin’s protests and reforms challenged in the Holy Roman Empire is exactly 
what a radical Scottish version of Calvinism, which we will call ultra-Calvinism, gave to a 
predetermined syndicate of God’s chosen. 105 
Returning to Trainspotting, when Begbie intentionally throws a pint glass in a crowded 
pub so that he may interrogate, persecute, and terrify just about everyone, he demonstrates the 
premeditated negative judgment that Augustine and Calvin theorized, and that early-modern 
Scottish Presbyterians enacted through psychological and physical violence.  He demonstrates 
his superior goodness by creating a test, by then implicating everyone else in guilt over the 
incident, and by finally putting himself into the position of judge, “examinin every cunt.”106  
Victims of Begbie’s violence become enactors of his violent will, proliferating victimization that 
cannot be traced back to its origin, and if it were traced back, Begbie would feel obliged to 
unleash inordinate wrath on any who questioned him.  Begbie becomes a latter-day version of an 
early-modern protestant judge at a heresy trial, representing the gratuitous will and pleasure of a 
jealous, vengeful God. 
Today, most of Scotland’s Christians are practicing or lapsed Catholics, which reflects 
the huge part that recent immigrants from Ireland have played in Scotland’s recent history; 
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nevertheless, Scotland is still socially, culturally, and politically Presbyterian.107  More than 
William Wallis and Robert the Bruce, more than the Stewarts and Jacobites, and more than 
David Hume and Adam Smith, Scottish Calvinism has had the greatest overall impact on all 
aspects of Scottish life.  Just from what has been presented in this background, one can catch 
glimpses of how powerful certain aspects of Calvinism can be.  In the context of Scotland, 
preordained superiority, justified subordination of the reprobate, gratuitous judgment, and the 
like are not exactly a blessing.  As the previous chapter and the above account of Begbie 
illustrate, these aspects can easily be blamed for the subordination that many Scots and Scotland 
as a whole have experienced.  On the scales of preordained judgment, Scotland does not 
historically seem to be in the ultra-Calvinist God’s favor—being apparently a nation of the 
reprobate rather than of the elect.  Moreover, the draconian aspects of Calvinism obscure much 
of what was good about the Reformation in general and the Scottish Reformation in particular.  
Once again, bad sense obscures good sense; thus, with sometimes disastrous results, Scotland’s 
emergent materials and energies have gone relatively untapped and unused. 
  How did things get to this point?  The question we posed above ut held off on 
answering—How does Begbie get to this point?—is one we will redirect and expand before 
answering.  Let us pose the question this way:  Why is Begbie where he is, and by extension, 
why are we where we are?   
In these questions, the place implied by the words “point” a d “where” is the same terrain 
of nastiness discussed in chapter 2:  the situation of sub rdinates under the empire of late capital.  
Within that terrain of nastiness, ultra-Calvinism is a ignificant factor.  It has left the domain of 
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theology and has entered into the domain of late capital.108  Indeed, it has been appropriated by 
it.  Most humans in the world are, to some degree, under the nebulous sovereignty of ultra-
Calvinistic late capitalism, and the implications of living in its empire are more than just 
theoretical.109  When we look to Scotland, therefore, we are not treaing Scotland as an isolated 
case; instead, Scotland is a window through which to observe global processes and, thus, to 
explore the challenges confronting the potential global multitude.  In chapter 2, Welsh opened 
that window for us in Trainspotting, Glue, and Porno. 
In the questions posed above, the terms “point” and “where” also indicate a state of 
being.  In Welsh’s writing, we are encouraged to confront why, sa , a Renton, a Spud, or a 
Begbie acts the way he does.  The reason cannot be—and is not—as simple as this:  each of them 
is a congenital failure.  To claim such would be rather prejudicial and negligent.  We know that 
they represent sociocultural outcasts that have proliferated through the long process of the 
multitude’s or common humans’ alienation from power and utonomy.  Consequently, humans 
have become destructive toward themselves and each other, despite themselves.  In the previous 
chapter, which connected the postmodern present to its medieval materials and energies, we 
explored how the disintegration of social networks has contributed to the self-destructiveness of 
marginalized groups.  As we did so, we only touched on some of the effects that the 
fragmentation of society into isolated individuals has on those individuals.  Here, we will 
intensify that line of inquiry, but instead of making connections to the medieval, we will connect 
our present concerns to Reformation materials and energi s.  
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The virtue we have already arrived at is congregation.  Even so, the individual, or lack 
thereof, is today the greatest stumbling block for congregation.  In the age of late capital, the 
disintegration of the individual into incoherent sets of egocentrisms, empty moral truisms, 
prejudices, and dysfunctions is nearly, if not totally, complete.  As the trainspotters and 
hooligans we have already encountered illustrate, human individuals have been fragmented by 
trivia, petty grievances, and escapist consumption patterns.  Such a situation does not allow for 
sympathy; thus, individuals are hollow, eliding their lack of pathos (feeling) with self-consuming 
habits.   To use Sick Boy’s words from the closing lines of Porno, all individuals are “lacerated” 
and perhaps “penitent” selves (484).  To be lacerated and penitent i dicates that one is in a state 
of fragmentation and lack.  In effect, all individuals are wee Scotlands—subordinate in their 
dispossessed-ness and self-destructiveness.  In order for congregation as a virtue to persevere 
after it emerges as a key element of an alternative world, another virtue must therefore be in 
play:  integration. 
With Welsh’s third novel, Filth, and his short story, “The Granton Star Cause,” we will 
first look at how antisocial and destructive an individual can become in the empire of late 
capitalism; then, we will “tease oot” the virtue of integration from emergent materials and 
energies in Scotland’s Reformation fabric.  In Filth, Welsh provides a historical-material and 
psychological case study of Detective Sergeant Bruce Robrtson, perhaps the vilest, most ultra-
Calvinist character in Welsh’s whole body of work. 110  In our reading of Filth, we will uncover 
1) how the situation of late capital informed by ultra-Clvinism makes way for an individual’s 
internal disintegration and 2) the disastrous results of hat disintegration.  Our study of “Granton 
Star,” a postmodern and Calvinist morality play that fe tures the clueless amateur soccer player 
Boab Coyle and God, will consider 1) Welsh’s rereading of Calvinism, and 2) his judgment 
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concerning the complicity of human individuals in their disintegration and their power to bring 
about something else.111  What will surface during our exploration of both texts is the recognition 
of a major hindrance to human integration:  the corruption of pathos and its disconnection from 
both mythos and logos.  As I noted in the Introduction, pathos is incarnated sensory knowledge.  
This kind of knowledge embodies and sensually informs the o r two, thus enabling them to 
have meaningful, practical existence.  Moreover, it is the bridge which connects mythos and 
logos to each other and across which experiential, sensorial data travels to them. Pathos is also 
the connective tissue of bodies politic—the permeable membrane through which mythos and 
logos can pass to and from the world and through which humans can connect to other humans.  
With all of this brought to the surface, we will ultimately use Francis Hutcheson’s post-
Reformation reformation of Scottish Calvinism to articulate the virtue toward which Welsh’s two 
stories point:  integration.   
3.1  First Reformation Strand:  The Worm That Shall Not Die 
“Same rules apply.”  This is the mantra of Bruce Robertson, perhaps the most loathsome 
character to appear in Irvine Welsh’s fiction.  In his third novel, Filth, Welsh delivers us into the 
banal, bigoted, and perverse world of Detective Sergeant Bruce Robertson.  Barring a few key 
exceptions, the reader perceives everything through Robertsn’s internal monologue, which is 
more like a catalogue of a psychopathic and burnt-out police fficer’s mundane daily activities, 
delusions, and half-baked opinions.  One striking consequence of this novel, however, is that it 
intentionally fails to give the reader what he or she would presume to find in it.  The novel 
initially presents itself as a standard twentieth-century whodunit, in which one will find out who 
murdered the journalist-son of a dignitary from Ghana.  But even when this mystery is 
technically solved, the actual mystery is far from being solved because it is located elsewhere.  
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For starters, the case of Efan Wurie’s brutal death is t e case Robertson is trying to solve, if 
Robertson can be believed.  And he cannot be believed.  Robertson already knows who murdered 
Wurie.  As he finally discloses in the last pages of the novel, he did.  In fact, dressed as his wife 
Carole, Robertson has killed Wurie in a jealous rage because Carole had slept with a black man.   
So, with that wild goose chase out of the way, what is it that we are supposed to be after?  
What crime is Robertson circumscribing with his self-dceptive charade before he kills another 
person, a schemie named Lexo, and before he ultimately hangs himself?  Welsh forces the reader 
to be the unfortunate sleuth in this whodunit, to chart out he circumstances and the motives for 
Robertson’s actions.  All clues point to a crime much deeper and complex than the one suggested 
in the early pages of the novel.  This crime is one which as drawn in quite a few victims, not 
just Wurie and Robertson.  The scope of Filth’s mystery, therefore, takes us well beyond the pale 
of typical mystery novels. 
Narrative theorists have for around half a century made n rrator intent or reliability the 
standard fare of undergraduate literature students’ term papers.  So, is Robertson an unreliable 
narrator?  The question implies its obvious answer.  Theproblem or point of the book apparently 
rests on the credibility of the detective who seems more c ncerned about his promotion to an 
inspectorship and about his various sadistic sexual and criminal adventures during business hours 
than he is about the murder case he heads.  As we will come to find, his whole world and his 
power over it depends on keeping a vast assemblage of mysteries in play—like the 
“smokescreen” to which Carl Ewart refers in Glue (463).   
Granted, most detective mysteries are at least as focu ed on their protagonists as they are 
on the cases at hand.  Often, the way a case pans out freq ently gives the reader insight into the 
hero, the sleuth.  So, is Robertson a psychological case study?  Again, the question implies its 
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obvious answer.  The generally accepted founder of mystery writing, Edgar Allan Poe, 
masterfully exploited such a strategy.  The psychology of the mystery-solver is the key to 
understanding so many of his stories.  In this vein, are not the eccentricities of Oedipus, Sherlock 
Holmes, and Hercule Poirot what often draw people to Sophocles’, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s, 
and Agatha Christie’s mystery classics?  (Peter Sellers made quite a career out of spoofing sleuth 
mystique in the Pink Panther movies.)  Therefore, saying that Robertson’s internal conflicts are 
important is not radical at all when considering the myster  genre.   
 What is literarily unique about Welsh’s psychological narrative approach has to do with 
the split in the narration between D. S. Robertson’ conscious voice and the voice of the others 
that live in the deeper strata of his being.  Even though one might complain about the over-
determined psychological aspect of Filth, Welsh does not make Robertson’s mind an easy one to 
figure out.  Unlike the trainspotting books, this book is claustrophobic in the sense that, for the 
majority of the narrative, it traps the reader in one part of one narrator’s mind.  And because 
Robertson only permits the reader to have access to what is the most superficial layer of his life, 
he becomes an increasingly disturbing mystery as the story pr gresses.  Robertson is effectively 
a purloined letter, to borrow from Lacan’s analysis of P e’s famous story “The Purloined 
Letter.”112  Determining the psychological state of the main characte  is still a mystery even after 
the last page because there is such a disjointed relationship between D. S. Robertson and the 
other voices or personalities Bruce Robertson contains—i cluding his estranged wife and a 
tapeworm.  For these reasons and perhaps others, Filth and a few other texts by Welsh sit 
comfortably alongside Samuel Beckett’s How It Is and The Unnamable.   
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 Moreover, the mystery at the core of Filth also bears a strong affiliation with the doctrine 
of predestination.  Like Begbie, Robertson’s dominant surface persona adopts the role of an 
ultra-Calvinist God.  In Calvin’s doctrine of predestination, God is an elusive and arbitrary force.  
God’s treatment of the damned (the reprobate) of the world, as compared to the chosen (the 
elect), is what both punctuates his indecipherability and bolsters his power:  “those whom he 
dooms to destruction are excluded from access to life by a just and blameless, but at the same 
time incomprehensible judgment.”  Even so, the question can ot help but emerge:  Why does a 
supposedly omnipotent God need to bolster his power by judging what he himself foreknew and 
created from his own perfect being?   
It is easy to forget that this is a question that stems from a highly suspect Christian 
doctrine that moves to abstract God from human life while at the same time ascribing to God 
what are undoubtedly human desires for supreme power.  Indeed, it is a doctrine that not only 
violates the spirit of the New Testament but also violates two interrelated commandments of the 
Decalogue handed to Moses on Mount Sinai:  the prohibition of graven images and the 
prohibition of bearing false witness.113  As Calvin introduces his argument for predestination, he 
indicates that he is treading on very dangerous ground, “penetrati g into the recesses of the 
divine wisdom, where he who rushes forward securely and confidently instead of satisfying his 
curiosity will enter into an inextricable labyrinth.”114  But Calvin cannot help himself, despite 
warning everyone else to not enter this labyrinth.  This betrays a high level of presumption on 
Calvin’s part:  that he is not only one of the elect but tha  he is also an elite member of the 
elect.115  As noted earlier, he enters what is effectively a labyrinth of his own making, and he 
makes it even more complicated.  Like the arrogant artisan Dædalus, he creates a mysterious 
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structure from which he himself cannot escape.  Calvin tries o organize the mind of God, which 
he himself says cannot be fathomed.  This is Calvin’s graven image.  Then, based on a confusing 
examination of others’ preordained degrees of belief, Calvin presumes to know who God has 
chosen to be the elect and the reprobate.116  As a consequence of flouting the second 
commandment, Calvin cannot help but to violate the ninth, bearing false witness against his 
fellow mortals.  When it comes to the doctrine of predestination, therefore, Calvin’s 
systematization of the Christian religion becomes a mystification of it.  Instead of helping 
humans understand God, he has compounded the mystery; thus, he has further alienated the very 
God he elsewhere tries to bring closer to humans.  Not only that.  He attributes to God a 
pathological “secret pleasure” in his arbitrary treatment of the reprobate.117  By aligning himself 
with such a God, Calvin betrays his own pleasure, which we might call Schadenfreude.  What 
Calvin offers us, then, is not as much a doctrine as it is a document of his own pathology.  It 
should come as no surprise that, in the context of Welsh’s Scotland, the pathology of this 
labyrinthine version of God is also the pathology of somene like Robertson.  
As Calvin unintentionally demonstrates, to take on the psychology of God is to actually 
take on one’s own psychology.  By no means is doing psychological analysis in itself a bad thing 
to do.  Sometimes, though, such analysis might be a distraction or, even worse, an obfuscation of 
a deeper problem.  In the case of Filth, it is putting the cart before the horse.  The novel’s 
primary narrative voice and its literary implications are greatly intriguing.  Moreover, its 
psychological insights can be greatly unsettling, as we will surely find.  Yet taken alone, the 
psychological terrain is a symptom of a deeper social terrain.  Getting to the latter through the 
former is the ethical purpose behind Welsh’s foray into myster .  To say so does not mean that 
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psychology is off limits—far from it.  But psychology cannot be alienated from historical-
material terrain when confronted with someone like Robertson.  Calvin’s predestinarianism 
demonstrates the disastrous, antihuman implications of such alienation.   Therefore, to better 
understand the evidence of the crime at hand, we as sleuths will have to analyze the scene of the 
crime.  Returning to terminology introduced in the previous chapters, we will need to assess the 
historical-material situation—the fabric, terrain, ground—that gives rise to the psychological 
state and sadistic actions of the perplexing Robertson, who guards his mysteriousness like ultra-
Calvinism’s God.   
 The crime scene, per se, is presented to us by Robertson’s tapeworm.  All indications are 
that Robertson is actually infested by first two tapeworms and then, after passing one of them, 
only a single tapeworm.  The one which remains is sentient.  Whether or not there is actually a 
remarkably cognizant parasite inside Robertson is beside the point.  The tapeworm is more 
important as a figure.  Like a genealogy, it is a collection of epistemic segments stacked on one 
another, and each segment informs the whole genealogicl body.  Even after Robertson has 
managed to evacuate one tapeworm from his bowels, the remaining sentient tapeworm cannot 
even consider abandoning Robertson.  “How can I forgive you?” asks the tapeworm, and then 
answering itself, “But forgive you I must.  I know your story” (Filth 260).  The tapeworm knows 
Bruce Robertson’s story—his life—because it has ingested his story.  Therefore, Robertson’s 
story has become the tapeworm’s history, genealogy, biography, and life.  Robertson and the 
tapeworm are literally and figuratively, mentally and physically inseparable.   
As the novel progresses, the tapeworm discloses more details about why Robertson hates 
himself and everyone else, about why he is a misogynist, homophobe, racist, classist, sexual 
predator, and murderer.  He was born out of rape, abused by his stepfather, abused by middle-
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class teachers, accidentally caused his brother’s death, witnessed the horrible death of his high 
school girlfriend, witnessed the mutilation of crime victims, lives as a repressed bisexual, and 
has apparently been accused by his daughter of sexual abuse.  Like segments shed by a 
tapeworm, the details come in disjointed fragments, and the reader, along with Robertson, is 
responsible for putting together the pieces.  Consistent in method, Welsh again encourages us to 
weave a map in order to first figure out a situation and then o seek for that alternative 
“something” in an otherwise bleak situation. 
Some fragments that will help us to reconstruct the historical-material ground of 
Robertson’s situation are related to a series of major twentieth-century labor movements.  After 
his demoralizing school years and stints in hard labor in coal mines, Robertson joined the 
Edinburgh police force in the mid-1980s.  He entered law enforcement not because he was 
devoted to the law.  He entered law enforcement for power, th  source of laws.  As the tapeworm 
explains, “Power was everything. . . .  It wasn’t for an end, to achieve anything, to better one’s 
fellow man, it was there to keep and to enjoy” (Filth 261).  Marxists know this power as the 
accumulation of capital.  Robertson’s first real taste of this power came when he violently broke 
the resistance of striking Scottish coal miners, such as his tepfather, as a rookie policeman 
during the 1984-85 British labor strikes (Filth 160, 261). 
When compared to labor strikes that took place in the early 1970s, the treatment of 
striking miners in 1984-85 demonstrated a significant change in policing procedures under the 
Tory regime of Margaret Thatcher.118  Strikers saw increased police numbers and increased 
police aggressiveness.119  For every miner on strike, there might be two or more police officers.  
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Not only mines, but whole mining villages would be cordoned off and patrolled.  As strikers 
would proceed to their picketing sites, they would be confronted and provoked.  In the case of 
large pickets, more officers would be called in as picketers were arriving, and these “officers 
would then pile out of the vans with a military-style surgency and march in paramilitary fashion 
to the existing police lines, thereby enhancing the atmosphere of conflict.”120  In addition to 
blatant intimidation, outright violence was by no means the exception; it was the rule.  Beatings 
and torture were par for the course. 
When Robertson boasts—“what I still love, and always fucking well will, is that good 
old-fashioned two-on-one with a scumbag in the interview room” (Filth 160)—he is thinking 
nostalgically back to his earliest days as strike-busting police corporal during Thatcher’s militant 
anti-labor heyday.  It makes him bristle “with excitement and satisfaction.  It’s that front-line 
feeling; that rush when you’re at a picket-line . . . and you’ve got your truncheon and shield and 
the whole force of the state is behind you and you’re hyped up to beat insolent spastic scum who 
question things with their big mouths and nasty manners into the suffering pulp they so richly 
deserve to become” (Filth 160).  He feels confident of his position as one of the sociocultural 
elect because his treatment of the “suffering pulp” of the reprobate is authorized by the 
government.   
Indeed, Robertson is the personification of the late-twn ieth-century British 
government’s attitudes and social policies.  At the foundation of Thatcher’s and Tony Blair’s, as 
well as most capitalists’, antipathy toward low-skilled, unskilled, and surplus workers is the fear 
that those workers will realize that they are the majority and the foundation of society.  They 
might entertain the idea that they are not the reprobate after all.  To keep the potential multitude 
in line, the leaders in such a situation do not personally enforce “the games,” as Robertson calls 
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life under the empire of late capital.  They enlist the literal and figurative children of workers 
who have entered middle-class professions like law enforcement and corporate middle 
management.  These middling people are the most powerful s ntinels of capitalist imperialism.121  
They are the best at keeping under wraps the emergent materials and energies of subordinated 
people because they intimately know those people, their soc ocultural life, and their weaknesses.  
They are the best at keeping the potential multitude on the margins of power.  “Zero tolerance of 
crime in the city centre,” thinks Robertson, “total laissez-faire in the schemie hinterlands.  That’s 
the way forward for policing in the twenty-first century.  Tony Blair’s got the right idea:  get 
those jakey beggars out of the city centres.  Dispossessed, keep away . . . we don’t want you at 
our par-tay” (Filth 273). The role of enforcer subsequently becomes a whole way of life, an all-
pervasive moral code.  “That’s what life is all about,” muses Robertson:  the “management” of 
each subordinate’s “uncertainty levels.  We don’t want this cunt getting too big for his boots, 
thinking that he somehow counts” (Filth 195).122 
It would be a mistake, however, to believe that Robertson’s Thatcherite-Blairean 
perception and treatment of labor is something new, an aberration.   Systematic political, 
economic, and even military alienation of labor power from those who produce it is part of pre-
capitalist and capitalist civilization’s history; or to use Benjamin’s idiom, it is the barbarism at 
the core of any civilization.  As Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels recognized in the nineteenth 
century, few situations illustrate this as well as Britain’s.  Therefore, we will remain focused on 
Britain and, more specifically, on early-twentieth-century Scotland to further build the genealogy 
of Robertson’s class consciousness (or lack thereof).   
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The nexus and breakdown of the power of Scottish workers occurred in and around 
Glasgow during the early 1900s.  The Clydeside uprisings (1914-18) are, depending on the 
historian, collectively the greatest or most tragic event in Scottish labor history.  It was more than 
likely both.123  Granted, it gave us the Clydeside Reds and their school-teacher-turned-Marxist-
revolutionary leader, John MacLean (1879-1923).  Whether the Red Clydeside movement was 
more legend than reality misses the point.124  If the Clydeside events were a success, they were 
so because they uncovered once and for all the unholy marriage between a presumably 
democratic government and capital.  If they were a failure, it was for the same reason.   
Using the British military and all the muscle of his Liberal premiership, Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George (1863-1945) deported labor leaders, imprisoned sociali ts, shut down the 
pro-worker Labour newspaper Forward, and the like.  He did so in order to bring workers of all 
kinds (e.g. shipbuilders, steel workers, munitions workers) into line with the will of his 
government and its business partners.125  Moreover, skilled labor and middle management, such 
as engineers and shop stewards, were also significant in delivering what the British industrial-
military state wanted.  They would break the resistance of workers through methods of 
intimidation, con-artistry, and disinformation.  It was only a matter of time before the striking 
workers’ power was absorbed.  
When the institutions and representatives that are supposed t  b  answerable only to the 
constituency separate themselves from the constituency and bond themselves to the institutions 
and representatives of capital, then the subordination of the constituency and its appropriation are 
easy to attain and maintain.  Consequently, the constituency’s sociocultural, economic, and 
political power is ready to be continually dissolved anbsorbed by the capitalist state, for the 
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capitalist state.  In such an environment, the individual member of the constituency is painfully 
aware that he or she does not “somehow count.”  The individual knows that he or she is one of 
the reprobate. 
However, individuals such as Robertson come to think that they somehow count.  This is 
a well-oiled trick employed not just by ultra-Calvinist-informed capitalism but by any imperial 
system.126  To adequately and loyally maintain such a system, the military officer, the office 
manager, the shop steward, the small business owner, the church minister, and the professor must 
be under the illusion that they are equal shareholders of accumulated power.  Nevertheless, with 
ultra-Calvinism as a potent ideological tool, capitalism surpasses the efficacy of previous 
empires in sustaining this illusion.  Again, power is a sign of a more universal kind of election in 
such a context:  those who have power over others are so because they are the elect, and those 
who are subordinate to power are the reprobate and must submit to the elect.  In such a 
framework, the so-called Protestant work ethic is an effective tool for capitalism, teasing the 
delusional non-elect with the chance of becoming elected through playing “the games.”  All the 
while, these middling people avow unthinking obedience to the “same rules” of discipline:  hard 
work, strong moral fiber, and stoic persistence that presumably “have to apply in each and every 
case” (Filth 12).  Accordingly, to keep the Bruce Robertsons of the world (the middle classes) in 
such a delusional state, imperial capitalism offers them a drug better than heroin:  the gratuitous 
domination of the means of production, power over other humans and the pleasure that comes 
out of it.   
After he has had sex with a prostitute while on holiday in Amsterdam, Robertson 
encounters a group of young men and, without provocation, “slyly” connects a punch to one of 
the men’s ribs “and he’s winded and bent over double as I pu h through the crowd, sliding away” 
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(Filth 160).  This gratuitous act metaphorically indicates how the narcotic of power can work 
among those people in the middle classes (and even in the working and lower classes) who 
believe themselves to be beneficiaries of capital.  Under the influence of such a drug, other 
individuals are merely catalysts and receptacles for the immediate gratification of one’s 
impulsive desires.  They are merely “something to smash” (Filth 160).   
But there is a twist deeply hidden in capitalism.  As we discovered in chapter 2, the 
consumption of a drug becomes a perpetually self-consuming habit because the empowerment 
that it offers is fleeting and disconnected.  Humans who consume such a drug must, therefore, 
enter into an endless spiral of consumption, which thereby consumes them.  In other words, 
one’s delusions of being the elect of late capital are contingent on one’s perpetual subordination 
to late capital.  Not only that:  it is contingent on continually subordinating others.  Mirroring 
Calvinist double justification, this is a process of double estrangement—the estrangement of the 
self and the estrangement of others. 
Robertson’s sister-in-law Shirley asks the detective after they have sex, “why is it you 
have to savour everything bad that happens to others” (Filth 253).  He offers an ultra-Calvinist 
answer:  “It stems from a belief that there’s only a finite number of bad things that can happen in 
the world at any given time.  So if they’re happening to some ne else they ain’t happening to me.  
In a way, it’s a celebration of joie de vivre” (Filth 253).  Robertson sums up the underlying 
predestinarian logic of his ultra-Calvinist predecessors and cuts to the heart of what motivates 
such logic—self-righteous, self-perpetuating, and unsympathetic gain.  His celebration of what 
he says is the joy of life, echoed by what Juice Terry calls the “spice of life” in Glue and Porno, 
comes at the perpetual expense of others.  This surpasses Schadenfreude, for it is more than just 
an attitude or secondary emotional gain.  It is an existntial practice.  When it comes to his 
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profession as a policeman, he advances above his colleagues by making “a point of remembering 
his associates’ [Achilles’ heels].  Something that crushes t ir self-image to a pulp.  Yes, it’s all 
stored for future reference,” when he makes final judgment on the poor, unsuspecting souls 
(Filth 20).  This ultra-Calvinist capitalist approach to human bei gs produces the systematic 
destruction that Robertson plans and carries out against his one male civilian friend, Clifford 
Blades:   
The more our friendship has developed, the more the destruction and humiliation 
of this sad little creature has grown to obsess me.  He needs to be confronted with 
what he really is, he has to feel, see and acknowledge his inadequacy as a member 
of the human species, then he has to do the honourable thing and renounce that 
membership.  And I will help him.  (Filth 174) 
As if this were not enough, he attaches a Thatcherite slogan to his juridical practice, echoing 
Nazi rhetoric and the worst bad sense of Calvinism:  “The Robertson solution.  Real zero 
tolerance” (Filth 74).  Indeed, through the course of the novel, Robertson collects all of his moral 
positions under the principle of “zero tolerance,” which he also calls “in a word, professionalism, 
and I’m a total fucking pro. . . .  Same rules apply in each nd every case” (Filth 75). 
Robertson’s tapeworm is suspiciously astute when it comes to understanding how this 
process works.  “You must accept the language of power as your currency,” explains the worm 
to Robertson, “but you must also pay a price. . . .  The pric  is your soul.  You came to lose this 
soul.  You came not to feel.  Your life, your circumstances and your job demanded that price” 
(Filth 262).  As a result of Robertson’s internal deadening, he reproduces what the dominant 
system needs to perpetuate itself—inequality, instability, hatred, division—but his labor is 
productive insofar as it is destructive, a key point to keep in mind when analyzing capitalism.   
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The presumptive elect, like Robertson, are only possible in an unsympathetic world built 
on an increasing number of the reprobate.  To keep elect status, the wretched status of the non-
elect must be maintained through psychological, social, cultural, political, and economic 
violence.  But the capitalist twist continues to turn: all humans, including the members of the 
middle classes who have come to believe that they are running “the games,” are not the elect and 
never will be.  Only capital is the elect; all humans re merely reprobates who secure capital’s 
preeminence.127  While teasing them with the possibility of election, capital encourages humans 
to facilitate their own disconnection from personal power.  Thus divided against themselves—
internally and socially—humans are condemned to sustaining the status quo that imprisons 
them.128  They are perpetually consumed; this is their gratuitous, merciful reward. 
Through our study of this crime scene, we have finally discovered the body at the center 
of the crime, and the body we have found is both the victim and perpetrator of a horrible, 
ongoing crime.  
We noted above that the tapeworm knows Robertson so well because it has accumulated 
his life-history, like a genealogy.  But as the novel progresses, we find that the tapeworm is not 
just some bizarre sort of biographical archive.  In the more dramatic sense, the tapeworm has 
consumed Robertson’s life—from his birth to his youthful attempts a  being a good son and 
brother, to his adolescent stint in the coal mines, and finally to his adult work as a police officer.  
Robertson’s power—his labor power—as an autonomous human being has been sapped away.  
The tapeworm teases Robertson with the possibility of regaining autonomy, giving him enough 
hope to continue living despite the emptiness of his life.  But as we have seen, Robertson 
continues to live—to labor—with little other purpose than to torment others.  His labor, though, 
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can only come to naught because it is all based on the absence of real autonomy and power.  The 
tapeworm’s survival depends on Robertson’s efforts to save himself from total oblivion; 
however, the tapeworm knows it must also keep Robertson from something it calls the “Self” 
(Filth 260). 
The tapeworm is, in fact, the figural representation of late capital.  So, who better to turn 
to than the tapeworm for further elucidation of how capitalism operates on the human individual: 
I live in the gut of my Host.  I have an elongated tube-lik  body, eloquently 
adapted to the Host’s gut.  It’s indeed ironic that I seem to have no alimentary 
canal myself, yet live in that of my most generous landlord’s . . . as I continue to 
eat, ingest and excrete through my skin.  (Filth 139) 
The Host is Bruce Robertson.  He is not an autonomous subject but is merely a vehicle for 
capitalism.  Robertson is also a parasite within capitalism, as are all those who live under it.  In 
this light, Robertson is the real tapeworm of Filth, representing the status of the individual in the 
global empire of capital.  Hollow inside and barely connected to anything outside of himself, he 
is in a perpetual dynamic of consumption and excretion.  In the alchemical and paradoxical 
process of capitalism, he is consuming and being consumed, all the while growing and decaying.  
Robertson, as a representative of the individual in the empire of late capital, has been 
transformed into a miniature copy of capitalism.  
This figure of an infinitely emptying, infinitely consuming me brane that has the 
capability of perpetual growth while in a state of perpetual decay evokes Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari’s characterization of capitalism.129  Capitalism evacuates its center in order to fuel 
its insatiable, perpetually growing body.  It empties interally to make room for what it 
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consumes externally, all to produce an infinite body.  Of course, because it has a body—no 
matter how expansive it is—it cannot be infinite; therefo , it cannot stop consuming.  It will 
consume forever, in a perpetual loop of consumption-expansion-disintegration-consumption. 
The fact that the tapeworm, taken as a separate entity, is more credible as a subject than 
Robertson brings into sharp relief Robertson’s status s not only radically inhuman but also as 
something not even identifiable as a complex living organism.  The tapeworm has alienated and 
appropriated what could have enabled Robertson to become an autonomous human being.  
Consumption in such a situation has become the only legitimate activity, and the system in which 
consumption occurs is the only legitimate system.  Forall practical purposes, this dynamic is 
today’s ultra-Calvinist God.  What, then, is the indivi ual human’s relationship to such a God?  
Through the perpetual process of consuming and being consumed, without attaching to anything 
or anyone except to bolster one’s egoistic power, one becomes a disassociated fragment.  
Reduced to a mere hollow thing—as both consumer and commodity—autonomous human 
subjectivity falls out of view.  Therefore, the gratuitously damned reprobate fuel and pave this 
God’s kingdom; they enable this God to accumulate his secret pleasure and to jealously enjoy it.  
Is the tapeworm the figural second-coming of Calvin’s God?  Is the Kingdom of Heaven 
really reflected in the earthly empire of capital? 
3.2  Second Reformation Strand:  An Individual Bigger Than One Individual’s Ego 
 God answers: 
—Jist hud oan a minute, pal.  Lit’s git one thing straight.  Every fuckin time ah 
come doon here, some wide-o pills ays up aboot what ah should n shouldnae be 
fuckin daein.  Either that or ah huv tae enter intae some philosophical fuckin 
discourse wi some wee undergraduate twat aboot the nature ay masel, the extent 
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ay ma omnipotence n aw that shite.  Ah’m gittin a wee bit fed up wi aw this self-
justification; it’s no for you cunts tae criticise me.  Ah made yous cunts in ma ain 
image.  Yous git oan wi it; you fuckin well sort it oot.  That cunt Nietzsche wis 
wide ay the mark whin he sais ah wis deid.  Ah’m no deid; ah jist dinnae gie a 
fuck.  It’s no fir me tae sort every cunt’s problems oot.  Nae other cunt gies a fuck 
so how should ah?  Eh?  (Welsh, “Granton Star” 129). 
This is the earful that twenty-three-year-old Robert An hony Coyle, “Boab,” gets from God after 
he has been kicked off his third-tier church-league soccer team, asked by his parents to find his 
own place to live, dumped by his girlfriend for his archrival on his now former soccer team, 
thrown in jail and beaten by the police for defacing a payphone, fired from his job at a moving 
company, and punched by a café owner for being short on change.  All of this has occurred 
within a twenty-four hour period.  Then, when he sits down in a pub for a much-needed pint of 
lager, God sidles up next to Boab to chastise him.  Could it get any worse? 
 Yes it could, and it does.  As punishment for being a “lazy, pathetic, slovenly cunt,” 
God transforms Boab into a bluebottle fly:  “Yir a piece of slime,” God says to Boab, “An insect.  
That’s it!  An insect . . . ah’m gaunny make ye look like th dirty, lazy pest thit ye are” 
(“Granton Star” 130-31).  After becoming a fly, Boab visits hi  former soccer captain and friend, 
Kev, the one who had kicked Boab off the Granton Star football team.  Boab is able to 
communicate to Kev by first using catsup and later ink, which e traces across walls or paper in 
response to Kev’s questions.  Because Kev has been so kind, Boab decides not to take revenge 
on him.  Boab does exact vengeance on his ex-girlfriend Evelyn and her new boyfriend Tambo, 
who had replaced him on the Granton Star team.  Boab regurgitates cat feces onto their takeout 
supper of curry.  He gets back at his former boss Rafferty by dropping bits of rat poison on his 
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sandwich.  Finally, he reaches his parents’ home and finds them involved in feminine-
domination sex.  Their tryst is interrupted by a phone call from Boab’s sister.  When his mother 
hangs up the phone, she spots a fly on the wall, Boab, and swats it with a newspaper.  Then, she 
and Boab’s father resume their activities.  The next morning, the Coyles find their battered son, 
naked behind the family sofa.  His massive internal injuries prove fatal. 
 Based on this summary, we might sympathize with Boab.  Nevertheless, Boab has, in 
many ways, truly brought all of this on himself.  Right?  Boab is like some other Welshian 
characters that we have encountered:  most notably, Renton, Sick Boy, Begbie, and Robertson.  
He has gone through life believing that he, as an isolated individual, is the center of the world.  
His shock at being asked by his parents to give them some spac , at being removed from Granton 
Star, at being dumped by Evelyn, at being beaten by the police, at b ing abused for not having 
enough money, at being fired from his job, and at being visited by a God in which he has never 
really believed indicates just how disconnected, unsympathetic, and egocentric he is.  Heaven 
forbid that he ever consider what other people go through everyday.  During his whole life, he 
has never thought about anyone else or others’ needs.  He has assumed that everyone and 
everything were put on the earth to serve him.  And he has not taken responsibility for his actions 
(more often inactions).  Like Robertson, he is a parasite.  This is not to say that what happens to 
Boab is not awful.  What happens to Boab is certainly tragic.  Welsh’s God’s point is that, 
despite the awfulness and tragedy, Boab is responsible—sort of. 
 So, what exactly is “Granton Star”?  And following that, what is its point? 
 This sixteen-page story may be called many things.  It is a farce.  The ridiculous plot and 
sardonic tone that Welsh employs make this one of his most hilarious stories.  It is part 
intertextual homage and part parody.  Playful all the while, W lsh manages to implicitly or 
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explicitly incorporate or allude to some of the so-called classics of Western literature:  including 
the biblical stories of the Fall of Adam and Eve, Jacob wrestling the angel, Jesus wrestling the 
devil, and Jesus casting the demons into swine; Homer’s The Odyssey; the medieval morality 
play Everyman; John Milton’s Paradise Lost; Nathaniel Hawthorne’s “Young Goodman 
Brown”; Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels; Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment; 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s No Exit; and, of course, Franz Kafka’s “The Metamorphosis.”  As noted 
earlier, the story is also a tragedy, conceptually on par with Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex and 
Shakespeare’s King Lear.   
 Of all these literary affiliations, “Granton Star” is in closest league with the medieval 
morality play Everyman.  In the late-medieval period, morality plays were performed during 
religious festivals.  Such plays are allegorical renderi gs of the Christian quest for salvation.  
The protagonist confronts the Christian obstacles of sin, temptation, and mortality.  Usually, a 
darkly humorous trickster figure confronts the protagonist, thereby forcing the suffering 
Christian “everyone” to confront his or her moral status.  A few factors, though, must be kept in 
mind when we address Welsh’s foray into this genre.   
Welsh is a postmodern Scot from Calvinist Scotland.  Therefore, the materials and 
energies he must deal with make his morality play, as it were, a bit different from medieval 
morality plays.  Unlike Everyman and many other of its contemporaries, “Granton Star” is 
informed more by Calvinist doctrine than by Catholic dotrine.  As such, the story begins from 
failure and continues to fail.  If predestination is Calvinism’s only legacy, then a moral allegory 
is completely moot.  There can be no quest toward salvation because everything has already been 
decided.  Moreover, as Welsh ironically hints, this is a morality play written after Nietzsche, 
after the presumed death of God.  Again, moral allegory is moot.  It is also written within the 
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postmodern situation.  In this situation, God has been either appropriated or replaced by 
capitalism, faith in God is either non-existent or reductive, and religion is either passed off as a 
commodity or as a passé superstition.  It might be surpri ing, therefore, that Welsh of all writers 
would employ this genre and unearth the concerns that such a genre entails.  Despite his 
reputation as an iconoclastic rebel of the so-called chemical generation, Welsh is very concerned 
about morality, and this includes the interrelation of Christianity and society.130  Moreover, he is 
not one to accept the common sense of the status quo as the whole truth.  In the case of “Granton 
Star,” he accordingly takes on the postmodern situation’s common sense by making it confront 
itself; he does so through an old, seemingly passé genre.   
As “Granton Star” suggests, the conflict between the morality of late capital and the 
morality of John Calvin and John Knox (c. 1505?-72) has reached ritical mass.  God has had 
enough, and Boab, as our representative, pushes the envelope too far.  Hence, there is still a story 
to be told, a moral to “tease oot,” as Spud might say.  Something has to give.  A transformation 
must occur if human beings and God are to mean anything.  Well, every good moral allegory 
contains a transformation, and Welsh honors this fact. Outside of Boab’s obvious physical 
transformation, a major transformation in this morality play is Calvinism’s.  To bring about this 
transformation, Welsh opens a situation in which the bad sense of Calvinism confronts the good 
sense of Calvinism.  Welsh’s story is about the sins, temp ations, and dramatic death of one kind 
of Calvinism, ultra-Calvinism.   
So far, we have discussed Calvinism according to the doctrine of predestination, 
undoubtedly Calvinism’s bad sense.  According to such a view, God is arbitrary, gratuitous, 
jealous, and vengeful.  There is plenty in the Bible, in both the Old and New Testaments, which 
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attests to such a God.131  There is also plenty in the Bible to challenge such a God.132  For a 
dialectical mind like Welsh’s, such a contradictory situaton is not a seal of hopeless 
impassibility; instead, it is the site from which hope can emerge.133   
As discussed earlier, Augustine, Calvin, and ultra-Calvinists placed a contradiction at the 
core of Christianity with the doctrine of predestination.  Over time, one side of the contradiction, 
predestinarianism, became hegemonic, subordinating the supposed unconditional love of God as 
a result.  But the conflict still exists.  It exists between Paul’s interpretations of Jesus and Jesus’ 
teachings and practices.134  Indeed, it exists in the passage from Romans quoted above.  Most 
important for us as we deal with the Scottish situation, this contradiction is at the core of 
Calvinism itself.  For example, in an argument for preordained justification, Knox begrudgingly 
admits, “but yet we must suffer God to work in us.”135  In this admission, he is indicating that 
even though God has preordained everything, human beings must still be engaged in the matters 
of this world.  The Reformers themselves knew that there was a significant gap in the doctrine of 
predestinarianism.   
This should lead us to wonder how loyal Calvinists were and are to this doctrine.  To gain 
some perspective, we do not have to look farther than Calvin himself.  Even though Calvinism 
and predestination have practically become synonymous (thanks primarily to Calvinists 
themselves), predestination was at best a peripheral concern in Calvin’s theology.  Despite what 
was actually Calvin’s anger-driven attempt to lock his Roman C tholic persecutors out of God’s 
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133 Adorno, Problems of Moral Philosophy, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Stanford:  Stanford UP, 2001) p. 
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good favor, the Covenant of Grace is what Calvin intended to be the heart of his theology, and it 
is, therefore, the ultimate concern of Calvin’s In titutes.136 
 Before the Reformation, the Covenant of Works was privileged in practice, if not in 
thought.  Everyman is a prime literary illustration of this covenant:  byrighting one’s sinful ways 
through good deeds, one can reconcile with God.  The Covenant of Works is basically the 
covenant of the Old Testament, which asserts that by humans offering up their labor to God, the 
human relationship with God can be secured.  This explains the importance of offerings, 
sacrifices, a plethora of laws, and the specialization of church vocations in Jewish and Christian 
antiquity.  However, since the time of Adam’s supposed betrayal of God, and since the 
subsequent eviction of humans from paradise, so-called good w rks and a growing mountain of 
imperatives, prohibitions, and priests had never really worked that well.  This covenant had the 
opposite of its intended effect:  humans and God had become increasingly estranged from each 
other; consequently, humans had also become alienated from each other.137   
Enter the Covenant of Grace.  With the life, teachings, and death of Jesus of Nazareth, 
and with the subsequent realization of his Christhood, Go washed away all human sin, debt, and 
death, according to general Christian theology.  Instead of continued sacrifice and the 
multiplication of laws, God entered integrally into human life instead of dealing with it 
imperially.  Ceasing his insistence that humans become mor like him, he became human.  
Through this integration, reconciliation occurred.  “Immanuel,” one of Jesus’ Jewish names, 
indicated that God was no longer separate from humans but was with them.   By God becoming 
vulnerable and personally risking suffering, he forged a real social and material bond with 
humans, replacing the abstract bonds of mediatory sacrifice, ecclesiastical representation, and a 
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laundry list of laws.138  From the crucifixion onward, it was through this reconciliation that the 
grace of God—boundless, unconditional, freely given love—b came integral to everyone and 
everything.  It was this interpretation of scripture that led Luther, Calvin, and other Protestants to 
rebel against the Roman Catholic Church.    
In Calvinism, the doctrine of grace is obviously important s a theological concern, but 
its practical, political implications are perhaps even more so.  Regardless of whether one is a 
Reformed Protestant or not, the implications of Calvin’s theology have affected everyone.  
Exceeding even Calvin himself, Calvinism indirectly asserted through theology and directly 
asserted through political practice the sacredness of the equal distribution of power.  The 
political implications were consequently enormous.  Calvinism, despite Calvin’s later 
conservative turn,139 effectively established the constituent members of the multitude as the 
agents of sovereignty.140  In other words, without the obedience of the common people, the kings 
and bishops would be powerless.141  Moreover, by alienating the power from the multitude, 
appropriating it, and then profiting from it, the secular and religious lords were challenging the 
power of God, for he was represented by the multitude.  This emergent strand of Calvinism is a 
prime example of liberation theology. 
In few countries is the influence of an emergent Calvinism more evident than in Scotland.  
The Reformation and Scottish Kirk did in many ways descend into religious zealotry, cronyism, 
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and terrorism.142  Indeed, the person many look to as the initial firebrand of ultra-Calvinism is 
Knox.  Such a perception of Knox is not unfounded.143  However, Knox challenged bad-sense 
elements within Calvinism.144 
When Knox was banished to the Continent because of his Reformist activities, he 
befriended and studied under such major figures as Calvin himself.  Ultimately, however, Knox 
became disappointed with Calvin because Calvin’s theology did not adequately materialize in 
Calvin’s politics or in his political advice to Knox.  The theological liberator counseled Knox to 
become more moderate in his political radicalism in Scotland.  In Knox’s view, Calvin conceded 
the sovereignty of a throne over that of God’s multitude.  Partly because of Knox’s more 
democratic bent, arguably a consequence of his own subordinate socioeconomic status, he would 
not make such a concession.  His strained, often incendiary relationships with both Queens 
Mary—not to mention his infamous treatise The First Blast of the Trumpet against the 
Monstrous Regiment of Women145—demonstrated at their core his insistent conviction that no 
person should have power over another.146  Both Calvin and Knox were actually interested in the 
right of humans to be free of authorities who abused them, to be the Church instead of under the 
Church, and so forth.  This meant that humans were empowered to live life in relative autonomy 
rather than serve a master—except for Jesus, of course, who was supposedly a servant to his 
servants.  And it entailed that humans were part of a human family of equals.  Unfortunately, 
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Calvinist bad sense overwhelmed Calvinist good sense, and made a mockery of what the actual 
Protestant Reformation originally stood for. 
It is part of Welsh’s objective to overturn—transform—what C lvinism and its God have 
become by dredging up Calvinist good sense.  As we have uncovered, this good sense is 
certainly present in Calvinism, even though it is submerged.  Indeed, Welsh’s morality play is 
impossible to understand without Calvinist good sense in mind.  With it now in mind, we are 
prepared to unlock the moral of his deceptively simple story. 
Boab Coyle, along with D. S. Robertson and Francis Begbie, is the logical culmination of 
Calvinist bad sense.  If we extrapolate the doctrine of predestination into the postmodern context, 
we arrive at the apathy, lack of sympathy, and antisocial behavior that we have witnessed in a 
number of Welsh’s characters.  Indeed, like Boab, one does n t even have to believe in God to 
assume that one is of the elect, and if one is of the reprobate, there is no act that can change that 
status.  In a strange way, then, the doctrine of predestination brings about a cynical equality by 
making human life and human history pointless.  The elect and the chosen are both subordinates 
to a preordained end, and any free will that exists is really on y a means to keep oneself from 
being completely bored in the interim.  Therefore, there is really no reason to be concerned 
about, by, or for anything except assuaging one’s boredom. 
Welsh uses this lack of concern as a launching point for making both Boab and the reader 
extremely concerned, if not appalled.  He suggests that God is not as incomprehensibly rational 
and superhuman as the God envisioned by Augustine and Calvin.  Welsh’s God cares deeply 
about what happens to people.  He will become a ragged, self- eprecating barfly in order to talk 
some sense into us.  He will admit that he has been wro g.  Moreover, he will contradict all 
preconceived notions that we might have about him.  For instance, Welsh’s God plays the Old 
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Testament devil, the tester which the biblical God would send to help humans realize something 
about themselves.  This role is in keeping with the darkly humorous trickster figure of the 
morality play genre.  Accordingly, God tests Boab in order to have Boab reach a point of 
transformation.  God also plays the penitent protagonist f the genre.  Even though he says that 
he cannot punish himself because he is immortal, even though he says that he is tired of “this 
repentance shite,” and even though he says that vengeance is his, he does actually punish 
himself, and the story demonstrates that vengeance is not totally his (“Granton Star” 130). 
Despite all the angry words, God tries to give Boab a second chance.  At first, it seems 
that Boab might make something of his second chance.  For one, he forgives Kev.  As a fly, 
Boab appreciates life more than ever before.  He is grateful for any and all kinds of food, 
including feces.  Like Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner, he becomes fond of the society of all others, 
including flies.  He learns through observing his parents that ot er people also have desires and 
needs.  Nevertheless, Boab’s internal transformation does not match up to his external one.  He 
squanders his second chance.  Boab primarily uses his new powers t  become the jealous, 
vengeful, and gratuitous God of ultra-Calvinism.  In effect, he punishes the God that he had met 
in the pub by proving him right.  Moreover, it is not God but Boab’s own mother who literally 
brings Boab back down to earth.  
Earlier, we noted that Boab is responsible—personally responsible—for what has 
happened.  This is true, but it is true in a paradoxical way. The interesting thing about an 
individual’s responsibility is that it is a node of responsibility in a whole web of responsibility.  
Personal responsibility, as it is most commonly understood oday, is a chimera unleashed by 
bourgeois-liberal society.  It is egocentric.  True personal responsibility is the individual’s 
recognition that human life is the shared responsibility of each and every individual.  In light of 
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this, Boab’s punishment is everyone’s punishment.  After witnessing the transformation and 
death of a friend he betrayed, Kev takes to drinking heavily, and his performance as a footballer 
declines.  Evelyn, Tambo, and Rafferty become extremely ill.  Moreover, Rafferty becomes 
hyper-vigilant because he cannot figure out which employee poisoned him.  The Coyles lose 
their son.  The awfulness and tragedy of the human conditi —the nastiness, as Spud calls it—
belongs to each and every individual, God included. 
As the God of grace, in contrast to the God of predestination, Welsh’s God is in each and 
every human, Boab’s mother included.  Welsh cleverly hints at this during Boab’s inquisition of 
God: 
Boab found God’s whingeing pathetic.  —You fuckin toss. If ah hud your 
powers . . . 
—If you hud ma powers ye’d dae what ye dae right now:  sweet fuck all.  
(“Granton Star” 129) 
For the next page of the story, God offers Boab a litany of things that he could have done in his 
life.  These most recently include contributing more to his soccer team, being more sensitive to 
Evelyn, being a human with needs who recognizes that his parents are humans with needs, and 
being able to defend himself against unjust treatment by a café owner and Rafferty.  God 
concludes this litany by saying, “So ye hud they powers, ye jist couldnae be bothered usin thum.  
That’s why ah’m interested in ye Boab.  You’re just like m .  A lazy, apathetic, slovenly cunt” 
(“Granton Star” 130). 
Because “Granton Star” is a morality play, we are saf to assume that Boab is everyone; 
moreover, when God says that Boab is just like him, he is saying that he and Boab are the same 
person.  Therefore, when Doreen, Boab’s mother, inadvertently kills her son, she not only brings 
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judgment down on everyone but also on God.  We might be reminded here of the Nietzschean 
mad man’s proclamation that it is we who have killed God.147  But Welsh will not let us off the 
hook.  Welsh’s God has already indicated that Nietzsche “wis wide ay the mark.”  God is not just 
in Boab.  He is also in all of the other individuals that populate Welsh’s fictional world and that 
compose the potential multitude of Scotland and of the whole w rld.  God is everyone, and as 
long as there are people around, God’s post mortem cannot be signed. 
 As the morality play genre’s name makes explicit, there is a moral.  Welsh’s morality 
play is no exception.  Because Welsh tends to work on multiple levels at once, there are multiple 
but intertwined morals in “Granton Star.”  Without knowing themselves, humans cannot know 
God, for God is within each and every one.  Grace is not some gift from above, but a bond that 
emanates from within human life.  Carl implies as much in Glue, when he muses, “The best ye 
can do, what is in yir power is tae acquire grace” (279).  Lastly, humans choose which kind of 
God exists:  either 1) an alienating, alienated, arbitrary, jealous, vengeful, and gratuitous God; or 
2) an integral, compassionate, just, gracious, and loving God.  T  again borrow words from 
Glue, God is “nae some cunt else” (278).   
 As our discussion of Filth has uncovered, and as our discussion of “Granton Star” has 
indicated, the kind of God with which humans have collectiv ly come to associate themselves is 
certainly not a graceful one.  This goes a long way toward explaining why Welsh has chosen to 
undertake the daunting task of putting on a Reformed morality play within the postmodern 
empire of late capital. 
3.3  Reformation Virtue:  Integration 
 Welsh is interested in uncovering and then promoting the em rgent, practical aspects of 
Christianity and Calvinism.  Whether or not Welsh is a practicing Calvinist Christian is not 
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important.  What is important is that he attempts to shake loose a very important thread in 
Scotland’s historical-material fabric so that it may contribute to a world based on something 
other than dogma, segregation, estrangement, and gratuitous j dgment.  There must be a world 
that is not founded on “zero tolerance,” on the “same rul s” applying in each and every case, and 
on “the games.”  Humans must be more than parasitical, s venging worms and flies, whose only 
connection to each other is their mindless consumption of each other’s power.  
One Scottish philosopher, theologian, and pastor during the early years of the eighteenth 
century thought so, too.  Francis Hutcheson contended with the bad sense of the Reformation 
legacy while at the same time keeping a cinder of its good sense alight.  He presented an 
alternative to the categorical, universally-applied principles that effectively aimed toward 
transcending the messiness of human life.  He spotted a productive, connecting energy in the 
midst of human contradiction and conflict:  a “moral sense.”  He was arguably able to do so 
because his theories carried forward emergent elements of the Reformation and embraced 
emergent elements of the Enlightenment that bourgeois ideology and capitalism could not 
tolerate:  passion, unconditional love, liberation from dogma, distributed power, and the 
unconquerable potential of humans.  Enabling the emergence of th se elements was a sixth 
sense, for lack of a better term.   
For Hutcheson, a moral sense was incorporated in human individuals.  Nevertheless, this 
sense was only productive when humans socially connected to each other.  Hutcheson, therefore, 
was not interested in merely finding “zones of relative fre dom to retreat into, those light, 
delicate spaces where new things, different, better things can be perceived as possibles” (Filth 3).  
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Hutcheson was concerned with demonstrating that a healthy world was universally probable by 
way of the interconnected life of human individuals.148 
However, the reader of Filth and “Granton Star” might find it difficult to locate such vital 
human material.  At best, humans seem to connect for what is “mutually advantageous to baith 
parties, likesay,” until they find their “ain place” (“Granton Star” 122).  Reflecting the 
predestinarian logic of ultra-Calvinism, the commonplace rationales that prop up late-capitalist 
society and culture do not make division a vice but a virtue.  In his time, Hutcheson could not 
abide by the cold rationality that was gripping the burgeoning modern world, the world that 
would ultimately bring about the postmodern empire of late capital.  He saw a social situation 
that had appropriated Calvinist bad sense and was taking it to its extreme. 149   
The influence of the Reformation’s emergent force on Hutcheson’s thought is 
inescapable.  The absence of a mediator between humans and their God, as asserted by the early 
Reformers, is something that Hutcheson takes even further by practically grounding God in 
human beings.  The affiliation between God and humans is not mediated by reasoning but is in 
nature itself.150  Furthermore, knowledge of God is an affective, not ration l knowledge.151  
Epistemology is not, therefore, a matter of reason; it is, nstead, a matter of what Hutcheson 
would call affection and passion.  Pathos, therefore, is the primary form of human knowledge.  
From it comes sympathy, the means and end of the moral sense.  Consequently, Hutcheson’s 
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moral theory does not take us away from or above material human life.  It takes us directly into 
it.   
The Hutchesonian moral sense is, therefore, material.  In Hutcheson’s words, it is “in the 
constitution of the soul.”152  The moral sense is inextricable from human life.  Though not in a 
particular organ, the moral sense is a material reality nd a physiological part of humans that 
becomes active when humans interact with each other.  It is, however, situated in human 
particularity:  i.e. how it operates in each individual is unique, just as with other senses.  So, even 
though the moral sense adapts to the diversity presented by in ividual humans, it is not 
monopolized by any individual.  It instead becomes active wh n individuals open themselves to 
others or share themselves with others.  This is an important point to stress.  The moral sense is 
not automatically “turned on”; like other senses, it must be stimulated or, as Hutcheson would 
put it, excited. 
 A century after Hutcheson, through the vantage of dialectical materialism, Karl Marx 
effectively places the same dialectical process of sympathetic integration at the center of 
dialectical materialism’s ethic: 
the whole of what is called world history is nothing more than the creation of man 
through human labour, and the development of nature for man, he therefore has 
palpable and incontrovertible proof of his self-mediated birth, of the process of 
emergence.  Since the essentiality [Wesenhaftigkeit] of man and of nature, man as 
the existence in nature for man and nature as the existence of man for man, has 
become practically and sensuously perceptible, the question of an alien being, a 
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being above nature and man—a question which implies an admission of the 
unreality of nature and man—has become impossible in practice.153 
Marx establishes that the ultimate concern of human social, political, and economic life is not 
glorifying an abstract, alienated, and estranging power, such as a gratuitous, incomprehensible 
God.  (Today, that God is the empire of late capital.)  The ultimate concern of human life is to 
make collective human life probable by recognizing the practical, material, and autonomous 
power of the graceful human individual, “profoundly and abundantly endowed with all the 
senses.”154  Therefore, it is through the integration of all human power—sympathy—in the 
human individual that congregation emerges as a probability. 
Bruce Robertson’s and Boab’s sin—the greatest sin in Marxist and Christian terms—is 
that neither one recognizes others’ lives in his own particular life.  Therefore, neither Robertson 
nor Boab recognizes that his particular life is connected to others’ lives.  By not integrating what 
Marx calls the species-being into their lives, they are doomed to a living death, like the one Jesus 
describes in Luke:  “‘for you are like graves which are not seen, and men walk over them 
without knowing it.”155  Being alive as a human entails integrating the whole s cial life of all 
human individuals—their sympathetic life—into oneself.  Instead of the parasitical life of a 
tapeworm or fly, an integral life “acquires grace” by revering what others have produced; this 
reverence is most evident when the human individual produces vital materials and energies for 
them.156  Thus, humans produce a “world without end.”157 
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Enlightenment Thread:  Mapping Emergence 
Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any impossibilities 




For ilka thing a man can be or think or dae 




A bad bar joke happens to be one of Welsh’s most humorous, provocative, and 
conspicuously philosophical stories as well as one of his explicitly “Scottish” stories.  The joke 
goes something like this.  Two longtime philosopher friends from two major Scottish universities 
meet up at a university bar and then go to a working-class Glasgow pub.  They talk shop with the 
locals and get drunk.  They are challenged by a football hooligan to settle their philosophical 
dispute in a fistfight.  The snobby one loses to his down-to-earth comrade.  The police break up 
the fight and haul them off to the station.  The snobby one gets beaten again by the cops, while 
his mate is released.  “The Two Philosophers” is deceptiv ly simple, which is part of what makes 
the story even more hilarious and, for us, all the more worthy of attention.160 
The two philosophers in the ten-page short story are long-time academic rivals.  One, Lou 
Ornstein, is a Jewish man from Chicago, a Marxist, and a devotee of Thomas Kuhn’s assertion 
that knowledge is not innocent (i.e. accepted truth or science is censored and manipulated 
knowledge), and that breaks with official knowledge are necessary to the growth of knowledge.  
He holds a professorial position in the University of Edinburgh’s philosophy department.  His 
counterpart, Angus “Gus” McGlone, is a Glasgow native, a classical liberal in the bourgeois 
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eighteenth-century tradition, a Conservative Party member, and devoted to Karl Popper’s 
theories about the evolutionary and transcendent reason (i.e., true knowledge is not contingent on 
experiential factors but becomes purified through rational criticism).  McGlone teaches 
philosophy at the University of Glasgow.  Despite their philosophical differences, however, the 
two philosophers have much in common:  successful academic careers, success at drinking, 
lesser success at womanizing, and failure at convincing each other.161 
Ornstein comes to Glasgow and finds Gus at the bar of the Byres Road hostelry, which is 
popular amongst the university crowd.  Gus is talking to one of his undergraduate students, who 
is making advances on him.  She leaves after also flirting w th Ornstein.  The two philosophers 
gradually descend into their usual habit, rehashing the Kuhn-Popper debate about knowledge and 
politics.  Both have been looking for a way to put this tired topic to rest, after years of fighting it 
out in conference papers, journal articles, and drunken conversations.  It is Ornstein, though, who 
comes up with the perfect solution:  have someone outside of the ivory tower, a seasoned 
Glasgow barfly at a working-class pub, judge their arguments and declare a winner.   
A man after Gramsci’s heart, the American-born dialectical materialist thinks that the 
organic intellectual, the knowing man in the street, will be the best arbiter.  The effete patrician 
McGlone is at first unsettled by the prospect of presenting h s case before inebriated plebs, but 
his curiosity and competitiveness will not permit him to back out.  So the two philosophers hash 
out their positions before two domino players—talkative middle-aged, working-class men—at 
Brechin’s Bar.  Unsurprisingly, one of the men, “auld Tommy,” sides with Ornstein’s more 
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down-to-earth and optimistic attitude over McGlone’s elitist, dismissive one.  Tommy’s 
counterpart does not side with McGlone or Ornstein; instead, he finds that quibbling over closely 
related epistemological categories begs the question about kn wledge:  “S’only names bit. . . .  
Magic, science, whit the fuck’s the difference?  S’only names we gie thum” (“Two 
Philosophers” 114).  Overhearing the debate, auld Tommy’s mate’s son, a soccer enthusiast 
wearing a blue Rangers strip, thinks the two philosophers might be having fun at the older men’s 
expense.  Auld Tommy tries to reassure him, but he is still uspicious.  After listening a bit 
longer, the young man and his mates have had enough and insist that the two professors settle 
this academic feud once and for all by taking it outside and really fighting it out:  “Yous two in a 
squerr go ootside” (“Two Philosophers” 15).  McGlone is, of course, taken aback, but Ornstein 
takes the suggestion seriously.  Also encouraging the two philosophers is the threat of a worse 
fate at the hands of the hooligans.   
They do as the drunken young man with the blue strip suggests.  Orn tein beats McGlone 
to the ground and then kicks him. The police intervene and interrogate the professors.  McGlone 
brandishes his bourgeois academic credentials, which has exactly the opposite result he had 
anticipated.  Duty Sergeant Fotheringham punches McGlone in th  stomach and sends him back 
to lockup.  Ornstein, on the other hand, gets on well withthe police and is soon freed.  As he 
walks through Glasgow on the way to the subway system, the Underground, he is surprisingly 
pleased with himself for doing something he had never done before, and he concludes that this 
was the perfect antidote for the abstract philosophical reasoning promoted and protected by 
bourgeois academia.  For the Chicago materialist, the fig t proved his point:  unknown 
knowledge is not make-believe or magical; one just needs to walk out the door and wrestle 
knowledge to the ground.  Ornstein’s now substantiated epistemology effectively blends 
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Kierkegaard, Marx, and Mohammed Ali:  knowledge is produced by having faith in its presently 
unknown truths, grounding it in material reality, and giving accepted knowledge or common 
sense a “squerr go ootside.” 
But what in the world does this story have to do with Scotland?  Speaking broadly, it has 
everything to do with it.  Speaking more particularly, it is a literary rupture that uncovers a 
complex of forces which have composed Scotland and its identity during what we call the 
modern era.162  However, we are getting ahead of ourselves.  In order to assert whether Scotland 
even exists, how it exists if it does exist, and, as we will postulate in the next chapter, what kind 
of Scotland is in the offing, we will travel down a few interconnecting paths.  These paths will 
trace across a specific spatiotemporal terrain.  As with the previous chapters, this chapter will 
focus on the relation between contemporary Scotland and a particular historical-literary period 
from its past—in this case the emergence of modernity from the eighteenth century through the 
twentieth century.  We will first follow a literary path that places Welsh’s story in close 
connection to the work of another Scottish writer, Robert Burns.  In fact, Burns’s poem “The 
Twa Dogs” is a springboard, touchstone, and template throug out much of this chapter.163  The 
formal and conceptual qualities of the comparable literary pieces discussed will bring us to an 
intersection, connecting our literary exploration with philosophical investigation.  David Hume’s 
epistemological and moral philosophy is not only linked nomi ally to Welsh’s short story; his 
theories directly bear on broader topics related to social knowledge and Scottish nationality, both 
of which entail deep-seated internal conflicts.  Then, we will cross paths with cognitive science.  
Even though this convergence might not be an obvious one now, its validity will become more 
evident after following the paths mentioned.  Cognitive scin e—cognitive linguistics in 
                                               
162 Concerning such a “rupture,” see Badiou, Ethics 42-43. 
163 Burns, “The Twa Dogs.  A Tale” 110-16. 
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particular—will shed light on what Welsh, Burns, and Hume, among other Scots, have been up 
to and still are up to since the 1707 Union of Parliaments:  they have been building Scotland 
through a dialectical process of cognitive construction.  Therefore, following chapters that have 
focused on the epistemological categories of mythos and p thos, we will be traveling in the 
domain of logos, the rational aspect of knowledge.  These encounters on our Enlightenment 
pilgrimage will help us to locate Scotland, re-envision natiolism, and lay the groundwork for 
considering a global politics that is boosted, not threatened, by particular social groups or 
nations.  Such a politics will be enabled by the virtues of congregation and integration; 
nevertheless, it will also incorporate a virtue of emergence. 
4.1  First Enlightenment Strand:  Knowing Pilgrimages  
As far as literary genre is concerned, “The Two Philosophers” might arguably be an 
allegory or parable, a tale that imparts some moral truth hrough a relatively simple, predictable 
plot.  As mentioned above, though, the story is also a p pular type of joke:  “Two people go into 
a bar. . . .”  Many narrative jokes are allegories with a twist, replacing a moral with a punch line.  
In other words, such jokes are destabilizing allegories that challenge one’s epistemological or 
moral assumptions.  They often tear away the façade soci ty wears to rationalize its often 
hypocritical norms; therefore, jokes demystify human life by exposing the supposedly sacred as 
at least mundane, if not profane.  Geoffrey Chaucer’s body of proto-modern work, particularly 
The Canterbury Tales, is emblematic.164  He strings together a whole network of such narrative 
jokes, one playing off at least one of the others.  Ultimately, the individual narratives come 
together to compose a masterful example of the estate atir . 
                                               
164 Geoffrey Chaucer, The Canterbury Tales:  Nine Tales and the General Prologue, eds. V. A. Kolve and 
Glending Olson, critical ed. (New York:  Norton 1989).  I use the term “proto-modern” to describe the medieval 
Chaucer’s work in order to call attention to the fact that he was tapping into emerging bourgeois energies and 
materials on a feudal terrain.  In this light, Chaucer is more early-modern than medieval. 
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In order to give his body of tales coherence while retaining a democratic or polyphonic 
voice, Chaucer employs a travel motif.  This approach is, of course, not new.  In the history of 
Western literature, it is common to find some sort of physical movement connected to the overall 
growth of a character or characters, literally moving the plot along by enabling encounters and 
crises, mapping out both physical and conceptual terrain, and so forth.  Sometimes travel logs, 
sometimes quests, and sometimes pilgrimages, such narratives re highly conscious of human 
experience’s materiality.  Physicality and thought coincide, one compelling the other.  Each also 
reflects the other.   
This integration of the mind and body is reflected in how people will frequently use 
spatial and temporal metaphors to describe works of art, such as novels or movies.  When many 
people describe a good story, for example, they make statemen s like these:  “It moved me.”  “I 
could relate to the characters.”  “I felt like I was there.”  “You get a good sense of where the hero 
is coming from and where she is headed.”  Moreover, becaus  of the integral connection between 
bodily movement and cognitive activity, it is not therefo  surprising why so many parables, 
allegories, jokes, narrative songs, and the like have been popular in most cultures for much of 
human history.  To wax Socratic, thought is weak unless the body is involved.  To wax Sartrean, 
“doing and understanding are indissolubly linked.”165  However, we cannot, as Socrates and his 
students allegedly did, all pick up and walk around a tree to think.  Therefore, singers and 
storytellers have come up with ingenious ways to help us still experience physical thought.  They 
help us to unite “the organism with the environment.”166 
The characteristics of proto-modern Chaucer’s narrative techniques are certainly in 
postmodern Welsh’s fiction.  We noted previously the multi-voiced structure of such books as 
                                               
165 Sartre 93. 
166 Sartre 90. 
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Trainspotting, Glue, and Porno:  individual characters tell their respective but interlocking tales, 
not unlike the characters in The Canterbury Tales.  It is also true that the estate satire has been 
most successfully employed by writers from subordinate social classes—both writers fill this 
bill.  Chaucer writes from the burgeoning middle class of the medieval period, and Welsh writes 
from the lumpenproletariat-cum-middle-class of the postmdern era.  Both write in their 
respective vernaculars:  Middle English and Scots.  The old hierarchies are not sacred to them, 
and hastening those hierarchies’ decline is certainly an objective.  In fact, pointing out the upper 
estates’ faults turns out to be more than a joke.  It is a serious deconstructive cultural engagement 
with significant political, economic, and, yes, philosophical implications.  But to be significantly 
political and so forth, such a story must be topical, which means it must be embedded in its 
social and historical context.  It must deal with the materials and energies that intersect in its 
singular moment and place.  It would, therefore, be a mistake to rest easily on just drawing a 
correlation between Welsh and Chaucer.  Accordingly, to get nearer to Welsh while nevertheless 
continuing to trace out a literary genealogy, we should look beyond Chaucer’s emerging 
England.  We should look closer to Welsh’s home, to Scotland, to Robert Burns. 
Despite Burns’s reputation as a noble savage—a “heaven-taught ploughman”167—Burns 
is sophisticated in the sense that he cleverly plays off of people’s expectations and prejudices.  
Even so, he is a Romantic, in the best sense of the term.168  If there is one thing positive about 
Romanticism, it is its celebration of life during the emergence of modernity.  This celebration 
frequently takes the form of a focus on common life.  However, paying attention to common life 
and putting it on a pedestal are different things.  Burns is ot always consistent when it comes to 
the latter point, yet his most compelling works are arguably those wearing a critical Janus face.  
                                               
167 This is the characterization applied to and adopted by Burns to rationalize how a rustic like him could 
write good poetry. 
168 Nairn, Faces of Nationalism 209. 
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In many of his poems and songs, Burns does critique those one might expect: the English, 
religious zealots, the socioeconomic elites, and so on.  Careful attention, though, uncovers how 
seriously he criticizes those whom he supposedly romanticizes:  Scots, Jacobites, humble 
Presbyterians, the poor, and so on.  Though Burns was an early figure of the Romantic era, he 
was also one of Romanticism’s greatest deviants—much as J. M. Synge was later for the Irish 
Literary Renaissance.  It is one thing to give voice to or honor those people and places on the 
edges of “respectable” society and culture, but it is wholly another to permit them to be insular or 
esoteric.  It is generally assumed that Burns is guilty of the latter, but a closer evaluation of his 
work uncovers his critical dedication to the former.  “The Twa Dogs,” for instance, exemplifies 
Burns’s ability to both laud and censure Scots while making it seem that he is primarily 
interested in deriding the English. 
In this dramatic poem, Burns produces his own estate satire from an interesting vantage 
point, that of two dogs.    Caesar, a dog of an indeterminate continental breed, and Luath, a 
ploughman’s collie named after Burn’s deceased dog (which was named after Cuchullin’s dog in 
Ossian’s Fingal) sit down on a knowe, or hill thought to be a fairy mound, to compare notes 
about their masters’ stations.  Caesar’s name and Continental connections associate him with 
nobility and the Classical world.  Luath, on the other hand, is tied to Gaelic myth, tenant farmers, 
and lower-level peasants in general.  Caesar is worldly, while Luath is somewhat provincial.  
Each is in the dark about the other’s experiences under a ifferent social class—that is, until they 
complete their conversation and descend from the knowe. 
The poem’s movement, however, alters the pilgrimage pattrn Chaucer has given us.  
Instead of following a relatively linear or progressive path, the two dogs converge for an 
afternoon on a hill, and they part ways after the sun has set.  Traveling has certainly occurred, 
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and it allows for the encounter.  However, substantial movement itself effectively takes place 
offstage, much as it does in, say, Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot or Endgame.  Whereas 
humans on pilgrimages must strike out to voyage abroad in order to locate themselves, a process 
which Chaucer ironically parodies, the dogs instead converge from abroad, or below, in order to 
situate humans, the topic of their dialogue, in a problematic sociocultural context:  in effect, they 
come together to map out the ground below, on which the humans live.   
Arguably, Burns is compelled to flout the pilgrimage tradition because he is actually 
trying to locate Scotland.  Maybe Chaucer was likewise looking for a post-feudal England, but 
he was more accurately shoring up “Englishness” by humorously p rging it of its less savory 
characteristics.  Indeed, the tales do virtually form a peristaltic journey, documenting a voyage 
through England’s bowels.  Burns, however, is not boosting an already established 
“Scottishness.”  To do so would be to presume that Scotland is, to use a popular psychological 
term, self-actualized.  Both Chaucer and Burns are sensitive to their respective sociocultural 
moments—their respective historical grounds—which compel themo differ in their use of the 
same genre.  Chaucer employs the travel motif to analyze and dissolve the feudal systems that 
were, during his time, still relatively stable and hegemonic, despite the burgeoning middle class.  
Burns, on the other hand, writes in a late-eighteenth-century Scotland dealing with a 
disintegrating, not emerging situation.  This disintegration occurred despite, if not because of, the 
1707 Act of Union.169  Chaucer’s England was on the rise; Burns’s Scotland, as iscussed above 
and below, was at best in limbo, and so his poem reflects that.  Nonetheless, the political 
situation for Burns is, as it was for Chaucer centuries before, inextricably connected to the 
historical and epistemological ones.   
                                               
169 Harvie, Scotland and Nationalism: Scottish Society and Politics: 1707 to the Present, 3rd ed. (New 
York:  Routledge, 1998) pp. 34-78. 
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As discussed in previous chapters, Scotland has been subordinate in many regards—
nationally, politically, economically, and culturally—for at least three hundred years.  Despite 
moments of autonomy in some of those regards over the sam period, it is still practically a dog, 
at least in the view of those who have been dominant, the English.  Burns takes this subordinate 
position, though, and elevates it.  However, he does not elevate it to subordinate the English or 
some other.  He just brings the subordinate to the level of equality so that it can achieve some 
sort of autonomous productivity.   
Burns decides that the best medium through which to get closer t  the Scots is through 
humans’ proverbial best friends, loyal servants, and fellow carnivorous pack animals, canines.  
So, instead of denying the status of Scots as virtual dogs, Burns makes this status a point from 
which to launch one of his most decisive appraisals of Scotland’s situation.170  Certainly, “Ye 
Jacobites by Name” and “Robert Bruce’s March to Bannockburn” are powerful Scottish self-
evaluations.  Burns, though, is most compelling when he comes at a topic by a less conspicuous, 
more complex tack, such as in “The Twa Dogs.”  The closer he gets to the ground and the people 
who live on it—instead of flying into nationalist and ahistorical abstractions—the more incisive 
and productive are his critiques, which are frequently leveled at his fellow Scots.   
In this and other poems and songs, Burns does not elevate the Scots over the English, the 
poor over the rich, or the humble moderate over the zealot.  Burns, like other Romantics, 
attempts to find if humans are possible, how they are possible, and what kind of world they 
might make.  For Burns, humans are not reducible to biological determinations, and neither are 
they justified by metaphysical ideals.  Humans living strictly as animals—like mice, lice, or 
dogs—is not what he observes or wants; humans living strictly as rational or spiritual beings—
                                               
170 In ancient Gaelic culture, dogs were associated with extraordinary power.  See Nagy 45, 54, 60-62.  
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like the “unco guid”171—is also not an option.  Burns’s view, demonstrated through the body of 
his work, is not that far removed from his fellow Romantics; but he is more tied to and more 
explicit about local politics.  Yes, he too celebrates the two Revolutions of the eighteenth 
century, the Rights of Man, and universal freedom from tyranny; however, he does not approach 
them through odes to immortality, the sublime, sage savages, nd almost other-worldly 
songbirds.   For Burns, mice, lice, dogs, and less-than-perfect laborers are not merely satiric 
stand-ins for higher concepts; they are the very media through which such concepts are forged.  
And more often than not, these mediatory materials are p ticular to Scotland.   
Satirists rarely write without intending for something to emerge from the tangle of their 
situations, and Burns is no exception.  He, along with writers such as Hugh MacDiarmid, is 
proud of something in Scotland, even if it has not yet crystallized.  And whatever that something 
might be, it will be based on something other than idealiz d social groups or some essentialist 
notion of nationality.  It will emerge from the realities on the ground, where dogs and humans 
share their lives. As in many of his poems and songs, Burns therefore begins his investigation 
close to the ground.  In the case of “The Twa Dogs,” being close to the ground is both a harsh 
Scottish self-analysis and an affirmative point of epistemological and ontological emergence.  
Openly admitting that he, the Scots, and Scotland are in a state of subordination , Burns seizes 
that ground from which to observe the potential materialization of something else.172 
                                               
171 Scots for “self-righteous.”  The unco guid are frequent targets of Burns’s pen.  See, for example, Burns’s 
“Address to the Unco Guid” and “Holy Willie’s Prayer” (37-39, 56-59). 
172 Nairn makes the assertion that Scotland is a nation that is no a state (Faces of Nationalism180).  I agree 
with his point, but the phrase “state of subordination” fits here because of its allusion to estate or status, which Burns 
and later Welsh undermine.  I am also intentionally employing a play on words.  Scotland historically is a collection 
of sub-nations, thus a non-nation, which contributed to its subordinate post-Union status, which was a consequence 
of the ordination of Scotland’s James VI as England’s James I.  Such play, though, is serious, as Burns’s and 
Welsh’s works attest.  Having subordinates—e.g. peasants, dog heroine addicts, or pub crawlers—serve as ironic 
and frequently playful agents of critique is not a celebration of the state of subordination but is more likely a method 
of short-circuiting a system that, based on dominance and subordination, creates such a state.  Therefore, if I may 
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Additionally, as a consequence of his fidelity to the materials before him, Burns arguably 
tries to discern whether Scotland and the Scots are possible beyond subordination.  If they are 
possible, he is then focused on discerning howScotland and the Scots are possible, which leaves 
him once again working with the materials that converge and shift before him, not some 
predetermining myth or transcendent dream.  Burns, therefore, is a cartographer.  He maps out 
the is in order to lay the groundwork for something else to emerge—from that same is.  It just so 
happens that in this instance, two dogs work as his surveyors. 
Once Caesar and Luath sit down, they begin to share their observations.  Caesar starts by 
describing how opulently his master’s set lives (lines 51-70).  Caesar’s “Laird” and the laird’s 
“flunkies” do not have to worry about having warm enough clothes, having heated rooms, 
knowing how the coal is dug and delivered, and so forth.  Suchwork is done by the personae 
non grata, the lowest orders of hirelings and peasants, whose own clothes are rags and whose 
makeshift homes cannot keep out the cold.  Another fact th t preoccupies Caesar is food 
distribution:  the “ha’ folk” and even the worthless “Whipper-in” have more food than they can 
eat, but the “Tenant-man” and his fellow “Cot-folk,” who procure the majority of the food, have 
scarce a morsel to eat.173  The laird thanks these workers by yelling insults at them, incarcerating 
them, and stealing from them (lines 93-100).  The logical assumption Caesar comes to is that the 
lives of people like tenants and cottars are barely worth living, for “surely poor-folk maun be 
wretches!” (line 102). Nevertheless, he is shocked by the fact that they persevere despite their 
totally miserable circumstances.   
                                                                                                                                             
use Sartre’s language from Critique, the two writers “negate a negation,” which opens the current ideological and 
national terrain to something “new” (83-88). 
173 “Laird” is Scots for “squire”; “ha’ folk” for “estate servants”; “whipper-in” for “games keeper”; “tenant-
man” and “cot-folk” for “cottars/cottagers/lesser peasant .” 
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Caesar, however, discovers that the lower orders do not live in complete misery despite 
their miserable circumstances.  Luath discloses, “They’re no sae wretched ‘s ane wad think” (line 
103).  According to the Highland collie, the folk traditions, close-knit community, and Kirk are 
what give his people—the wretched of Scotland—their persev ance (lines 107-38).  They have, 
according to him, a life filled with riches that are nots -called material wealth, but shared 
cultural and spiritual wealth.  But Burns sneaks into the po m a critical observation.  The poor 
romanticize the rich, which indicates the laborers’ acquiescence.  Luath thinks that the lairds of 
the land are at heart noble people (lines 146-48).  Caesar, though, has some unexpected news for 
Luath.  Luath is surprised to find out that the affluent, the supposed stewards of Britain, are 
petulant, self-absorbed, and morally bankrupt (lines 149-70, 191-228).  Their loyalty is to 
accruing wealth and to Continental high society, not to Britain and most definitely not to 
peasants. 
So, what does Burns uncover in reference to the persistent question before the Scots, 
“Whither Scotland?”174  As to whether Scotland and the Scots are possible, the initial impression 
is not very positive.  If Scotland exists, then as of the late eighteenth century, it was composed of 
self-deprecating slaves living under petty aristocrats—“Such a Parcel of Rogues in a Nation.”175  
This is not a pretty picture, which Burns makes every effort to show.  However, his negation of 
Scotland, at least through his undressing these two major social classes, is paradoxically an 
affirmation of Scotland.  And what amounts to a negative affirmation opens the door to figuring 
out how Scotland is possible and ultimately what kind of Scotland is possible. 
                                               
174 “Whither Scotland?” is a question that members of the Scottish Renaissance posed to themselves and to 
their compatriots during the first few dozen years of the twentieth century.  This question is reflected in much of 
modern and postmodern Scottish letters, including that of Burns, MacDiarmid, Nairn, Neal Ascherson, Candia 
McWilliam, and Welsh. 
175 “Such a Parcel of Rogues in a Nation” is one of Burns’s mo t famous nationalist songs, played as a 
dirge, which scolds the Scots for allowing themselves to be sold to England for “English gold” when Lowland elites 
signed the 1707 Act of Union (511-12). 
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4.2  Second Enlightenment Strand:  Reasoning with Antisyzygy176 
The title of Welsh’s estate satire, complete with a voyage through Glasgow from a 
university bar to a football fans’ pub, could just as accurately b  titled “The Two Humes.”  As 
with Kant, and arguably as with any significant philosopher, there are more than two Humes.  
For our purposes, though, we will stick with two.  Gus McGlone and Lou Ornstein represent 
these two Humes.  With Ornstein-Hume, we have the radical speculative empiricist, and with 
McGlone-Hume, we have the conservative anglophile.  The speculative empiricist, or populist 
skeptic, demonstrates a materialist stance.  Like a Gramsci n, Ornstein-Hume sees what is and 
charts the alternative probabilities out of it.  The classic liberal McGlone-Hume, on the other 
hand, asserts what should be and pushes what is in its direction by appealing to civilized norms.   
Enlightenment Scots’ ideas—such as Hume’s, Adam Smith’s, and Adam Ferguson’s—
have become well-entrenched commonplaces and ideologies since the eighteenth century.  
Instrumental knowledge—along with its sociopolitical counterpart civil society—is probably 
their greatest collective legacy.  However, there is a problem in this legacy of the early-modern 
bourgeois revolution.  In their efforts to preordain enlightened knowledge or moral civility as the 
universal ground of all human life, prominent Enlightenment thikers—including Hume and 
                                               
176 Antisyzygy is a concept attributable to G. Gregory Smith, who held that Scotland and its literature are “a 
combination of opposites,” which is a “reflection of the contrasts which the Scot shows at every turn, in his pol tical 
and ecclesiastical history, in his polemical restlessness, in his adaptability, which is another way of saying that he 
has made allowance for new conditions, in his practical judgement, which is the admission that two sides of the 
matter have been considered” (Modernism and Nationalism: Literature and Society in Scotland 1918-1939:  Source 
Documents for the Scottish Renaissance, ed. Margery Palmer McCulloch [Glasgow:  Association fr Scottish 
Literary Studies, 2004] p. 6).  In short, antisyzygy is the paradoxical core of Scottish life.  Ontologically and 
epistemologically, Scotland is a fabric of contradictory elements that weave together to make a mutable, potentially 
evolving whole.  It is, therefore, no surprise why MacDiarmid would have been attracted to this concept, which 
surfaces throughout much of his work:  i.e., Scots and Scotland are the consummate embodiment of dialectical 
processes.  In fact, MacDiarmid expanded the concept, particul ly in A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle, and even 
made it the nominal subject of one of his poems, “The Cal donian Antisyzygy” (MacDiarmid, Selected Poetry, eds. 
Alan Riach and Michael Grieve [New York, NY:  New Directions, 1993] p. 230). 
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later Immanuel Kant—satisfied their liberalism, but they also unintentionally undermined the 
very human subjects they attempted to empower.177   
Hume, in the last book of Treatise of Human Nature, and Kant, in his second and third 
critiques of reason, promote a social framework in which enlightened individuals tap into a 
common stream of experience or knowledge which will lead them to civil society or moral 
consistency.178  Now, it is only fair to admit that such ideas were and re certainly a breath of 
                                               
177 Nairn, Faces of Nationalism 75.   
178 Contrary to much of what he writes in Treatise, Hume appeals to the wisdom of custom when it comes 
to humans’ sociopolitical activities.  See in particular sections 7 through 11 of Book 3.  We are dealing with one of 
two Humes, McGlone’s Hume.  Anticipating Popper, this Hume sid s with an evolutionary optimism when it comes 
to social institutions and relations:  “Time alone gives solidity to [a government’s] right; and operating gradually on 
the minds of men, reconciles them to any authority, and makes it seem just and reasonable” (556).  Admittedly, 
Hume does so with great equivocation.  In an effort to remain descriptive, he notes how the interests of a 
government and its constituency can be at odds, which his empirical observation of history demonstrates.  But he is 
pulled in the direction of justifying the necessity of civil society, in spite of the plethora of evidence that questions 
its very feasibility:  “Few enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal hand of nature; but by art, labour, and 
industry, we can extract them in great abundance.  Hence the ideas of property become necessary in all civil socety: 
Hence justice derives its usefulness to the public: And hence alone arises its merit and moral obligation” (David 
Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp [Oxford, UP:  Oxford UP, 1998] p. 
87).  Hume is locked in an indefensible position not because som ort of just or egalitarian world is impossible.  He
is caught in this cul-de-sac because part of him is almost uncritically dedicated to bourgeois hegemony over human 
labor, which is founded on the unequal distribution of materi ls and power—vis à vis the natural rights of rulers and 
private property.  Even though we can connect one Hume’s sp culative empiricism to Marx’s dialectical 
materialism, the other Hume is no Marx, and he is not interested in a paradigm shift that would upend the “natural” 
evolution of civilization.  Revolution for the bourgeois Hume is only justifiable as a correction within civil society:  
for example, when a tyrant must be resisted or overthrown f r the sake of national interest.  In view of this, not only 
is this Hume no Marx; he is no Tom Paine either.  The Hume of civil society believes in the priority of abstrac 
relations—property, allegiance, obligation, and so forth—when it comes to the sociopolitical life of humans.  This 
Hume, though, is at stark odds with the Hume of human possibility—the Hume who does connect well to Marx, the 
Hume who guides us here (see his epigraph above).  Immanuel Kant, on the other hand, does not have to equivocate, 
for he is not trying to have it both ways, as it were:  the human individual is justified as long as he or she constantly 
moves to conform his or her will to reason (Critique of Practical Reason, ed. Mary Gregor [London:  Cambridge 
UP, 1997] p. 102).  This, for Kant, is also the basis of a civil—even holy—society.  He famously writes, “the human 
being (and with him every rational being) is an end in itself, that is, can never be used merely as a means by anyone 
(not even by God) without being at the same time himself an end, and . . . humanity in our person must, accordingly, 
be holy to ourselves: for he is the subject of the moral law and so that which is holy in itself, on account of which 
and in agreement with which alone can anything be called holy.  For, this moral law is based on the autonomy of his 
will, as a free will which, in accordance with its universal laws, must necessarily be able at the same time to agree to 
that which it is to subject itself” (110).  Some would argue that Kant’s seamless consistency makes his theory much 
more powerful than Hume’s.  Perhaps as a rhetorical matter, this is so.  But as an ethical matter, Hume is more pro-
human than Kant.  Kant’s is an agonistic or monastic morality, while Hume’s is a communitarian ethic.  
Alternatively, like many utilitarians, Hume is on the side of social justice that originates from the needs and interests 
of most people; however, despite the appeals to the proto-utili arian concept of civil society already discussed, he 
inadvertently betrays a lack of confidence in institutions based on precedence, not to mention that he is more than 
suspicious of social systems based on moral laws.  Justice is only possible if all parties act justly, which makes 
justice impossible in a society founded on the accumulation of wealth and thus the unequal access to wealth 
 142 
fresh air when considering the logic of feudalism that preceded them and the logic of 
totalitarianism that has followed since.  On their faces, Hume’s appeal to experience as the basis 
of knowledge and his subsequent appeal to shared social values wo ld apparently be in league 
with what we have been promoting in this study.  Likewis, Kant’s appeals to idealized reason 
break the stranglehold on truth so long imposed by, for example, kings or the Church.  Both 
philosophers, like their political counterparts in the Renaissance and their religious counterparts 
in the Reformation, emancipate the individual from tyrannical pre-modern systems.  That being 
said, though, the Hume of the Treatise’s third book and the Kant of the last two critiques might 
not have broken as much as they had hoped from the statusquo or from vulgar appeals to 
predestination.   On the one hand, they moved to wrench reason away from religious and 
monarchic ridiculousness; on the other hand, however, thy succeeded, even as they tried not to, 
in helping to formulate the modern alienation of reason and society from most humans.  Hume’s 
appeals to experience and dominant social values do not, upon closer examination, include the 
wider multitude’s experiences or values outside of emerging bourgeois society.  The possibility 
of inclusion is there; Hume, however, officially desir d something else.179    Kant does in fact 
liberate reason from imperialistic human institutions, but he leads it further away from the 
human multitude—to an even higher and remote plane, to God.  Knowledge and social life, 
therefore, have become products that have been extracted from their actual producers, humans, 
                                                                                                                                             
(Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morality 83-98).  Hume is consistently adamant about its being impossible to 
establish or enforce a “system of eternal rational measures of right and wrong” (466).  In Hume’s case, then, 
“Caledonian Antisyzygy” is more than evident. 
179 Hume is consistent in his contradictoriness.  He desired to be one of England’s elite, even though he 
suspected that he would not be accepted because of being unmistakably Scottish.  Because England was not going 
to, in his mind, be a receptive home, he favored France.  And when he did describe what his identity should be, he 
claimed the predictable Enlightenment cosmopolitan rankof “a citizen of the world.”  See Alexander Broadie, The 
Scottish Enlightenment: The Historical Age of the Historical N tion (Edinburgh:  Birlinn, 2001) pp. 58-61.  There 
were also times when he would embrace being a Scot.  Some argue that, in fact, Scottish Presbyterianism, Scottish 
law, and the clannish communitarian social systems in the south Lowlands were the materials from which he 
constructed his philosophy.  See MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 281-86.   Some, such as Frantz 
Fanon or Nairn, would recognize Hume’s inconsistency or hyb idity as a symptom of his subordinate socio-cultural 
status. 
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and have been relocated in what is for most an unapproachable domain.  In other words, the 
system makers become subordinate to their own systems, and the systems become further 
removed from their ground even as they mine it for resources at an accelerating rate.180   
However, this is where the paradoxical or negative affirmation mentioned above, in 
relation to Burns, may come in.  If humans in their common life make reason, knowledge, 
society, culture, and so forth, then there is the possibility—and to continue a more militant tone, 
the probability181—that humans will wrestle them back down to the common pla e or mortal coil 
and reintegrate them into their particular situations.  Some might argue that this privileges 
intuition, irrational knowledge, uncertainty, and so forth.  To an extent, it does; however, neither 
reason nor society is thrown out, just repositioned.  What we call reason today owes its birth to 
very irrational beginnings, and civilization to frequently barbaric forces.182  I say irrational and 
barbaric because an empirical review of human history, sociology, and psychology will tend to 
undermine the validity of temperate reason and civil society being the foundations of human 
thought and action.  Humans might rationalize, or give reason, to their lives by building mental 
structures in which to plug their experiences and presuppositions; h wever, any reason that 
comes about is the effect, not the initial cause or basis, of their lives.  Humans might live 
                                               
180 Or, to put it politically, constituent power is neutralized by the establishment of constitutions, as we 
touched on in chapters 2 and 3. 
181 Probability, not certainty, is the cornerstone of Hume’s thought.  Probability begins as a possibility, but 
as one’s experience increases and consequently as one’s ability to work with experience’s materials improves, a 
possibility may become more than a fantasy, belief, or hope.  It becomes probable because, to use Hume’s idiom, it 
is a possibility that contains more “rigour and firmness.”  This does not mean that other possibilities will be 
foreclosed, as it were.  They will always be entailed by a probability and will perhaps also become more valid with 
the accumulation of materials (information, elements, and so on) and speculative (projective) production with them.  
(Hume 106, 124-55). 
182 Again, Benjamin’s observation about the barbarism inherent in civilization is apt. 
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according to reason and social norms that stem from it; however, reason and its mechanisms are 
secondary though integral aspects of human existence, not the core.183   
The Hume of the first and second books of Treatise, along with the Hume of such 
writings as An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, arguably knew this.184  The first book 
of Treatise reads like an essay on physics, and to an extent, it is just that—an essay on the 
movement of things, impressions, passions, and ideas.  Hume basically argues that there is no 
epistemological ideal or meta-knowledge, or to put it another way, there is no pre-written master-
narrative to which we can refer or on which we can depend.  Establishing the certainty of initial 
causes, overarching ideals, and predetermined truths is, to him, contrary to the movement of life.  
Then, in the second book, Hume follows Francis Hutcheson in charting out how the interactions 
between the material world and human senses, or passions, create knowledge and, more 
importantly, increased probabilities for humans in the world.  He renames Hutcheson’s moral 
sense and calls it sympathy, in an apparent attempt to make it more secular.  But without splitting 
hairs too much, the two concepts refer basically to the same thing—a collectively activated 
                                               
183 Human energy, what Hume following Hutcheson would call “passion,” is the basis of all human life; 
therefore, reason “is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to 
serve and obey them” (Hume 415). 
184 Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford, UK:  Oxford 
UP, 1999).  I must, in all fairness, write a brief apologia at this point before we turn our direction to Hume and 
Scotland.  As much as it might seem like it, I am not dismissing Kant.  In fact, he is good company as we chart out 
the material and political ramifications we face when co fronting radically fragmented global capital and its 
postmodern imperial logic.  Kant was extremely concerned about the tyranny of baseless dogma and anti-thought 
that he witnessed throughout history and during his life. To be frank, a Marxist would be hard-pressed to find a 
better example of a theoretical predecessor in the bourgeis revolution, except perhaps for Hume, as we will explore 
below.  The latter point leads me to the second part of this apologia.  The reason that Hume will be brought to the 
foreground here, but not Kant, is because we are dealing with the particularity known as Scotland.  By no means will 
Kant be absent.  Kant’s specter cannot help but haunt a discussion about Hume because much of Kant’s work, which 
is today more influential than Hume’s, was in large part a response to the Scottish skeptic.  But the Scottish skeptic, 
even more so than Hutcheson before him and Kant after him, rode on the crest of and contributed to one of the most 
powerful ruptures in humans’ comprehension of their own lives, the Enlightenment.  Hume’s being at the right place 
at the right time had much to do with him being in the middle of eighteenth-century Scotland.  Indeed, as we have 
suggested, Hume’s personal and political battles with Scotland and “Scottishness” go a long way toward explaining 
how he could be a founder of both modern particularistic empiricism and modern universal civility.  They also go a 
long way to understanding modern Scotland. 
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physical sense that connects individual human beings regardl ss of socio-cultural differences.  
Indeed, Hume’s ethic, like Hutcheson’s before him, is an integral thus communitarian life ethic.   
Even though morality is technically the topic of the third book of Treatise, Hume’s ethic 
is operating from the first book onward.  Hume’s is a practic l ethic, and a human-friendly one at 
that.185  According to Hume, attempts to locate first causes or to fathom providential intention 
lead people into a futile world of infinite regressions ad mystifying beliefs.  In other words, 
searches for capital-T Truth do more to lead people away from engaging and producing living 
truths.  By undermining optimism based on providential design, Hume resituates power in 
humans, at least until he appeals to the primacy of civil society in the last book of Treatise.  
There are sections of the third book that consistently follow the epistemological, psychological, 
and sociological insights of the first two books; however, Hume waxes more and more 
conformist as he proceeds, effectively undermining the revolutionary probabilities that dominate 
the majority of his groundbreaking work. 
Welsh’s story illustrates Hume’s contradictory positions, but like us, he sides in favor of 
Hume-the-materialist instead of Hume-the-classical-liberal; in effect, Welsh finds the former 
more valid than his antithesis.  Philosophically, one could certainly make the argument that 
Kuhn’s theories on knowledge, which Ornstein favors, are the direct postmodern descendent of 
Hume’s empiricism.  Alternatively, on McGlone’s side, one could say that Popper’s also are, if 
one looks at the latter part of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, his political tracts, and his 
historical writings.  Contradiction is in fact a significant characteristic of Hume’s philosophy—as 
well as his life.186  An interesting biographical commentary on this contrariness emerges when 
                                               
185 Hume 177. 
186 According to Tom L. Beauchamp, Hume bases his moral philosophy between particularity and 
universality, which allows for his “moral diversity, but do not translate into either a pure conventionalism or an 
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Welsh bases McGlone in Glasgow, where Hume wanted to go f r a “legitimate” academic 
career.  McGlone represents the establishment and retroactively anticipates what would have 
ostensibly happened to Hume if he had succeeded in procuring a position at the university where 
his mentor and greatest influence, Hutcheson, had taught.  McGlone does represent Hume’s 
conservative, or classical liberal, politics—bourgeois politics.  Ornstein, however, hails from 
Edinburgh, where Hume had ended up serving as a librarian after being rejected for 
professorships at Edinburgh University and the University of Glasgow.  Ornstein is originally 
from the New World, the American Midwest.  Not Ivy League and not part of Britain’s patrician 
intelligentsia, Ornstein represents the renegade philosopher.  He also undermines the classism 
and imperialism still extant in Anglo-Saxon politics.  What we are dealing with is not just a 
philosophical matter or a biographical matter—it is also a political matter.  
McGlone-Hume represents the quintessential citizen of the British Empire.  Hume’s 
politics were at least moderate and often conservative.  He was one of the Edinburgh intellectuals 
who helped man the city walls when the 1745 Jacobite Rebellion came down from the 
Highlands.  And his calling himself an Englishman for most of his life, along with writing one of 
the popular English histories of his time, made clear where is predominant socio-political 
loyalties were.  Like Swift before his expatriation to Ireland, Hume was radical philosophically, 
but his politics were far from antiestablishment, which means far from a resistance to English 
imperialism.  In fact, Alasdair MacIntyre provocatively links Hume to the Anglicization of 
Scotland and the virtual sellout of Scottish philosophy.187  The standards of modern civil 
society—not to mention international relations—that are justifiably affiliated with eighteenth-
century England do in fact owe much of their existence to Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, such 
                                                                                                                                             
unqualified cultural or historical relativism of standards” (Introduction, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of 
Morals 45). 
187 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 281-99, 300-25. 
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as Hume, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson.188  Whereas Ferguson’s theories of civil society 
were based on the martial aspects of ancient Rome and the Scottish Highlands,189 Hume’s ideas 
about an ideal government were obviously modern and bourgeois, formed with Westminster (not 
Holyrood) in mind.  In view of this, Hume himself practically defied his own insight about 
experiential knowledge by attempting to disassociate himself from Scotland and its unique 
philosophical and sociocultural heritage.  He might have, s MacIntyre suggests, tried to shoot 
straight toward an ahistorical universal—Anglo-British hegemony—by bypassing what he 
personally considered to be a constricting immediate context—Scottish antisyzygy.190   
But as another example of negative affirmation—or the otr side of his antisyzygy—
Hume’s materials were nevertheless Scottish.  Historically, politically, personally, socially, and 
culturally, Hume was in the middle of an intersection that was categorically Scottish, even if 
being categorically Scottish meant being categorically scattered.  He might have wanted to 
support the hegemony of Englishness in the United Kingdom, practically begging for his mind to 
be appropriated south of the Borders.  But the forces buzzing around him in eighteenth-century 
Edinburgh, that liminal city of Scotland, made him Hume, not his predecessor Newton or 
contemporary Locke.  Hume’s knowledge was formed in the confli ted reality only a Scot could 
know.   
This is the fact that Welsh ironically brings home when he has Ornstein pummel 
McGlone.  One can almost hear Welsh saying, “You cannot call yourself an empiricist unless 
you are willing to deal with reality or, even better, you cannot call yourself a Scottish 
                                               
188 Nairn, Faces of Nationalism 73-89. 
189 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. Fania Oz-Salzberger (Cambridge, UK:  
Cambridge UP, 1995). 
190 MacIntyre Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 312, 324. 
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philosopher unless you can handle a squerr go ootside.”  Knowledge is not based on reasonable, 
civil ideals.  It is based in human, material production—being, becoming, living.   
Ornstein-Hume represents the Scottish Enlightenment’s heretic.  Hume violated even the 
liberal stance of the Presbyterian Moderates, including Hutcheson.  His staunch atheism, unlike 
the more popular deism of the eighteenth century, broke with British polite society, including the 
academic tolerance of universities in Scotland’s Central Belt.  Consequently, he did not get the 
highly coveted Professorship of Ethics and Pneumatical Philosophy at Edinburgh University, so 
he spent much of his academic career as a librarian, not as a lecturer, in Edinburgh.  His thick 
Broad Scots dialect and gregarious personality are thought to have led to suspicions about his 
legitimacy as a respectable British thinker.  But such setbacks did not stop Hume from 
continuing his research or his writing as an increasingly popular public intellectual.  Even if his 
peers could lock him out of the halls of academia, they could not avoid having to deal with his 
theories.  His work’s significance is verified by the attention it received during and after his life.  
Moreover, he was irresistibly friendly and great company, not unlike his younger Continental 
counterpart, Kant.  He was and is a key figure of the Enlightenment overall, and of the Scottish 
Enlightenment and Scotland in particular. 
We will direct our attention to aspects of this latter Hume.  I am not ready to concede 
totally to MacIntyre’s premise that Hume was the thinker who handed Scotland’s mind and thus 
its body to England.  One Hume probably did do this, but ano her Hume, Welsh’s Ornstein-
Hume, set the groundwork for something else.  When McGlone chooses Popper as his theoretical 
predecessor, he violates one of the basic Humean tenets:  R ason is not primary, but secondary.  
Consequently, knowledge is not a miraculous, pure, linear, and impeccably logical unfolding of 
destiny.  On the contrary, knowledge is when two forces—bodies or passions—come into 
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contact and spark an impression.  Even then, knowledge might erely be an intuition or a 
partially apprehended event.  It might form the basis of a new habit, or it might rupture 
habituated knowledge (beliefs, assumptions, and the like) to open the way for other probabilities.  
One’s imagination might encourage him or her to move toward another probability, connecting 
impressions that would lead to the materialization of that probability, and perhaps rupturing the 
status quo.  Or one’s imagination might entangle a probability in fantasy, thereby disabling its 
materialization. 191  Is there some tool or filter that might help knowledge out of its logjams, 
ensuring fidelity between impressions and material reality?   
Enter logos.  Reason is what Hume calls a “calm passion,” which functions as mechanism 
that situates impressions and ideas so that they do not bec me bogged down in contradiction, 
imagination, and so forth.192  With reason, therefore, Hume does not provide us a path 
connecting experience with a predetermined end.  In other words, he is not giving us a treasure 
map with an “x” marking the spot.  He provides us with something much more democratic and 
ethical.  Before us, he lays out how we actually know—through materially grounded interaction, 
emotion, connection, correlation, speculation, and corre tion.  What Hume calls reason is fidelity 
to a truth emerging from a situation.  Reasoning, therefore, is mapping out the materials before 
us so that we have firmer ground to stand on.  We put them into their possible combinations.  As 
we do so, we begin to place them in their most valid or pr bable combinations, corresponding to 
the particular characteristics of a given situation.  A d from the present’s probabilities, we can 
then project future probabilities.  Then, of course, when w  enter the future—the next present—
we will continue likewise:  locating, situating, correcting, and projecting truths.  Hume, 
                                               
191 Hume 250.  
192 Hume 179.  Compare to Hutcheson’s characterization of the moral sense, discussed in chapter 3. 
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therefore, finds in humans the ability to produce understanding of the is but also the ability to 
produce what can be by working rigorously with what is. 
Is, though, is apprehended first and foremost from what is immediate, according to 
Hume.  Extrapolating his thought, the immediate includes not only immediate objects, immediate 
needs, immediate family, and so forth; it also includes the immediate social, cultural, economic, 
and historical forces that each human encounters.  In larger part, Hume’s philosophy does not 
support radical bourgeois individualism, in which humans, by some execution of individual will, 
single-handedly and ahistorically form the universe to their liking (that ultra-Calvinist capitalist 
God rears it head again).  Instead, as Marx later would, he finds the individual human being to be 
a focal point from which to ascertain what some have call d human nature or humanity—but 
what we, following Marx, have been calling species-being.   
The individual is the integration of diverse forces in a specific time and locale which 
congregates with other individuals.  Preceding Marx, Hume observes that general human 
experience, which is shared through the social interaction of individual humans, enables humans 
to produce their world.193  As a consequence, we come face to face with one of Hume’s most 
important insights—the speculative, or creative, nature of the labor of human knowledge.  
Knowledge is projective; that is, knowledge is built in the spatiotemporal immediate but is 
                                               
193 At one point in the third book of Treatise, the revolutionary Hume emerges right in the middle of a 
passage by the conservative Hume:  “Nothing is more vigilant and inventive than our passions. . . .  Nature has . . . 
trusted [human relations] entirely to the conduct of men, and has not plac’d in the mind any peculiar original 
principles, to determine us to a set of actions, into which the other principles of our frame and constitution were 
sufficient to lead us” (526).  Even though the sentences surrounding these intend to substantiate civil society with 
“three fundamental laws of nature”—stability of possession, its transference by consent, and performance of 
promises—these two sentences point to an alternative, em rg nt probability—the common.  Elsewhere, Hume 
becomes even more explicit about the importance of the common:  “Reduce a person to solitude, and he loses all 
enjoyment . . . and that because the movements of his heart are not forwarded by correspondent movements in his 
fellow creatures. . . .  The more we converse with mankind, and the greater social intercourse we maintain, he more 
shall we be familiarized to [our] general preferences and distinctions, without which our conversation and discourse 
could scarcely be rendered intelligible to each other” (An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals 109, 115).  
Compare to Karl Marx:  “Whenever we speak of production, then, what is meant is always production at a definite 
stage of social development—production by social individuals” (Grundrisse:  Foundations of the Critique of 
Political Economy (Rough Draft), trans. Martin Nicolaus [New York:  Penguin, 1993] p. 85). 
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always opening to possibilities.  With this characteristic of speculative knowledge, we approach 
the next portion of our answer to the question, “Whither Scotland?” 
4.3  Third Enlightenment Strand:  Cognitive Cartography   
How are Scotland and the Scots possible?  Let us turn again to “The Twa Dogs” for 
suggestions.  Through the personages of two dogs, Burns demystifies the terrain before him.  
Granted, he does retain a fondness for certain aspects of the “cot-folk’s” sociocultural life; 
however, and most significantly, he undermines the nobleness of both poverty and affluence.  He 
distributes blame to all Scots for Scotland’s status, which is a negative affirmation:  because of 
their own acquiescence and self-destruction, Scotland and the Scots are not only possible but 
regrettably very real.  They are instrumental in the production of Scottish subordination in 
general and their self-defeating estate system in particular.  What Burns does is this:  he takes the 
status quo of Scotland—a dissolute, subordinate stateless nation that may not even be a nation—
and galvanizes it.  Conflict was always probable because residual and emergent socio-cultural 
energies existed before the Scots even came to the west of Scotland from Ireland in the fourth 
and fifth centuries AD, and after they entered into the Union in 1707.  Class conflicts, existing 
before and after feudalism, were always probable; however, because of various historical and 
material reasons, they had not been systematically activated or they had settled into bad sense, 
submerged under residual forces.  Burns, however, makes a systematic attempt to activate or 
transform latent energies by intentionally agitating underlying conflicts.  He does so by 
employing a challenging though well-worn literary structure, allegorical estate satire.  As noted 
above, he modifies that genre by placing the meaningful action or labor off stage and into the 
world of the spectator.  And, not unlike what Swift does to the Irish in “A Modest Proposal,” 
Burns turns his dramatic poem against Scots to ostensibly spur them into resisting his 
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characterizations of them.  Effectively, Burns makes it impossible for Scotland and the Scots to 
not exist.  He vivisects them, which ironically affirms their existence and promotes their 
autonomy.194 
By means of a discursive trick, he encourages a situation in which not becoming an active 
subject is invalid, even if one begins out of anger, pride, and so forth.  But unlike Swift, a virtual 
outsider in Ireland during his time, Burns’s ability to alter his and Scotland’s situation is more 
likely.  His poems and songs not only point to how Scotland was, but they also point toward 
envisioning and building alternative probabilities for Scotland.  On the surface, poems like “The 
Twa Dogs,” “Holy Willie’s Prayer,” and “Robert Bruce’s March to Bannockburn” might seem to 
do little more than chastise the Scots for their failures.  In the case of “To a Mouse,” for instance, 
humans in general are taken to task:  their “best-laid schemes” are bound to fail when they are 
disconnected from the ground of daily human life.195  (Moreover, if Burns seems harsh, Welsh’s 
critiques of Scots make Burns’s pale in comparison.)  However, despite patinas of cynicism, 
fatalism, and disappointment, there is something highly affirming in Burns’s satirical and 
polemical poems.  (The same goes for Welsh’s fiction.)  How is this possible?  A complex 
productive practice of mapping is sparked in each literary instance.   
There is a strong mapping tradition in Scottish letters since, if not before, the 
Enlightenment.  Moreover, there is arguably a national purpose in this mapping, whether 
intentional or not.  In the eighteenth century, Tobias Smollett’s Humphry Clinker and Janet 
Schaw’s Journal of a Lady of Quality are good examples of this tradition.  In the Romantic and 
                                               
194 In this respect, Burns reflects the third phase of the native intellectual theorized by Frantz Fanon:  such 
an intellectual is one who defends “his nation’s legitimacy and who wants to bring proofs to bear out that 
legitimacy, who is willing to strip himself naked to study the history of his body, [and] is obliged to dissect the heart 
of his people” (The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington [New York:  Grove, 1963] p. 211).  If we 
may extend postcolonial status to Scotland—while certainly doing so with necessary qualifications—we will 
observe Burns as an intellectual for whom building an autonomus post-imperial Scotland means first mapping out 
its less than savory aspects. 
195 Burns 101-102. 
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Victorian phases, we have, as discussed, many of Robert Burns’s poems and songs, and we have 
Robert Louis Stevenson’s stories as examples.  Lewis Gra sic Gibbon’s A Scots Quair and Hugh 
MacDiarmid’s epic poem A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle are exemplary of the Modernist 
period.  And the postmodernists often turn to this cartographic l tack:  e.g. Alasdair Gray’s 
Lanark, William McIlvanney’s Laidlaw mysteries, Duncan McLean’s Blackden, Candia 
McWilliam’s Debatable Land, and A. L. Kennedy’s So I Am Glad.  What they have in common, 
despite their differences, is an acute consciousness of hi t rical and psychological displacement 
and fragmentation.  Consequently, there is an impulse to map out the disjointed terrain before 
them.  But there is also uneasiness in these writers’ works when it comes to pinning things down 
too much or marking out too definite a territory. 
Tobias Smollett, for example, scatters his charactes all over the United Kingdom, all the 
way down into Wales, in Humphry Clinker.196  The theme of illegitimacy, the frequent 
occurrence of absurd coincidences, the disjointed epistolary narrative, and the radically opposing 
opinions and personalities make this book intentionally frustrating and hilarious.  The Sterne-like 
playfulness is, as it was for Lawrence Sterne, serious.  A ragtag collection of individuals from 
different generations, social classes, and typecasts are on individual or group pilgrimages.  Like 
The Canterbury Tales, the whole body of this eighteenth-century novel is a collective voyage.  
But as we have noted about Burns’s poetry, the voyage is a dynamic process:  A Scot builds 
Scotland by first dispersing and then recombining its fragments.   
In the next century, Robert Louis Stevenson similarly tracks down evidence and connects 
the dots of a dualistic entity in The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.197  City streets, 
buildings, rooms, and mental pathways reflect and influence each other.  As the psychological 
                                               
196 Tobias Smollett, Humphry Clinker (New York:  Penguin, 1985). 
197 Robert Louis Stevenson, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (New York:  Penguin, 1994). 
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thriller progresses, one may sense how the barriers between physical structures and 
psychological states are all but nonexistent.   
Then, in the early years of the postmodern phase, Alastair Gray’s Lanark takes things a 
step further than its predecessors by making place and person indistinguishable while at the same 
time making place and person continually mutable:  both Lanark-the-person and Lanark-the-city 
are subject to frequent, unexpected spatial and temporal anomalies.198  For instance, Lanark-the-
person’s skin becomes that of a reptile.  Buildings, roads, and other structures come and go 
without explanation.  Distances bear little relation t  travel time.  Time itself speeds up or slows 
down depending on where a character is at a given moment.  Close literary comparisons can be 
made to Samuel R. Delany’s novel Dhalgren and his Neveryòn series.  
The mapping in such works reflects and advances the insights of Hume’s speculative 
philosophy discussed above.  Hume is in good company with these writers, for his theories 
helped open the door to the sorts of experiments his literary counterparts have pursued.  
Speculative empiricism, which is as much a creative cognitive system as it is a 
phenomenological or epistemological philosophy, brings to the fore not only situation-specific 
analysis—mapping out the is—but it also insists on extrapolating probabilities.  Expressly, if 
some thing, some place, or some situation can be thought f, t en it can be.199  To do this, 
humans actually use the probabilities of the present—in the “medieval” space discussed in 
chapter 2—to imagine something else, which makes that something else probable as well.  The 
veneers of apparently static sociocultural significations and predetermined historical movement 
are pulled away, opening up alternative probabilities, situations, r spaces.  To echo Hume, 
speculation based on material reality enables us to break th  hold of prejudice, which actually 
                                               
198 Alasdair Gray, Lanark:  A Life in 4 Books (San Diego:  Harcourt Brace, 1996). 
199 Hume 236.  
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forces a disconnection from material reality.200  To borrow Hume’s famous phrasing, intransigent 
custom and prejudice are based on what ought to be instead of what is.201  Hume’s theories, 
though, enable us to project another world (or other worlds) from our world instead of referring 
to idealized models.202  Hume’s avoidance of normative or predetermined systems points to his 
ethic:  sympathy for humans as they are and confidence in th ir productive capabilities.  His 
science, as he called it,203 demonstrates a conviction that humans can produce better is s when 
they grapple with the is that they inhabit than by producing more oughts to escape it.  This 
Humean ethic may help us to understand why seemingly fantastic literature is in fact very 
realistic, and it highlights the ever-present ability of humans to produce their world.   
Thus, Humphry Clinker is not a chronicle of weird characters’ journeys and opinions.  It 
is a document of sociocultural and economic forces that affect Scottish identity.  Mr. Hyde is not 
just some monster that Stevenson created to thrill readers.  He is a figure who calls attention to 
the unsteadiness of identity, the limits of juridical and scientific laws.  Lanark is not an 
ungrounded aesthetic experiment.  It is an attempt to situate humans in a society, if not a world, 
that is consistent only in its instability.  What we have re writers dealing with the materials they 
have been dealt, and they are trying to locate and construct omething different—and more 
vital—out of those materials. 
In chapter 2, we approached this topic of production from a more historiographical 
viewpoint.  We were interested primarily in locating the raw, or prehistorical, productive energy 
that powered historical production, which we then explored further in chapter 3 when we 
discussed the possibility of integrating that energy.  Here, we will focus on how such production 
                                               
200 Hume 421-22. 
201 Hume 470. 
202 Hume 431. 
203 Hume 273.  Marx, Grundrisse 83.  
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occurs in practice.  The discussion about Humean epistemology that has brought us to this 
point—specifically our focus on Hume’s speculative knowledge—lays the groundwork for an 
exploration of the practice of mapping in the modern Scottish national context. 
 In good Humean fashion, we should probably first state the is of “The Twa Dogs” and 
“The Two Philosophers.”  Earlier, we looked at the poem in a more literary and historical way, 
which is certainly appropriate.  Now, we are going to move even deeper into the systems and 
structures underpinning the tale.  The “reason” that arguably controls the world of laird and 
cottar in “The Twa Dogs” is a hybrid socioeconomic system hat sets up what is, overall, a rigid 
binary estate system:  decaying clan society, pseudo-feudal hier rc i s, and burgeoning 
capitalism form the environment for Scotland’s exploitative, self-absorbed property owners and 
stoic, self-destructive laborers.  This system is completely “reasonable” to the people of the 
poem, for it satisfies the ideals of an established hierarchy that both the higher and lower orders 
accept and perpetuate.  Indeed, this system was still at work in Burns’s time, perpetuating the 
cruelly rational predestinarian logic discussed in the preceding chapter:  some are the a priori 
elect, and most are the a priori reprobate.  According to that system’s members, therefore, they 
lived in a civil society.  But to continue as Hume would instruct us, we should see if there are 
other probabilities emerging from the is before us.   
The dogs, contrary to human common sense, find the human social system to be totally 
irrational and anything but civil.  In fact, they ultimately find it to be pathological.  The satirist 
himself, Burns, obviously discerns not only a radically ntihuman logic in this system; he finds a 
radically anti-Scottish one.  If not acknowledged as secondary to basic biological and 
psychological needs and labor, the logos and the civitas founded on it are biologically, socially, 
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and morally destructive to humans in general and to Scots in particular.  The dogs give us a 
starting point from which to move toward probabilities they do not actually state but imply. 
The similarities between Welsh’s “The Two Philosophers” and its eighteenth-century 
predecessor might not be readily apparent beyond their literary affinities; however, they both 
confront similar situations, and they similarly open up to alternative probabilities.  The “reason” 
that rules late-twentieth century academia in Scotland echoes eighteenth-century social 
hierarchies.  Before the two philosophers even step foot into Brechin’s Bar, Ornstein’s thesis has 
been proved.  Knowledge is contextually determined—determined by time, space, material 
factors, ideological factors, cultural factors, and so forth.  It depends on human beings, their 
social interaction, and their usage of materials at a given time, in a given place.  The very fact 
that two intellectuals have been having the same argument for years—at conferences, in journals, 
and so forth—points to the existence of certain material realities:  The academic world to which 
they belong is only possible in a particular socioeconomic environment.  Not unlike international 
corporations, “The Academy” is really a collection of fragmented bourgeois enclaves throughout 
a generally impoverished world.  The University of Glasgow is a case in point.  Glasgow, one of 
the first industrialized “New Towns” in Europe, is now like so many towns of its kind:  the 
greater number of its inhabitants are trapped in cycles of poverty and in unsatisfying jobs 
because of dried up industries, while those in the minority a e mobile professionals who live and 
work in areas practically removed from the larger materi l reality.  The very idea that a dialogue 
about knowledge is restricted to trained professionals is alo an indicator of a hierarchy similar to 
the one uncovered in Burns’s poem.  Institutionally recognized ntellectuals—patronized by the 
ruling class via universities, endowments, grants, and so forth—are the postmodern equivalents 
of the laird’s flunkies.  They have very little knowledge of the labor that actually creates and 
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maintains the basic material and societal structures that enable academic discourse, publishing, 
and so on.   
The auld Tommys of the world are integral to the intellectual labor of the philosophers, 
yet the academy is inaccessible to them.  Welsh, through Ornstein, accordingly points out that 
knowledge is only possible through reintegrating the so-called immaterial labor of intellectuals 
and the material labor of machinists, bartenders, neds, and the like.204  Or to put it more bluntly, 
as Welsh does, the mind has to be embodied, literally connected to the physical world.  
Knowledge can no longer be the monopoly of one select group of humans.  Knowledge is 
generated by everyone, and therefore, it must be redistributed to everyone in order for it to be 
viable.  Scotland, along with many places like it, is subordinate because of disintegration and 
misdistribution; consequently, as we are suggesting here from a Humean-Marxist perspective, 
distinguishing between lack in materials and lack in knowledge is superfluous.  Accordingly, 
Scotland’s self-concept and historical material status are practically one and the same.  So, again, 
one might ask, “How Scotland?” 
To find out how something occurs, it is advisable to find out what that something is made 
of.  Systems and structures—whether social, economic, or symbolic—are founded on a particular 
historical-material ground.  This goes for nations, too, which are systems composed of a matrix 
of other systems.   
In “The Twa Dogs,” Burns first gives us specific references to establish a ground.  We 
know, for instance, that the dogs are not only in Scotland, but in a specific area of Scotland.  The 
place that bears the “name o’ auld king COIL” is Kyle, Ayrshire.  Burns launches the tale from 
very near the place of his birth, which is culturally and socially more similar to the Border 
                                               
204 Following Hardt and Negri, we will take the segregation of material and immaterial labor as a symptom 
of capital’s inherent divisiveness.  Together, laborers of all stripes form the multitude, “all those who work under the 
rule of capital and thus potentially as the class of thse who refuse the rule of capital” (Multitude 106). 
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Marches and Highlands than it is to the Central Belt, the power center of Scotland during the 
eighteenth century.  So Burns situates the tale in a Scotland frequently ignored or made exotic.  
Moreover, the poem is unmistakably situated in the eighteenth century.  References throughout 
the poem to cottars (tenant farmers) and the relationship they had with lairds (landed gentry in a 
pseudo-feudal system) are references to an economic phenomenon that really came into being 
after the Reformation, the revolution that began the disintegration of monarchic hegemony north 
and south of the Borders.  Moreover, by explicitly invoking an ancient Scottish king’s name, 
Burns connects Scotland to a pre-English past, when the Gaels who emigrated from Ireland, the 
Dalriada Scots, were settling the western coast and island , and when they were absorbing the 
Picts to the north and battling the Brythonic Celts to the south.  A temporal marker also opens a 
fertile seam at the base of Scotland.  The placement of the poem in June puts it close to the 
Summer Solstice, one of the most holy days in ancient agrarian religions, including the religion 
of the Celts.  This connection is suggestive because of the dualistic characteristics and possibly 
emergent message of the poem.  According to Celtic myth, the Summer Solstice is the time of 
year when heaven and earth are married; consequently, the sun god impregnates the earth 
goddess in order to secure his rebirth following the winter.  It is also the mythical death of the 
oak king, which enables him to transform into his winter double, the holly king.  Burns was well-
versed in Scotland’s folklore, so such mythological elements cannot be ruled out as part of the 
ground.  Thus, in the first stanza of “The Twa Dogs,” before we even get to Caesar and Luath, 
we already have a ground that implies all of Scottish hitory, from the days of Gaelic chieftains 
to a beautiful midsummer day in the eighteenth century.   
Welsh, on the other hand, presents us with a ground that consists of one of the 
Enlightenment’s most profound epistemological battles, and it contains a Scottish common sense 
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haunted by self-congratulatory defeatism.205  The philosophical concerns of the Enlightenment 
were symptoms of dramatic changes since the Renaissance:  in technology, politics, population, 
economics, literacy, and so on.  Just as Scotland’s folk history is not erased from the world of 
two Enlightenment dogs, the Scottish Enlightenment haunts the world of two postmodern 
philosophers.  Moreover, as reflected in the work of Hutcheson and Hume, Scotland’s 
contributions to the Enlightenment include the notion that humans are interconnected at a deep, 
practically physiological level.  The punches and kicks flying in the last quarter of “The Two 
Philosophers” literally drive that notion home.  Welsh also locates in the ground a consistent 
tendency in Scotland to protect itself by abandoning itself—in effect, success through failure.  In 
the name of conservatism or “classical liberalism” or provincialism, Scots have facilitated 
Scotland’s subordinate status and its subservience to Sco tish and, thus, English elites.206   
So, is “The Twa Dogs” a medieval tale?  Is “The Two Philosophers” actually an 
eighteenth-century argument?  Burns’s poem is modern; likewise, Welsh’s tale is postmodern.  
Even if many of their materials are obviously from the past, both tales are significantly 
determined by their particular situations.  Neither tale is based in the past, but the materials of the 
past are integral to their grounds.  As we discussed in chapter 2, the present does not produce 
itself ex nihilo, out of nothing.  The past comprises the materials fromwhich the present and, 
therefore, the future are made.  There is a continuum of substances, even though the forms may 
differ:  history does not repeat itself, but it does build on or transform itself with materials 
produced along the way.  Therefore, a ground is a rich, dynamic space of the present. 
So, now that we have located a ground for both literary works, what do we do?  First, we 
might think back to the problem presented in the previous section, “Whether Scotland?”  The 
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problem was generally resolved by pointing to a negative affirm tion:  Scottish antisyzygy—
whether historical, philosophical, artistic, or psychological—is proof of Scotland.  The 
question—“Is there a Scotland?”—asserts Scotland’s existence.  This might still seem too 
abstract, even if it is not an abstraction according to speculative empiricism.  An initial reading 
of Burns’s poem, for example, could understandably lead one to b lieve that Scotland is 
disintegrating beyond hope, that it has been thrown to the dogs, that it practically does not exist.  
One would be justified in assuming that Burns is just pointing out Scotland’s success at being a 
failure.  But even in a brief analysis of the first stanza, we have found a Scotland that is an 
undeniable and rich historical-material reality.  This does not mean, though, that Scotland’s 
status, as presented throughout the tale, is the healthiest of probabilities.  As a consequence, we 
are endeavoring here not only to validate a negative affirmat on but to also demonstrate how 
Scotland can exist affirmatively despite its subordinate and self-destructive status.  Establishing a 
ground is the first step in mapping out what Burns and Welsh present to us.  With that said, we 
are now ready to do some mapping.   
Designating a ground and mapping out from it—versus, for instance, establishing a 
prefabricated national ideal and making everything fit intot—better enables us to understand 
how Scotland exists and what forms it can take.  This directly and intentionally reflects an 
insight of recent cognitive science:  instead of forming knowledge according to strict semantic 
rules or to an ideal, humans build knowledge spatially and temporally from a particular 
experiential location while tapping into a densely packed set of materials.  Humans do what is 
called mental mapping,207 which is a major recent discovery and subject of analysis.  To 
                                               
207 According to Gilles Fauconnier, a mapping, “in the most general mathematical sense, is a 
correspondence between two sets that assigns to each el ment in the first a counterpart in the second”; and 
“mappings between domains are at the heart of the unique human cognitive faculty of producing, transferring, and 
processing meaning” (Mappings in Thought and Language [Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge UP, 1997] p. 1). 
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investigate an instance of mental mapping, one in fact has to conduct mental mapping oneself.  
Accordingly, we will conduct a fairly thorough mapping of Burns’s Scotland in “The Twa Dogs” 
to illustrate the process, as well as introduce the terminology used by cognitive scientists to 
explain that process. Then, we will be prepared to conduct a briefer but more interpretive 
analysis of contemporary Scotland via “The Two Philosophers.” 208 
Through his presentation of the dogs’ dialogues, Burns expands the ground, Scotland, 
through cognitive construction.209  In cognitive construction, mental spaces are opened up from 
the ground, S in this case (Figure 4.1).210   
 
Figure 4.1 
With the production of new spaces comes the possibility of producing even more spaces.  Spaces 
can then connect to others, self-correct according to new data, and so forth.211  As a consequence, 
                                               
208 Our investigation will be informed by cognitive scienc, particularly cognitive linguistics.  As with any 
interdisciplinary activity, we will be synthesizing specialties:  in this case, cognitive science, historical m terialism, 
and literary analysis.  The intricacies of each field are many, so to make this investigation approachable for a 
broader audience, I will not touch on every aspect of, say, mental mapping.  Mental mapping theory is in fact an 
extremely active field, and its vitality is reflected in a growing amount of literature, key texts of which will be 
mentioned here.  Furthermore, we will be using an adaptation of a theory that has to this point been used primarily 
on analysis of individual syntactical units, brief instances of interlocution, and so forth.  We, of course, ar looking 
at larger materials:  e.g. concepts, historical information, folklore, sociocultural systems, and so forth.  Nevertheless, 
we will attempt to remain faithful to the core insights of the theory. 
209 Cognitive construction is the production of “mental spaces” (Fauconnier 34). 
210 Mental spaces “are the domains that discourse builds up to provide a cognitive substrate for reasoning 
and for interfacing with the world” (Fauconnier 34). The ground is background information; to be more specific, the 
ground is a particular event, its spatiotemporal context, and its participants.  See Fauconnier 42; and see Jo Rubba, 
“Alternate Grounds in the Interpretation of Deictic Expressions,” Spaces, Worlds, and Grammar, eds. Gilles 
Fauconnier and Eve Sweetser (Chicago:  U of Chicago P, 1996) p. 231. 
211 Contemporary mapping theory echoes Hume in a number of regards, but two in particular stand out in 
this context:  connection and correction.  Like Hume, cognitive science is generally not prescriptive but descriptive; 
therefore, it does not apply a truth to a situation firstand then find it in that situation.  Such would amount to an 
accountant “cooking the books” for a client.  Accordingly, mental mapping theorists “consider not the abstract 
relations of ideas, but their real connexions and existence” in natural language, a point which we extrapolate to the 
study of sociocultural production (Hume 453).  Correction of misapprehensions is also not effected by some 
revelation of truth, but by truths that emerge during cognitive production, or what Hume would call experience:  
S 
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the ground and the knowledge it produces can expand.  This is certainly a dialectical process, and 
according to leading practitioners of mental mapping theory, it is an experiential and 
physiological phenomenon.212  “The Twa Dogs” is a compelling instance of this process in 
action. 
Before Caesar and Luath even speak, they expand the ground by e tailing rich historical 
materials.  Caesar enters first, and his very characteristics imply correctly that Scotland or at 
least certain classes in Scotland are involved in mariti e activities that connect Scotland to the 
Continent:  “he was nane o’ Scotland’s dogs; / But whalpet some place far abroad, / Whare 
sailors gang to fish for Cod” (lines 10-12).  International relations have proved profitable, as 
Caesar’s engraved gold collar indicates (lines 14-15).  Luath, on the other hand, implies a more 
landlocked and less materially profitable side of Scotland, which historians say was the dominant 
side of Scotland during the period:  “The tither was a ploughman’s collie” (line 23).213  However, 
as noted earlier, Luath implies non-capitalist wealth, for lack of a better term; Luath also entails a 
connection to Scotland’s mythological, Gaelic past.   
Through these two dogs, Burns is able to first designate two focal points, or referents, in 
a frame of reference.  The frame we will be using relates to the material history of eighteenth-
century Scotland; accordingly, the referents are the elit s and the lower-level laborers, which we 
will respectively designate a and b.214  He also begins opening spaces215:  C for Caesar and L  for 
                                                                                                                                             
“Experience soon teaches us [the] method of correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language, wh re 
the sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable” (582).  Such correction would not occur without dialectical 
activity—ongoing connection and correction, to use Hume’s language.  
212 Rubba 240. 
213 See Bruce P. Lenman, “From Union of 1707 to the Franchise Reform of 1832,” The New Penguin 
History of Scotland:  From the Earliest Times to the Present Day, eds. R. A. Houston and W. W. J. Knox (London:  
Penguin, 2001) pp. 280-85, 290-96. 
214 Frames are “structured understandings of the way aspects of the world function,” which “general human 
cognitive capacities appear to include the ability (and the need) to set up” (Fauconnier and Sweetser, “Cognitive 
Links and Domains:  Basic Aspects of Mental Space Theory,” Spaces, Worlds, and Grammar 4).  “Frames . . . can 
be very schematic or more specific, depending on how far e delve into our knowledge base to take into account 
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Luath.  When Caesar is introduced, frame a is established in the ground, and space C is created; 
when Luath arrives, frame b is established in the ground and space L  is created (Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2 
From this point on, each consecutive passage of dialogue creates a new space: e.g.   Ci, L j, Ck, 
L l, and so forth.  And these spaces onnect through references to the foci a and b.
 216 
When Caesar does speak, he refers to the hegemonic minority of Scotland, a, from which 
he comes; he does so on his way to focusing on the marginal majority of Scotland, b, from which 
Luath comes.  Caesar first comments on the fact that the laird and even lower-level servants on 
the laird’s estate eat “a dinner, / Better than ony Tenant-man / His Honor has in a’ the lan’: / An’ 
what poor Cot-folk pit their painch in, / I own it’s past my comprehension” (lines 66-70).  Based 
on the materials to which he has access, Caesar’s first space is connected to the ground via a1’s 
reference to referent a, and b1’s reference to referent b.  Caesar maps out a cottars’ Scotland in 
which hunger and destitution are the norm.  Most of Luath’s first response (lines 71-82) validates 
Caesar’s assessment, so C’s fidelity to the ground is to this point intact.  Nevertheless, Luath 
adds a little more information:  “But how it comes, I never kent yet, / [That his master’s people 
are] maistly wonderfu’ contented; / An’ buirdly chiels, an’ clever hizzies, / Are bred in sic a way 
                                                                                                                                             
contextual specifications” (Fauconnier 12).  There is a high probability that each situation can have multiple frames 
and referents.  However, for the purposes of clarity, focusing on a smaller number of frames and referents at a time 
can yield deeper results. 
215 These are also known as “cognitive domains.” 
216 Mental spaces are “externally linked by connectors, that relate elements across spaces, and more 







as this” (lines 83-86).  Despite the cottars’ lack of nourishment, they find some way to live, if not 
thrive.  Therefore, L  is connected to the ground by 
2 referring to referent b (Figure 4.3).   
 
       Figure 4.3 
Something significant occurs after Luath makes his observation.  Caesar is not ready, 
based on the empirical evidence before him, to accept Luath’s information.  In effect, he points 
out the lack of fidelity in Luath’s space L .  He notices how Luath and his people are “negleket . . 
. huff’d, an’ cuff’d, an’ disrespeket,” and equated with cattle (lines 87-90).  Then he goes on to 
describe how inhumanely the laird treats them (lines 93-100).  He concludes that “surely poor-
folk maun be wretches” (line 102).  Therefore, Caesar creates space Ci, which is an expansion 
beyond C based on the additional data.  It connects to the ground by linking b3 to b1; because it 
downplays Luath’s data, though, the link is indicated by a broken line (Figure 4.4).217 
 
       Figure 4.4 
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Luath, “a gash an’ faithful tyke” (line 29), cannot disagree with the presence of elements 
in Caesar’s construction, but he adds new, more substantial da a to the mix, elements about 
which Caesar had been ignorant.  Luath provides a litany of the “poor-folk’s” riches, which 
include their families, conversations about religion and politics, harvest celebrations, New Year 
merry-making, and so forth.  To drive the point home, Luath adds, “My heart has been sae fain to 
see them, / That I for joy hae barket wi’ them” (lines 137-138).  The collie, therefore, creates 
space L j, connected to the ground via a link between b
4 and b2 (Figure 4.5).  
 
       Figure 4.5  
Despite Caesar’s earlier doubts, Luath’s mapping has proved its faithfulness to the ground.  In 
fact, with the emergence of space L j, Ci cannot stand as it is and be valid. 
To retain fidelity in his mapping and thus project probability, Caesar would have to 
construct another space to establish fidelity to the ground, Cij , connected by a link between b
5 
and b3, as well as a cross-spatial connection via a link between b5 in Cij  to b
4 in L j.  This in turn 
would correct the misapprehensions of the first Ci.  However, it is important to note that even if a 
previous space might be invalidated, in part or whole, it is s ill conserved.218  No materials are 
                                               
218 Modifying Fauconnier a bit, we are using the psychological concept of conservation, which cognitive 
linguists sometimes term “presupposition float.”  Moreover, r flecting Raymond Williams’s notion of “residual,” we 
will hold that even if a presupposition is challenged and halted, residues of it will continue to surface.  Fauconnier’s 
theory does not rule out such a possibility:  “A presupposition will float up into higher spaces, until it is halted.  It 










lost, just re-calibrated.  Caesar, though, does not actually construct Cij  in the poem.    
Nevertheless, based on the dialectical nature of the poem and on the personalities of the 
characters, Caesar would presumably create such a space and branch off from it, and that is why 
we will still construct the space (Figure 4.6). 
 
       Figure 4.6 
The turn of the poem comes about halfway in the poem—at the twenty-first stanza, right 
after Luath discloses that he has barked in joy with the “Cot-folk.”  Luath brings his attention to 
the people of the higher estate, the world of Caesar’s lai d.  He sees an increase in greedy rascals 
entering the aristocracy, doing their best to destroy laborers and undermining the noblesse oblige 
of nobility who “aiblins, thrang a parliamentin, / For B itain’s guid his saul indentin” (lines 144-
48).  So, Luath opens space L k, connecting it to the ground by linking b
6 to b4 and a2 to a (Figure 
4.7). 
                                                                                                                                             
will then remain in force for the mental spaces into which it has floated.  In other words, inheritance is not an ‘all or 
nothing’ process” (62).  Hume would say that such residues are possibilities that lack vivacity and vigor. 
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       Figure 4.7 
It is at this point that a mapping situation emerges which is parallel to the one that 
focused on the laborers.  Sometimes forgiving to a fault, L ath has constructed a space in which 
the higher Scottish nobility is noble in every sense of the word, but the lower nobility and 
ascending aristocracy are not.  Caesar is quick to provide Luath with more accurate and, for 
Luath, incredible data.  The nobility, their cronies, and ll their flunkies are the scourge, not 
stewards, of Britain.  They are far from being “For Britain’s guid! [They are] for her destruction! 
/ Wi’ dissipation, feud an’ faction!” (lines 169-70).  Caesar creates space Cl, which links to the 
ground by way of a link between a3 and a1.  Caesar’s evidence causes Luath to create a new 
space, L lm.  L lm reflects Caesar’s information and is connected via links between a
4, a3, and a2.  
Like Cij , L lm reestablishes fidelity to reality.  But unlike Caesar earli r on, Luath continues to 
equivocate and thus also creates another, counterintuitive, space.  Ln is a space Luath constructs 
to perpetuate his idealization of not only the nobility but also of the cottars.  He imagines that if 
the upper classes would only take part in more folk activities, then they would be honorable once 
again (lines 175-88).  He connects this space via linking a5 and a4, as well as b7 to b6.  These 
Lk Cij 
Ci L j 









connections mean that space Ln still includes Caesar’s information but in a repressed form, hence 
the broken lines in Figure 4.8. 
 
       Figure 4.8 
If Luath had been shocked into denial by having his romantic view of the nobility 
shattered, Caesar is apoplectic by Luath’s insistence on r habilitating the laird’s set.  He 
exclaims, “L—d man, were ye but whyles where I am, / Thegentles ye wad ne’er envy them!” 
(lines 289-90).  As Luath does in stanzas fifteen through twenty, Caesar provides a litany of facts 
about the higher estate.  Unlike Luath’s litany, though, Caesar’s does not provide a flattering 
picture of his estate.  He also uses the actual, not idealized, facts of laborers’ existence to contrast 
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the two estates.  Caesar, therefore, constructs space Co, onnecting to the ground by way of a 
link between a6 and a3, and by linking b8 to his last reference to b, b5.  As a consequence of the 
information Caesar has shared, Luath would have to create ano her space, Lop, in order to retain 
fidelity to reality.  As with a similar situation mentioned above, this does not actually occur in 
the poem, but we will go ahead and assume that such a projection would occur.  Despite 
instances of Luath’s folkloric conservatism, he is generally affable and open-minded.  Lop would, 
therefore, be connected to b in the ground by linking b9 to b7 and cross-spatially to b8.  It would 
be connected to a by linking a7 to a5 and cross-spatially to a6 (Figure 4.9).  
In their dialogue, which is effectively an exercise in Humean empiricism, the two dogs 
have in fact refined, reintegrated, and consequently enlarged the ground they both come from.  
When we refer to fidelity in mental mapping, we are actu lly delineating between possibility and 
probability.  The two instances in which Caesar and Luath lack fidelity to actual reality, they are 
certainly still dealing with possibilities, but these possibilities do not reach the level of 
probability.  Particularly in Luath’s case, we are confrted with one of those oughts that so 
perplex Hume, not to mention Caesar.  Another consequence of th  dogs’ exchanges is that they 
have helped Burns reach his satirical objective:  readers, pre umably his contemporary Scots, are 
encouraged to analyze themselves, to reconnect with the ac ual reality of Scotland, and to engage 
in a little cognitive construction of their own.  Now tha  we have the cognitive process and 
terminology of mental mapping in hand, we can now explore what Welsh is up to in “The Two 
Philosophers.”  
Ornstein is the first to be introduced.  Because of his Jewish-American and educational 
background, Ornstein indicates that Scotland is an international place and is, at least 
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         Figure 4.9  
  
superficially, a more tolerant society than it had someti es been in the past.  Moreover, by his 
very affiliations in the US and in Edinburgh, along with his Marxist leanings, Ornstein expands 
the ground of Scotland to effectively include all of Western academic and political thought.  
Ornstein is also greatly aware of his physical and social surroundings.  Consequently, the story is 
filled with references that help connect not only the reader to the narrative but also to its ground.  
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McGlone, on the other hand, demonstrates cosmopolitan insularity:  he is a snob.  As a member 
of the recently ascended Scottish bourgeoisie, he has very littl  interest in associating with fellow 
Glaswegians; nevertheless, he is a philosophical universalist, believing that all humanity is 
connected through idealized reason.  His perspective, though, broadens the ground by connecting 
it both to a specific class phenomenon that has occurred in variations throughout modern Scottish 
history and also to a general philosophical phenomenon of modern Western history. So, we have 
from our initial contacts with Ornstein and McGlone two parallel spaces produced out of the 
ground of Scotland, much as we did with Caesar and Luath. 
 Beyond the two spaces created by the introduction of the two characters, Welsh’s story 
does not begin mapping in earnest until halfway through, when Ornstein and McGlone leave the 
bar at the university hostelry.  So that we do not wander too far abroad, it is helpful to point out 
focal points, which for us are also referents, and their frame of reference.  The philosophers’ 
respective positions on epistemology supply us our focal points, and our frame is knowledge in 
postmodern Scotland:  McGlone is the defender of one focus, bourgeois rationalism; and 
Ornstein is the advocate for what he calls unknown knowledge, the other focus.  When Ornstein 
and McGlone disembark from the subway, they enter Govan, a working-class section of 
Glasgow.   
Immediately, another space opens up, and it is related to McGlone.  Among his 
colleagues and students, he poses as a man who pulled himself out of the mean streets of 
Glasgow, but the truth is something different.  In fact, he did not grow up in a Govan but in 
middle-class Newton Mearns, where he “had led quite a closeted life” (“The Two Philosophers” 
113).  Alternatively, from Ornstein’s side, a space opens up that connects the Chicagoan’s 
Jewish-Irish neighborhood to this place that is a “mixture of the traditional and new” peppered 
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with vacant lots (“The Two Philosophers” 113).  On the surface, these two instances of cognitive 
construction might seem unrelated to the frame we are using.  They are autobiographical details 
about class, place, and personal identity.  Nevertheless, as the story proceeds, the frame and 
spaces are integral to expanding the ground for the next instances of construction.  Govan is 
unknown knowledge, but by comparing it to known knowledge, South Chicago, Ornstein is able 
to proceed.  Unknown knowledge becomes known knowledge, which opens access to more 
unknown knowledge.  Particular situations, such as one’s place of origin, are not ends in 
themselves but are access points to more spaces.   
No sooner has Welsh disclosed these personal references to the two philosophers than 
Ornstein has to ask for directions to the nearest pub.  An elderly woman points them to the spot, 
Brechin’s Bar.  Ornstein, who is not up on his Scots pronunciations even if he represents Hume-
the-Scot, mispronounces the name:  “Bretchin’s.”  McGlone corrects him:  “It’s Breekin’s Bar, 
not Bretchin’s” (“The Two Philosophers” 113).  Then, Ornstein associates the correctly-
pronounced name with a town in Scotland by the same name.  He assumes, therefore, that the 
clientele’s football loyalties will be with the town i dicated by the name, but he is wrong, as 
McGlone points out.  The color blue on the game strips worn by the people going into the pub 
signifies the Rangers Football Club.   
Such seemingly mundane details are significant to the mental mapping and, therefore, to 
mapping this tale.  Each instance, however mundane, supplies the materials for building spaces.  
In Welsh’s tale, Ornstein consistently demonstrates his ep stemological stance by not wasting 
any moment and the materials each moment contains.  Ornstein quickly opens up a new space, 
and its viability is established by the link he makes with the previously unknown, despite some 
of the invalid conclusions he draws.  What he does not know does not keep him from 
 174 
constructing knowledge.  McGlone, as the voice of reason, intercedes.  This will force Ornstein, 
if his cognitive construction is to be valid, to modify his knowledge by constructing new spaces.  
Ornstein, like Caesar and Luath before him, does not seemto be someone who would be too 
resistant to modifying previous spaces by building new ones that include new data.  Because of 
the sensitivity to signs Ornstein demonstrates throughout te tale, he will have little difficulty 
creating spaces to accommodate proper pronunciations, differences in places despite nominal 
similarities, and so forth.   
Even though McGlone seems to have the upper hand on knowledge at this point, a look at 
his own new spaces will demonstrate that he does not.  As he narrator tells us, McGlone has led 
a relatively closeted life, and he is consistently not willing to expand the walls of his knowledge.  
In the moments after leaving the Underground, McGlone only pens new spaces in reaction to 
Ornstein’s cognitive constructions.  McGlone might posses  data that Ornstein does not, but it is 
Ornstein who opens up spaces in the face of new or “unknown” data, such as the location of a 
pub or the team preferences of the local soccer enthusiasts.  Regardless of how McGlone’s 
cognitive processes function, he does nevertheless map out new spaces because he, too, is not 
previously familiar with the situation into which Ornstein has led him.  In effect, if he is to 
continue on their little pilgrimage together, he has little choice but to open and enter new spaces. 
The two philosophers enter the pub, Brechin’s Bar, and cognitive construction takes an 
interesting, physical turn.  To start with, both philosophers r spectively build new spaces that 
practically renovate preexisting academic structures.  Where t  official academy has failed in 
growing knowledge, the pub reinvigorates it.  In fact, the pub has more in common with the 
academy envisioned by Scots during the Enlightenment than do the corporate institutions of 
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higher learning that dominate today’s academy.219  The pub, as in the public’s place kept by a 
publican, is an institution long tied to the sociocultural life of the common constituency, and in 
Britain and Ireland, the pub is a particularly important ins itution for the working and lower 
classes.  Certainly, imbibing alcohol is part of the institution, but it is secondary or 
complementary to its sociocultural functions, a factthat might escape some Americans.  Ornstein 
and McGlone also each create new spaces to accommodate their new peers, the two domino 
players who not only serve as referees but also as philosophers.  Of course, Ornstein has no 
problem with constructing these spaces, while McGlone is r si tant the whole time.  As noted 
above, though, when the discussion becomes more heated, it invites the younger pub goers to 
intercede.  Even with auld Tommy and his mate weighing in, Or stein and McGlone cannot 
seem to adequately deal with their age-old impasse.  The drunken, bloated-faced Rangers fan and 
his mates pick up on the friction, and they suspect that the two academics are doing the usual:  
patronizing the lower estates in order to carry on their p tty, self-serving activities, much like the 
gentry Caesar describes to Luath a couple of centuries before. 
It is important at this point to remember that McGlone a d Ornstein have let the cat out 
of the bag, as it were, because they have constructed and entered spaces that have not only 
altered their discursive context.  They have, through cognitive construction, entered into spaces 
that include the working-class Glaswegian pub goers and their entailed experiences and thus 
knowledge.  The previously unknown to McGlone and Ornstein is seeping into the known, and it 
quickly begins to flood in.  Before they know it, the two philosophers have moved into positions 
that overwhelm their biases and assumptions.  Along their journey, they have been building up to 
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this point where cognition becomes real.220  Knowing is when nerves, blood, muscle, fat, and 
fluid work in concert to engage the world and produce something out of that engagement.   
McGlone is not prepared for that engagement, which is why he cannot adequately counter 
Ornstein’s punches when they have their fight on the street outside of the pub.  All he can do is 
express surprise.  McGlone is incapable of employing the data (materials and energies) that he 
has before him, and this inability consequently keeps him fro building new spaces.  He is 
literally hard-headed.  There is no remarkable change in his attitude even after his skull hits the 
curb.  His inability to adequately fight his way out of this s tuation indicates that he has again 
entered another epistemological cul-de-sac, but this time the cul-de-sac is not one that protects 
his elite status.  He tries to disconnect once more fromthe world and the actual knowledge that is 
produced in it—the is.  However, each blow by Ornstein and then by the police w ll not permit 
him to return to the realm of ught, where he would continue to alienate the power of knowledge 
from the ground.  On the other hand, Ornstein has, through pen reception of materials and 
through cognitive construction, approached and then built strong connections to what had 
previously been unknown.  Possibility becomes probability.  As a consequence, each punch or 
kick Ornstein gives to McGlone is a resistance against the violence of epistemology founded on 
fantasy and prejudice—the antihuman core of preclusive reason.   
It would be understandable if one assumed that McGlone is bas cally a tweed-wearing 
bearer of wisdom, not much of a threat to anyone except maybe his students at grading time.  
One would hardly suspect him of being a cold-blooded authoritarian, perhaps the academic 
version of the trainspotting books’ Begbie or Filth’s D. S. Robertson.  When, however, we look 
at what he represents in relation to knowledge and thus to human life, he is a very real threat.  
                                               
220 I use this term “real” in its common sense manner, in the experiential sense given to it by cognitive 
science, and in the Lacanian sense.  
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Above, I noted that actual cognitive construction does not begin in earnest until midway through 
Welsh’s tale. We find out near the beginning of “The Two Philosophers” that cognitive 
construction has been in a “cul-de-sac” for most of these two academicians’ “parallel careers” 
(112, 111).  The first half of the story does nothing more than document the virtually paralyzed 
status of knowledge.  This is important documentation because it indicates the fact that human 
cognitive construction is not automatic and can be thwarted by the protectors of official 
knowledge.  Knowledge runs into dead ends because individuals can short-circuit knowing by 
abstracting it, restricting it, or as Jean-François Lyotard warned, cashing it in for vulgar 
performativity.221   
McGlone, of course, does not really mind this dead-ended situation.  He is a respected 
intellectual with a secure position at a respectable Scottish university, and this is not to mention 
he has students flattering him and making sexual overtures toward him.  In other words, he has 
accumulated a lot of cultural capital, and risking the loss f it is not a likely option.  Therefore, 
he is one of the bastions of the ruling orders, policing the very aspect of human life that makes 
humans human—the ability to transform materials into thoug t and thought into materials.  
McGlone perpetuates the disintegration of labor power, separating the human work of knowing 
from the work of being and becoming.   
To say the least, Ornstein is the veritable voice in the wilderness professing knowledge 
that is not sanctioned by the McGlones of the world.  He is deeply troubled by the status quo, a 
status quo that alienates and hoards knowledge.  He is not only conscious of the intellectual 
surrender his and McGlone’s academic deadlock represents; he is also aware of the dire 
sociopolitical implications that will arise if production of “legitimate” knowledge continues to be 
                                               
221 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington 
and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis:  U of Minnesota P, 1984) p. 6. 
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divorced from general human life.  He knows that another conference presentation, article in a 
refereed journal, or class lecture is not going to help the situation either.  So he turns to what has 
never let him down before:  “unknown science,” the kind of science that Hume proposed two 
centuries before and that ultimately prohibited Hume from university posts.  The primary 
Humean element of knowledge, an impression sparked by passion, comes most explicitly in 
Ornstein’s first punch.  Before the University of Edinburgh professor knows it, the citadel of 
knowledge, as personified by McGlone, crumbles to the ground.  New knowledge floods in.  
After the fight and after the police station, Ornstein returns to the streets, and like his literary 
predecessors Caesar and Luath, he descends into the very ground from which he emerged.  He 
reenters the Underground, where the public transport system will presumably carry him and his 
significantly expanded knowledge into Scotland, where he will connect and construct 
knowledge.  Ornstein, along with other Welsh characters, expresses a basic human need to 
imagine and realize other probabilities.  Nevertheless, a  cognitive construction implies and as 
“The Twa Dogs” and “The Two Philosophers” demonstrate, there are multiple probabilities. 
4.4  Enlightenment Virtue:  Emergence 
We have covered here two aspects of the question, “Whither Scotland.” Is Scotland 
possible?  And if so, how so?  We have answered by way of looking at the interrelation of 
cognitive construction grounded in Scottish historical-materi l xperience.  But we have actually 
done more than that.  We have encountered a productive proc ss that is not just a matter of 
abstract signification.  Philosophers—from Socrates to the Stoics, from Hume to Marx, and from 
Adorno to Derrida—have all pointed to the palpability of theory, to the worldly labor of thought.  
There is no reason, therefore, to assume that particul r situations, such as a nation, are split 
between a material reality and a theoretical one—that the life of Scot who goes to the pub after a 
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grueling day at the shipyard or unemployment line is divorced from what goes on in the 
philosophy department at the University of Glasgow.  Scotland is ot the culmination of some 
essence buried in the sinews and genes of the Volk; nor is it merely some imagined 
community.222  To be viable, it is an ongoing dialectic human process that employs material and 
immaterial labor.   
Above, I claimed that Welsh’s story had everything to do with Scotland.  Scotland is 
praxis, and mental mapping theory gives us a method to locate and analyze how that practice 
works.223  One begins with particularity, but we quickly find that p rticularity is itself rich with 
consequences.  A single spatiotemporal site is an intersection where many materials flow, and 
that the individual human is both a product and producer within such intersections.  Moreover, 
and just as important, the cognitive construction is not a monastic individualistic exercise.  For it 
to be valid and viable, it must be a radically cooperative venture.  It is an open-ended pilgrimage 
in which the pilgrims dialectically map out and build knowledge together.  Burns and Welsh 
illustrate this insight, and more significantly, they attempt to direct Scots to a praxis enabled by 
the virtues of congregation and integration but motivated by a virtue of emergence.  Poetry and 
fiction, therefore, are not academic to these writers.  Writing is material.  Writing is politics.  
Writing is ethics. 
                                               
222 Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imagined communities” runs aground when dealing with a situation 
like Scotland’s (Imagined Communities:  Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism [London:  Verso, 
1991]).  Even though he points to Scotland’s longstanding ethnic hybridity, linguistic diversity, and mixed 
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223 For a similar perspective, see Tim Edensor National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life 
(Oxford, UK:  Berg, 2002) p. 37. 
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How Scotland is probable brings us closer to what kind of Scotland is probable in the 
postmodern phase.  For a nation that is also not one, what is Scotland to be?  Being a nation or a 
nationalist does not by itself guarantee good sense.  Nations, national identities, and nationalisms 
come in all sorts of forms, and they do not necessarily demonstrate fidelity to truths, to 
experiential grounds, or to human life in general.  We are constantly—and rightly—reminded 
that the modern period was rife with instances of nations and nationalisms that base themselves 
on exclusion and even extermination.  The glaring examples, of course, are Germany in the 
1930s and Rwanda in the 1990s.  In both of these cases, racial essentialism was used as a brutal 
means to national ends.  Others, such as the former Soviet Union and today’s imperial United 
States, formulate themselves according to abstract ideals executed through mechanical systems, 
whether they are called bureaucracies, social services, or something other.  The USSR employed 
an extremely rational antihuman framework in the name of equality.  The US employs a highly 
mobile, protean, and hydra-like collection of systems that defuse resistance in the name of 
freedom.  Brutality is not far removed from either of these systems either, just obscured a bit by 
the respective ideal adopted by each.  There are also nations nd nationalisms founded on 
resistance against or emancipation from an oppressor.  South Africa and the Republic of Ireland 
are examples.  These are nations founded on opposition.  T  generalize, they have a bifurcated 
nature.  On the one hand, they define themselves as former r current victims.  On the other, they 
define themselves according to a national character—ethnic, societal, or religious—that existed 
before a colonial or imperial situation or that existed on such a situation’s margins.  There are 
many other examples, many of which are variations of the ones above or are hybrids.  Again, 
these are generalizations, but they reflect the dominant common sense about how and why 
nations, national identities, and nationalisms are formed. 
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 Nevertheless, Scotland and most other “lesser” nations or societies do not fit neatly into 
the sort of grand national narratives glossed above.  Pr sumably all instances of human 
socialization demonstrate one or more of the mentioned habits associated with building a nation 
or nationalism.  It is not uncommon for differences btween people to be distilled into essences.  
It is not uncommon for some shared aspiration or ideal to emerge in a human community.  Most 
groups of people have had a history of victimization or superiority r both.  So, really, the kind 
of nation or nationalism one has is really a matter of praxis.  Thinking back to cognitive 
construction for a moment, a nation or nationalism i characterized by the way it is mapped out, 
the probabilities it opens up, the fidelity or lack of fidelity to its ground, the ability or choice to 
correct itself according to new data, and so forth.  In other words, a nation or nationalism is a 
result of human production, which becomes a basis of further production.   
Returning to the etymology of “ethics,” the ethos of a nation or nationalism is its use—its 
praxis.  But people’s use of something does not necessarily equate to “good” use, as we have 
noted up to this point.  And in this so-called postmodern and post-nationalist era, the uses of 
nationalism are worthy of scrutiny, to say the least.  Nevertheless, re-conceptualizing what it 
means to be, say, a Vietnamese, Chilean, or Scottish nation today is perhaps a means—a praxis 
driven by a virtue of emergence—by which not only to glimpse national possibilities but also to 
produce the probability of a deeply connected, healthy global community.224  Doing so will help 
us to explore in the next chapter a Scotland defined indepenntly either of England or of a 
nationalist ideal while not neglecting its subordination t  imperialism and its own folkloric 
residues.  All of this will better enable us to conceive of a cooperatively constructed universal 
truth—a truth that will materialize in the counterimperial multitude and will make an alternative 
postmodern world a probability. 
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Nevertheless, to emerge from “the nastiness,” as Spud calls it in Porno (284), without 
inadvertently creating more nastiness, we will need to inc rporate one more virtue into the praxis 























Postmodern Loom:  Emergence through Forgiveness  
But Och!  I backward cast my e’e, 
On prospects drear! 
An’ forward, tho’ I canna see, 
I guess an’ fear!   
 
    —Robert Burns225   
 
What awaits us is a history of liberation . . . relentlss and as painful as it is 
constructive.  The constitution of strength is the experience itself of the 
liberation of the multitudo.  The fact that in this form and with this force 
constituent power cannot but appear is irrefutable and that it cannot but impose 
itself as hegemonic in the always renewed world of life is necessary.  It is our 
task to accelerate this strength and recognize its necessity in the love of time. 
 
      —Antonio Negri226 
 
A sacred, magical brown bull, Donn Cuailnge, from ancient Cooley, Ireland, has escaped 
and is charging through the Isle of Erin with an entourage of hundreds of cattle.  All of the 
ancient Scoti—the Irish—are after him because the rules of sovereignty depend on it.  Medb, a 
goddess who has been degraded to the level of a mortal queen by the time of the ancient Gaelic 
epic Táin Bó Cuailnge, and her husband Ailill have had a domestic dispute over who has the 
most power, using their individual material possessions as evidence.227  They are equal in 
everything except a bull that belongs to Ailill.  Medb conspires to steal from Ulster Donn 
Cuailnge, the most physically and magically powerful bull in Ireland.  Her plan is perfect, 
considering that the cattle raid (táin) will take place while the warriors of Ulster are paralyzed.  
During holy periods, particularly during the Celtic new year of Samhain, the men of Ulster are 
immobilized by birth pangs, as a result of a curse.  But there is one warrior, Cúchulainn, who is 
not affected by the curse, a fact Medb and the rest of Ireland comes to regret overlooking.   
                                               
225 Burns, “To a Mouse, On turning her up in her Nest, with the Plough, November, 1785” 101-102. 
226 Negri, Insurgencies 336. 
227 Thomas Kinsella’s translation of Táin Bó Cuailnge is still considered the most authoritative, 
approachable one:  The Táin (Oxford, UK:  Oxford UP, 1969).  Unless otherwise stated, his is the translation we 
will be using. 
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Accompanied by his charioteer Laeg, the “Hound of Culann,” which is the meaning of 
Cúchulainn’s name in Gaelic, becomes the sole protector of Ulster.  Cúchulainn is Ulster’s King 
Conchobor’s favorite hired sword, even though Cúchulainn comes from questionable parentage 
and low estate.  His special abilities in martial artsnd his manic emotional condition prove 
useful to the kingdom’s needs, even though Cúchulainn’s volatility is the cause of recurrent 
comment and accommodation.  When word gets to Cúchulainn about Medb’s plot and the 
fugitive bull, he immediately takes on the bandits, which begins a full-fledged internecine war.  
Among the fords and standing stones on the Murtheimne Plain, he single-handedly engages and 
kills the majority of Ireland’s armies, including former friends and even a foster-brother.  Only 
after he has fended off four kingdoms’ warriors for over six months, and after he is near dead 
himself, the Ulstermen recuperate from their pangs and come t  assist Cúchulainn in the final 
battle.  But it is uncertain whether Conchobor and the Ulstermen are truly committed to the 
cause.  After a lengthy battle, Ireland, including Ulster, is exhausted by war, so it is decided that 
Donn Cuailnge and Ailill’s bull will settle the dispute.  The bull of Ulster wins against the bull of 
Ireland and spreads his remains throughout the whole island.  Nevertheless, Ireland remains at 
war over the coming years, and Cúchulainn ultimately comes face to face with his deliverer, a 
raven.  
 In the veldt of 1980s apartheid South Africa, a giant Marabou Stork and its entourage of 
other Marabou Storks threaten to destroy all of the wildlife in a tropical paradise that Scottish 
émigré and businessman Lochart Dawson plans to develop into elite housing and an upscale 
nature preserve.228  None of the black Africans are, according to Dawson, up to the task of 
protecting the property.  So he hires Scots Roy Strang and Sndy Jamieson to take on the job of 
finding and killing the marauding band of enormous, nightmarish birds.  Roy is an unlikely 
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mercenary because of his extreme lack of self-confidence.  He is preoccupied about his and his 
siblings’ parentage, his appearance, and his sexuality.  He is also self-conscious about his 
socioeconomic background, which is the root of most conflict between him and his employer.  
Even so, he is even more committed than Dawson or Sandy when it comes to the task at hand.  
The storks prove elusive but belligerent, so the closer Roy and his driver Sandy get to finding 
them, the more carnage the birds create.  The storks kill whole colonies of flamingos—thousands 
of the birds—as well as anything else that gets in their way.  Finally, though, in the last few 
pages of Nightmares, Roy comes face to face with the leader of the Marabou Storks, the monster 
and perhaps savior that he has been chasing throughout the book. 
Both Cúchulainn and Roy might come across as variations of the sort of heroes so 
popular in Hollywood movies.  One can almost hear the scr enwriter’s pitch:  “Despite all 
reasonable odds, a Celtic warrior faces duplicitous and horrifying foes to come out on top and rid 
the world of evil.”  To see our hypothetical pitch coming to fruition, one need only look to two 
popular “Scottish” movies and an “Irish” memoir-turned-film-sensation that came out in the 
1990s:  Rob Roy (1995), Braveheart (1995), and Angela’s Ashes (1999, 2000).  Celtic myth and 
legend—whether Gaelic, Arthurian, Welsh, or Scottish—are rly, if ever, unambiguous.  
Indeed, it is uncertain how heroic Cúchulainn and Roy actually are.  It is also unclear whether 
the two are fighting against evil or fighting for it:  both serve as mercenaries to less than credible 
lords, an arrogant king and a sadistic capitalist, respectively.  Indeed, one would be hard-pressed 
to find in Gaelic mythology or Welsh’s body of work anu problematic protagonist.  
Cúchulainn’s and Roy’s death tales further articulate this ambiguity. 
Years after The Táin, Cúchulainn has done his usual day’s work in a battle, single-
handedly cutting down hundreds of men and evading magic.  Then, unexpectedly, he is mortally 
186 
wounded by a cursed spear thrown by Lugaid, the son of a man who Cúchulainn betrayed and 
had murdered.  Cúchulainn’s life’s work of killing comes back to haunt him.  Cúchulainn drags 
himself to a standing stone, and with a belt, he defiantly straps himself upright to the stone so 
that he does not sit or fall prone to the ground.  This is when Morrígan, an enigmatic goddess 
who commonly takes the form of a raven, lands on his shoulder.  Her gesture is apparently what 
signals Lugaid to come and finish his revenge by decapitating the Hound of Ulster.229  However, 
it is unclear if Lugaid kills Cúchulainn.  Perhaps the raven has delivered the hero from death 
before Lugaid’s blade touches the Hound’s throat. 
After Roy has chased the leader of the Marabou Storks f an indeterminate period of 
time, a final confrontation occurs.  “The large Stork was right there,” observes Roy, “But 
something was far from right” (Nightmares 258).  The scene and the personae in it keep 
transforming into other places and other people.  Roy has difficulty figuring out who is his 
enemy:  “I hear other voices shouting.  Their faces are just at the periphery of my vision” 
(Nightmares 261).  Apparently, he, too, is affected by whatever strange forc  has descended on 
the scene of the final battle, for his trusted companion Sandy has a gun pointed at him.  In his 
final moments, before Sandy pulls the trigger, Roy looks into a mirror and “sees the image of the 
Marabou Stork.  It’s on the flamingo . . . tearing into it, ripping it to shreds, but the flamingo’s 
still alive, I see its dulled eyes” (Nightmares 262).  Is this a reflection of something occurring in 
the background?  Is it an allegorical or clairvoyant image presented by an oracle-like mirror?  Or 
is Roy seeing himself, literally and figuratively?  If so, is he the stork or the flamingo?  We soon 
get an idea in Roy’s final monologue: 
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The sun is rising behind me and my shadow spills out away from it, out in front of 
me.  My spindly legs, my large overcoat, my massive beak . . . I have no visible 
ears. . . .  I have the gait of a comical scarecrow, I shuffle like an old man who has 
shat his pants. . . .  I spread my large, black wings. . . .  (Nightmares 264) 
Nevertheless, Sandy has turned his shotgun on Roy-the-Stork, and it goes off.  As in 
Cúchulainn’s case, it is unclear whether Roy-the-Stork flies away before or after the blast.  Has 
the bird delivered Roy to death, or from death? 
 We will soon return to that question. 
It might seem odd that I would introduce such a markedly postmodern ethical system and 
a markedly postmodern novel with a Gaelic epic that predates even the Fenian literature we 
discussed in chapter 2.  But juxtaposing them as ethical and literary documents of historically 
distinct sociocultural situations that share common materials and energies helps to set the stage 
for the following analysis.   
Addressing their literary juxtaposition first, the similar ties between Welsh’s Nightmares 
and the ancient Gaelic Cúchulainn stories from the Ulster Cycle are, to say the least, remarkable.  
They are both epics in form and scope.  They are focused on extremely ambiguous characters.  
They are written during historical periods of monumental conflict and change.  They are both 
“Scottish” in the sense that they respectively document 1) the situation of the people (the Scoti) 
who would become the primary shapers of Scottish history du ing the first millennium AD, and 
2) the situation of the people who will decide Scotland’s future as it enters the third millennium. 
Even though these epics are from distinct time periods an  are written in different styles 
(one in Gaelic poetry, the other in modern prose), theys are the same basic elements of their 
shared genre.  To achieve the objective of a quest that actually moves on many levels, the 
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protagonists must go on a journey that is mythological, emotional, and empirical.  As epic 
protagonists, Cúchulainn and Roy are allegorical figures.  They are intended to represent 
everyone.  Nevertheless, because epics are typically tied to a particular sociocultural situation 
(e.g. The Odyssey to ancient Greece or The Bluest Eye to black America), an epic’s protagonist 
bears the unique problems and hopes of his or her particula situ tion.  Therefore, Cúchulainn is 
a representative of prehistorical Gaeldom, and Roy is a representation of postmodern Scotland.  
The former situation is marked by severe unrest and transformation at the dawn of the Roman-
dominated medieval period, and the latter marks a situation of subordination on the inner 
periphery of the empire of late capital.  Moreover, what is treated as “historical” in epics is 
actually a blending of the mythological and the historical.  Those events which seem fantastic 
have substantial impact on those which seem mundane, and vice versa.  Also a hallmark of the 
epic tradition, one narrative strand intersects with, digresses from, or interrupts others, thereby 
justifying, contextualizing, correcting, or enriching another na rative strand or the whole story.  
It is a complex process of mental mapping.230  As students of epics or sagas might also know, the 
genre is rarely written (or sung) just to entertain, and they are not just told to transmit myths, 
inspiration, or historical facts.  As entertaining and instructive as epics may be, they are 
significant because they are deliberative and prophetic—they try to solve a problem and project a 
solution.  In effect, they try to make history.  They do not, therefore, separate the past, present, 
and future, but bring them into vibrant though sometimes confli ted interaction. 
Thus, Welsh’s working in the epic tradition and our touching o  it here are not pre-
modern regressions.  The epic is a dialectical literary process that can perpetually uncover 
emergent materials and energies, and Welsh’s second novel arguably fills the bill on all counts. 
                                               
230 See chapter 4 concerning mental mapping. 
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Now addressing the ethical juxtaposition of the Ulster Cycle and Nightmares, the two 
worlds that Cúchulainn and Roy inhabit are ones where forgiveness is all but destroyed.  In 
Cúchulainn’s situation, a world based on regeneration beliefs and a proto-democratic society of 
tightly-knit agrarian communities is dissolving under a culture of war and power-consolidation 
that is burgeoning throughout Europe.231  In Roy’s situation, the culture of war and accumulation 
has become hegemonic and has become an empire of death.232  The plight of the multitude, 
which Roy represents in Nightmares, is bleak.  Nevertheless, an alternative probability is 
negatively implied—a generative, cooperative world.  What is lacking in both worlds, though, is 
the virtue of forgiveness.  In the case of Cúchulainn’s situation, the consequence is the adoption 
of a death-ethic over the life-ethic entailed in much of Celtic sociocultural fabric.  In case of 
Roy’s situation, the potential consequence is the total liquidation of life—human and 
otherwise—and thus a tragic end of history.233  
In both stories, the virtual outcasts of their respectiv  societies—Cúchulainn and Roy—
perpetuate systems that are determined to consume them, not forgive them.  These are systems 
without room for forgiveness because, as we have charted in the preceding chapters, they depend 
on giving up, not giving to, others.  Systems of war and death depen  on giving up, not giving to, 
oneself or others.  Therefore, such systems create a si uation in which humans do not give to 
themselves and to each other the very possibility—no, probability—of accessing and producing 
what makes them human, life.  Consequently, humans become like “some animal being eaten 
                                               
231 Mary Condren, The Serpent and the Goddess: Women, Religion and Power in Celtic Ireland (Dublin:  
New Island, 2002) pp. 23-43, 113-127. 
232 As a term, “empire of death” will at first seem hyperbolic.  Nevertheless, if one takes seriously, for 
instance, Hardt and Negri’s arguments concerning corruption and perpetual war, as well as the ecological dissters 
that are currently underway, then this is not hyperbolic at all (Multitude 3-95).  Nevertheless, if invoking the 
terminology still seems like hyperbole, then perhaps it will at least spur further argument and study. 
233 I am purposely alluding to and countering Francis Fukuyama’s thesis that neo-liberalism and late 
capitalism have emancipated humanity from the determinatio s of historical-material reality.  See Francis 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York:  Harper Collins, 1992). 
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from behind while its face seem[s] to register disbelief, fear, and self-hate at its own impotence,” 
as Roy notes about the look on Kirsty’s face as he rap s her from behind while holding a mirror 
to her face (Nightmares 183).  Estranging life, which is giving up on the vital present that is 
made probable by past presents and that makes probable future presents, is a catastrophic 
historical-material phenomenon. 
So, returning to our earlier questions about the raven and the stork, do the ambiguous 
birds that visit Cúchulainn and Roy at the end of their respective tales deliver them to death, or 
from it?  As one might guess by now, the answer is not explicitly stated in Welsh’s novel; nor is 
it clear in its Gaelic predecessor.  From here on out, we will focus our attention on Nightmares; 
nevertheless, materials and energies from the prehistory of Scotland’s Irish predecessors will 
periodically emerge.  On the one hand, their emergence will illustrate the insights of the 
historical-material historiography theorized and practiced by such Marxist thinkers as Antonio 
Gramsci, Walter Benjamin, and Raymond Williams (the historiography and thinkers which have 
influenced much of this study).  On the other hand, the prehistorical Gaelic materials and 
energies will give us a “language” to use as we analyze Nightmares.  For example, the figural 
importance of the Marabou Stork becomes clearer when the Stork is understood as a postmodern 
emergence of Morrígan, the raven who visits Cúchulainn as he i  about to die.  As we have 
discovered in the preceding chapters, Welsh’s work invites such connections—congregations 
and integrations.  For Welsh, like James Joyce, everything is in play.   
In Nightmares, Welsh once again gives us a rich ground of materials and energies from 
which to construct probabilities; therefore, this last chapter will weave a map that will lead us to 
our answer about the bird figure.  To help us navigate this rich ground and the multiple 
probabilities it might enable, Welsh effectively gives us a compass.  Welsh drops hints 
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throughout his whole body of work, including in Nightmares, that something hangs in the air 
between us, “just something, some kind of second chance” (Glue 455).  This is admittedly not 
the most deterministic compass, but it will still help us to not wander aimlessly as we proceed.   
To begin addressing the complicated situation presented by Nightmares, we probably 
need to take a somewhat Calvinistic approach to the text:  nail down the book, discover its 
ultimate concern, and do not get lost in the magic that emanates from it.234  The basic 
background and plot of Nightmares runs like this:  Roy Strang, the son of John and Verity 
Strang, is from Edinburgh’s schemes, like the characters in Tra nspotting, Glue, and Porno. 
Unlike the trainspotters and hooligans, Roy is a loner, reminiscent of Bruce Robertson in Filth 
and Boab Coyle in “The Granton Star Cause.”  Partly because of his socioeconomic status, partly 
because of being a victim of childhood rape, and partly becaus  he has never had the opportunity 
to root himself in any ground, Roy is “a dangerous floater” (Nightmares 107).  When we meet 
him, he is comatose in the hospital.  His coma is the result of a failed suicide attempt.  He 
narrates his story to us while in a semi-vegetative stat.  From what he tells us, we may piece 
together what brought him to this point.  Despite being acquitted of brutally raping Kirsty 
Chalmers, or perhaps because of his acquittal, Roy came to realize that he had benefited from the 
unjust society that had tormented him throughout his whole life. His inability to cope with his 
life of brutality against others, most notably the brutal rape of Kirsty, compelled him to take his 
own life.  To settle the score, per se, he taped a plastic bag over his head and passed out while 
watching a soccer match on television.  Before he could die, though, he was found and sent to 
the hospital, the location from which Roy narrates his life to us.  During the time Roy is in the 
hospital, he is tended to by nurses and doctors; he is visited by his mother and father, his two 
                                               
234 To borrow Calvin’s words, a reader “stands in need of some guidance and direction, as to what he [or 
she] ought to look for . . . he [or she] may not wander up and down, but pursue a certain path, and so attain the end 
to which” the text invites the reader (22). 
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brothers and sister.  He is also visited by a woman who does not disclose herself until the last 
quarter of the novel.  Roy discovers, and thus we discover, that she is Kirsty.  As the novel nears 
conclusion, Roy begins to return to consciousness, and Kirsty realizes this.  This is the moment 
she has been waiting for.  She cuts off his eyelids, remov s his feeding tube, cuts off his penis, 
stuffs it into his mouth, and stabs him in the neck with surgical scissors.  She leaves him to die, 
hemorrhaging and suffocating. 
 The narrative is divided among three levels of consciousness:  deep subconscious, 
subconscious, and semiconscious.  Roy moves between a dram world, which is at the deep 
subconscious level, and a memory world, which is at the subconscious level.  Periodically, the 
external world intercedes when he comes close to consciousness.  Therefore, he moves back and 
forth between two strands of knowledge that we have previously discussed:  mythos and pathos.  
In this novel, mythos is split between a terrain of mythology and a terrain of memory—between 
the heroic mercenary who hunts the Marabou Stork in beautiful South Africa and the dangerous 
floater who terrorizes one of Edinburgh’s roughest housing cheme communities, Muirhouse.  In 
effect, these are two interconnected mythos-scapes, op rating like Peter Pan and his shadow.  
Alternatively, Roy’s pathos-scape consists of basic sensorial stimuli and raw emotions until near 
the conclusion of the novel.   
And logos?  The part that logos plays in Nightmares is consistent with speculative reason, 
as explored in chapter 4.  The narrator who moves back and forth across the terrains of Roy’s 
consciousness is inextricably linked to each dimension but cannot restrict itself to any particular 
terrain.  All levels of Roy’s consciousness present Roy-the-narrator with materials and energies; 
thus, the narrator is a conduit.  As discussed in the Introduction and systematized in the previous 
chapter, a conduit does not master the various materials and energies that flow to it; instead, a 
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conduit congregates and integrates those materials and energies to bring about the emergence of 
an alternative probability.  Logos is this compositional mechanism; thus, Roy-the-narrator is a 
weaver and mapper that mirrors Welsh’s writing technique.  H is the logos-conduit working 
with the materials coming to him from the mythos- and pathos-scapes.  
At this point, it might prove helpful to restate that these aspects of knowledge have been 
instrumental in discovering the three virtues that we have located in Scotland’s historical-
material fabric.  Moreover, let us review how those virtues interact.  Congregation brings 
emergent materials and energies together.  This convergence is impossible without the human 
individual who can integrate these materials and energies into his or her being.  Therefore, 
integration connects emergent materials and energies to the individual so that he or she may 
enter into congregation.  These two virtues are actually interrelated processes.  By themselves, 
they are not substantially productive.  Incorporating or sharing materials might not produce 
alternatives to the status quo, “the nastiness” (Porno 284).  Enter emergence.  It brings about a 
constructive dynamic when added to the other two virtues.  When integration and congregation 
are connected to emergent force, a creative navigational process begins, in which alternative 
probabilities begin to materialize. 
On the one hand, this tripartite praxis might appear too idealistic.  Because it entails 
elements of creativity, sympathy, and purposefulness, it inadvertently gives the appearance that 
residual bad sense has disappeared—that the nastiness never existed.  But as chapter 4 has 
demonstrated, all materials and energies—whether emergent or residual—continue to exist 
within emergent constructions.  (Effectively, the materi ls and energies of the past are never 
lost.)  What makes common sense or dominant society good,bad, emergent, or residual is a 
matter of ethos—how existing materials and energies are used.  The ethos operating in a 
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situation is the key to ascertaining what probabilities will materialize.  On the other hand, 
because of the construction-like characteristics of this praxis, the whole ethic presented here 
might come across as too mechanical.  In light of this, is there a virtue at work as the virtual 
spirit or soul of the systematic trio of virtues we have lready uncovered?  Indeed, there is:  
forgiveness.  What is interesting about this virtue is that it does not exist independently of 
congregation, integration, and emergence.  These apparently mechanical virtues and the 
productive mechanism to which they give rise produce something no -mechanical but 
nevertheless integral to them.  Forgiveness is not a spirit that we can insert into the tripartite 
praxis that makes up the ethic of emergence; it is one that this praxis brings into being.  Even so, 
forgiveness cannot be taken as a given.   
As we have seen throughout this study, and as our discussion of Nightmares has already 
indicated, the three virtues that we have presented (not to mention the three ways of knowing) 
can be disconnected, perhaps still are disconnected, and can again be disconnected even after 
they have been connected.  Moreover, their disconnectio is something that the dominant system 
of our day—the empire of late capital—desires and facilitates.  In order to continue as an 
emergent practice, the process that gives rise to forgiveness must continue to reincorporate 
forgiveness into every aspect and thus into the whole prcess.   
Individually, each “mechanical” aspect of the ethic of emergence—congregation, 
integration, and emergence—implies some level of forgiveness.  To bring about congregation, 
individuals must be willing to take the risk of giving themselves to each other, not despite their 
differences, but with their differences.  In effect, a congregation of individuals must forgive each 
individual.  To bring about integration, each individual must be open to all materials and 
energies from the multitude of human individuals; thus, e or she must be forgiving.  To bring 
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about emergence in a particular situation, a congregated multitude of integrated individuals must 
not only forgive any nastiness in that situation; that multitude must also be able to give itself to a 
previously unknown alternative situation.  In effect, such a multitude must “fore-give” itself to 
the probability that it has mapped out before itself from the materials and energies that it has 
congregated and integrated.   
Nevertheless, as we have discovered, congregation, integration, and emergence cannot 
occur in isolation, at least not in any substantially ethical way.  Congregation must give itself to 
integration, and vice versa.  They must weave in and out of each other.  Once the interaction 
between congregation and integration is established, the congregation-integration process must 
give itself to the emergent probability that it has enabled.  If this process resists continuing 
toward a probability that it has opened, as McGlone does in Welsh’s short story “The Two 
Philosophers,” then it jeopardizes that alternate probability.  Equally as important, such 
equivocation also permits the dominant situation from which the congregation-integration 
process is emerging to appropriate and neutralize its emerg nt materials and energies.  All told, 
then, the virtue of forgiveness entails individuals giving themselves to each other, giving 
themselves to a cooperative praxis, forgiving the situation from which they emerge, and giving 
themselves to an alternative future to which they themselve have given birth.   
In the final pages of this study, we are going to weave together the threads that we have 
untangled from the Scottish situation.  More expressly, we are going to juxtapose the three 
virtues of the emergent praxis that we have uncovered in the medieval, Reformation, and 
Enlightenment situations by following the narrative structure of Welsh’s Nightmares:  mythos-
scape, pathos-scape, and logos-conduit.  On the one hand, t is weaving will be an illustrative 
deployment of the practical ethical system we have been uilding towards:  the ethic of 
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emergence.  On the other hand, it will be an envisioning of a Scotland that is autonomous 
because of its ability to grow and to connect to other subordinate global entities under the reign 
of the empire of late capital. 
How should we proceed?  We should begin with death.  If wetak  death to be not only 
the conclusion of an isolated individual’s life but also the process of alienating individuals from 
each other, from themselves, and from what they produce or ould produce, then we see what 
Welsh takes on in his whole body of work.  He is taking o  the empire of late capital, which is an 
empire of death.235  He, of course, comes at his target from a particular situation, postmodern 
Scotland; nevertheless, his ultimate concern is not just Scotland, but what comes after Scotland:  
a Scotland after Scotland, a world beyond Scotland, and a system of life that emerges from the 
current system of death.   
Each of the stories we have explored ends in some kind of death or near-death:  In 
Trainspotting, Renton personally cheats death by betraying his friends in a high-stakes drug deal.  
More importantly, he kills the bond between his mates and himself.  In Glue, Gally’s and 
Duncan Ewart’s deaths haunt the collective life of Carl, Billy, and Juice Terry.  In Porno, Renton 
again abandons his mates, but the most dramatic instances of the novel are Begbie’s psychotic 
obsession with killing Renton and Begbie’s almost fatal meeting with an automobile.  In Filth, 
death is virtually the ground, process, and end.  Bruce Roberts n’s whole childhood is dominated 
by the death of others and his own alienation.  His whole adulthood is about perpetuating a 
system of death.  And his supposedly final end, brought about by hanging himself, is less a 
conclusion than it is a coda to his existence as one of the living dead.  In “Granton Star,” Boab 
dies twice.  Like Robertson, he has been one of the living dead; after God effectively kills Boab 
                                               
235 The approach I have adopted in this study reflects the dialctical-material approach that Marx 
formulates for himself in Grundrisse (100-108).  Arguably, the method and aim that Welsh uses throughout his body 
of work share more than a passing affinity with Marx’s ethical motivation and his dialectical-material methodolgy. 
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as a human—which is really God’s attempt to give him a second hance at life—Boab is hell-
bent on exacting revenge, which results in his own death and the suffering of others.  In “The 
Two Philosophers,” McGlone is like Boab.  He is among the living dead until his friend and 
colleague Ornstein gives him the opportunity to gain a new lease on life.  McGlone squanders 
this opportunity, which results in his being beaten on a curb and then incarcerated by the police.  
Finally, Nightmares is told by a person trapped in a literal and figurative purgato y, and Roy’s 
semi-dead state is apparently ended by the woman whose life he destroyed.  Even so, these 
deaths do not necessarily have to end in death.  In each case, death negatively affirms an 
alternative.  Thus focusing our attention on Nightmares, we will begin with death on each level 
of Roy’s consciousness in order to locate the submerged alternative life. 
5.1  Congregation Spool:  Fowl Mythology and Faulty Remembrance 
 The last moments of Nightmares are confusing, to say the least, and the meeting with the 
Marabou Stork complicates the situation even further just when one might hope that the Stork’s 
appearance would clarify everything.  Just as in Filth, finding the body or the perpetrator of a 
crime does not actually solve the case.  As a figure, the grotesque, feathered scavenger-predator 
confounds human conceptions of what is “natural,” “logical,” and “good.”  Speaking 
ecologically, does the Stork protect life by consuming disease-ridden carrion?  Or does it serve 
death by killing such animals as flamingos?  One could answer, “Both,” and that answer would 
get us somewhat closer to the complex entity we are dealing with.  Thematically speaking, 
Welsh is concerned about people and institutions that dominate others, and the Marabou Stork 
thwarts such domination.  The staunch pro-apartheid white South African capitalist Lochart 
Dawson, the dream incarnation of Roy’s actual Uncle Gordon Strang, is such a person.  Thence 
the Stork signifies resistance to all that Dawson represents:  racism, exploitation, and private 
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property.  To enrich this figure even further, storks are also associated with birth, hence the 
folklore about storks delivering babies.  Thus, it is more than both a servant of death and 
protector of life; it is also a deliverer of life.  We are dealing with an animal that is the figural 
representative of a threefold power:  devourer of death, t ker of life, giver of birth.   
As strange as such a figure might seem, one will frequently discover it in Gaelic myth, 
legend, and folklore.  Instead of coming in the form of astork, this tripartite force’s most 
frequent and provocative representative is another ambiguous bird, the raven.  In European 
history, ravens have not received much good press mainly becaus  of the role they played, along 
with rats, in carrying disease, particularly during the plagues of the Middle Ages.  If we look 
deeper into the ancient Celts’ understanding of the bird, though, we find a more complicated 
relation between people, ravens, and birds in general.  Ravens, other black birds, and water fowl 
certainly could be harbingers of impending demise.  Like the Norse Valkeries, they could aid in 
war and deliver warriors souls’ to the afterlife.  But they were also capable of disrupting war.  
Moreover, they could indicate change, either positive or negative, and foretell birth.  Unlike their 
messenger-bird or -angel counterparts in the Jewish and Christian traditions, the message implied 
by ravens’ appearances would rarely be self-evident.  They represented a multifaceted, holistic 
life-force instead of an authoritative, hierarchical one.  The most provocative embodiment of this 
force, for the Gaels and for us in this context, is Morrígan.236 
 We will need to turn again to the mythic Celtic seam of Scotland’s ground to bring 
Morrígan to the surface.  Just as Roy is really never separate from the Marabou Stork, 
Cúchulainn’s very existence is conjoined with the tripartite goddess Morrígan.  In one sense, she 
                                               
236 Concerning ravens, The Morrígan, and other associated Celtic figures, see Condren 35; Rosalind Clark, 
The Great Queens: Irish Goddesses from the Morrígan to Cathleen ní Houlihan (Gerrards Cross, UK:  Colin 
Smythe, 1991) pp. 21-105; Miranda J. Green Dictionary of Celtic Myth and Legend (London:  Thames and Hudson, 
1997) pp. 154-55, 174; James MacKillop, Dictionary of Celtic Mythology (Oxford, UK:  Oxford UP, 1998) pp. 113, 
335-37. 
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was with him generations before he was born.  She played  significant role in the lives of his 
truly mythic predecessors, the Tuatha Dé Danann, the proto-Gaels who invaded Ireland and 
conquered the Fomorians.237  Even though it would not presently be appropriate to spend more
time on the early invasions and the literature that grows from them, it suffices it to say that 
Morrígan has always played a significant role in Gaelic culture.  Because she is also closely 
associated with such figures as Medb, Cúchulainn’s archenemy in The Táin, she is practically 
omnipresent and certainly ambiguous.  When he is a child, Morrígan watches over him in the 
form of a war crow.238 When he woos his wife Emer, she foretells the couple’s courtship and 
then complicates it.239  During the battles between him, as sole protector of Ulster, and the other 
four Irish kingdoms led by Medb and Ailill, it is Morrígan or one of her surrogates who, through 
confusing warriors, incites certain battles and frustrates truces.240  In many of his battles, she flies 
in raven form beside his chariot or sits on his shoulder.  In her other common forms of a washer 
woman and milkmaid, she tells the hero about his coming death and heals him during battle.241  
In The Death Tale of CuChulainn, again in the form of a raven, she sits on his shoulder as he dies 
against a standing stone.242  Despite their ambiguous, sometimes antagonistic relationship, 
Cúchulainn and Morrígan are practically inseparable. 
Turning back to Nightmares, one will perhaps encounter a significant problem when 
posed with what may initially seem to be a preposterous quetion: “Who plays the role of 
Morrígan?”  Indeed, I am asserting that the Marabou Stork is Morrígan, or to be more precise, 
the Stork is a postmodern emergence of the Gaelic figure.  With that qualification out of the way, 
                                               
237 MacKillop 414-16. 
238 Kinsella 80. 
239 Jeffrey Gantz trans., The Wasting Sickness of Cú Chulaind & The Only Jealousy of Emer, arly Irish 
Myths and Sagas (New York:  Penguin, 1981) pp. 155-78. 
240 Kinsella 98, 141, 155, 223, 238. 
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242 Tymoczko 61. 
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let us return to our seemingly preposterous question.  In keeping with Morrígan’s habit of 
perplexing things, and in keeping with Welsh’s habit of not all wing a story to ever really 
conclude, the answer is not at all as simple as one might expect.  If one has just finished the last 
page of the novel, the answer will seem obvious:  “Kirsty plays Morrígan, delivering Roy from 
his wasting body.  As the Marabou Stork, she dismembers him—figuratively beheading him by 
cutting off his penis, then stuffing it into his mouth.”  However, if one reviews the book, paying 
even closer attention to the last chapter, up to when Kirsty castrates Roy, it is also evident that 
Roy is the Stork and thus also Morrígan.  He has already figuratively killed and devoured 
Kirsty—by taking her energy, by taking her soul (Nightmares 191, 208, 229, 264).  So, we need 
to delve further to better comprehend how this Stork figure operates.   
 If we return to the passage from Nightmares quoted above—in which Roy describes his 
bird-like features—Roy seems unequivocally to be the Stork.  If this is so, Roy is his own 
murderer, midwife, and savior.  We are, therefore, confronted with the fact that in his 
dreamscape as Roy-the-hero, Roy is actually a twofold chara ter:  one part Roy-the-Stork and 
one part Sandy-Roy, for lack of a better way to delineate them.  Like Cúchulainn’s charioteer, 
Laeg, Roy’s companion in Dawson’s South African Emerald Forest, Sandy Jamieson, is really 
Roy’s idealized counterpart and lover.  Sandy is based on the professional footballer Jimmy 
Sandison, whom Roy was watching on the television when he tried to suffocate himself 
(Nightmares 255).  Most importantly, Sandy protects Roy by helping him become a more whole 
individual, which entails distracting Roy from too quickly completing his mythological quest.  
Sandy’s role also includes being Roy’s dream lover (Nightmares 123, 257).  This role has an 
interconnected threefold effect:  1) It helps Roy accept his own bisexuality.  2) It helps Roy rid 
himself of the violent, self-destructive homophobia that curses him because of his uncle raping 
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him, and because of a patriarchal, anti-sexual, and working-class Calvinist culture.  3)  It gives 
Roy an accommodating companion with whom to share the burden of composing an alternative 
life.  Therefore, Sandy helps Roy make peace with his own self-concept and desires, defusing the 
destructive bad sense that Roy’s self-deception has imposed on him.  The twist associated with 
Sandy’s role is this:  to ultimately protect and deliver Roy, Sandy has to kill him because Roy is 
the Marabou Stork.   
 We might be tempted to say that Roy-the-Stork is the “bad Roy” and that Sandy-Roy is 
the “good Roy.”  This temptation could prove dangerous.  Sandy is the one who introduces Roy 
to Dawson, and as the novel progresses, it becomes apparent that Sandy and Dawson have 
associated before—as employer and employee and probably as lovers.  In view of this, Sandy’s 
loyalty to Roy is put in doubt.  Indeed, Dawson and Sandy might have been conspiring against 
Roy the whole time, waiting until Roy has fully disclosed himself as the Stork. 
Sandy is probably both Roy’s comrade and enemy—a double agent.  It is possible that 
Sandy-Roy betrays and delivers Roy in both connotations of both terms.  He betrays Roy by 
helping Roy’s repressed aspects emerge, and he betrays Roy by handing him over to the enemy.  
He delivers Roy by providing him safe passage through hostile terrain, but he also delivers Roy 
to his doom.  In effect, Sandy is both a John and a Judas to Roy’s Jesus.  When we remember 
that Sandy is a character that Roy himself has created, we realize that Roy is his own greatest 
hope and his own arch-nemesis. 
Elsewhere, though, the Stork is directly associated with Kirsty:  “She kept coming after 
me.  The nightmares, the Marabou Stork nightmares . . .” (Nightmares 221).  Kirsty, of course, is 
who apparently ends Roy’s life when she dismembers him.  However, as with Sandy, we cannot 
be too confident in passing judgment on her.  As we will discus  below, her intended punishment 
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of her rapist might be what helps Roy actually ascertain a hopeful alternative world.  If she is the 
Stork within his dream, as compared to the virtual Stork in his conscious life, then her 
elusiveness throughout the novel gives Roy the opportunity to find out that “the pursuit of the 
Marabou” is “as fundamental as the pursuit of truth” (Nightmares 36).  She gives him time to go 
on his epic quest, pursuing truth, thereby pursuing life.  In effect, she gives him a second chance 
at life.  One could even argue that she gives him three chances.  Exceeding God in “Granton 
Star,” Kirsty effectively gives Roy a third chance at life when she literally transforms him.  As 
she carves his body, the intensity of life that he feels literally and figuratively opens his eyes.  As 
we will discuss in greater detail below, it is the only time, without narcotics, that he truly feels. 
  Because we are dealing with mythos, we do not have to rule out the possibility that both 
Roy and Kirsty are the Stork.  Because we are dealing with a Morrígan figure, the Stork is not 
exclusionary but congregational, and both Roy and Kirsty fulfill the roles of protector, deliverer, 
and devourer; together they bring about the emergence of a p stmodern Morrígan in Welsh’s 
epic. 
Nevertheless, what exactly is being protected, delivered, and devoured? 
The answer:  Roy’s memory.  Today, memory is popularly treated as if it were merely a 
storage bank of empirical facts.  Most judicial systems, particularly in the West, have raised the 
testimony of witnesses to an almost sacred level, second only to the recently discovered Holy 
Grail of justice, DNA evidence.  This esteem for the ey witness is so even in the face of 
mountains of evidence produced by psychologists and cognitive scienti ts which attest to the fact 
that memory is as creative as it is empirically refe ntial.  Therefore, memory is fallible, at least 
in today’s juridical environment, because it is, by its very operations, something that fabricates.  
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This is why I place it under the epistemological domain of mythos and, therefore, why I put it 
into relation with mythology.   
I do not mean to disparage either memory or mythology by associating them in such a 
way.  As generative cognitive operations, they are crucial to human life.  Moreover, they are 
deeply interconnected, and in the case of Nightmares, Roy belatedly discovers that it might be a 
mistake to keep them separate: 
I’ve been trying to stage things too much in this little world f mine, trying to 
exercise total control over this environment, instead of trusting myself to react to 
events with dignity and compassion.  So what if my twoworlds are coming closer 
together?  It may be the way I get closer to the Stork.  (123) 
Together, memory and mythology make up the creative consci usness of historical-material 
reality.  Perhaps memory is considered more legitimate because it typically speaks the language 
of a dominant sociocultural situation, whereas mythology ets circulate what has been filtered 
and repressed by memory.  Roy accordingly explains about his mythological world, “In here I’m 
doing all the things I didn’t do out there.  I’m trying to be better, trying to do the right thing, 
trying to work it all out” (Nightmares 119).  Therefore, memory and mythology are not bad or 
good in themselves, particularly if they are recognized as being interimplicated; however, they 
can be badly or well used.  And bad use of them arguably comes about when they are 
disconnected.  Disconnected from each other, mythology can truly become a “fantasy land,” and 
memory can become “practically non-existent” (Nightmares 157, 4).  However, under the empire 
of late capital, these two strands of mythos must be separated, just as mythos, pathos, and logos 
must be divorced from one another.  If they congregate their materials and energies, they pose a 
threat to a system that depends on fragmentation, on a lack of critical and generative synthesis.   
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 Roy says that his memory is “practically non-existent”; however, this does not mean that 
it is really nonexistent.  In fact, three quarters of the book is composed of his memories.  He only 
escapes to his mythological dream world—“the beautiful ble skies of Africa” (Nightmares 
57)—when his memories become too much for him or when he com s too close to regaining 
consciousness.  So, for someone whose memories are practically nonexistent, he remembers 
much and he remembers often.  Let us investigate these memories to see what Roy means by his 
qualification. 
 Before nine years of age, during the early 1980s, Roy’s memori s are scant; however, 
when he reaches the nine-year mark, they begin to become an overwhelming force.  As if the 
hard life in the schemes and in his extremely dysfunctio al working-class family had not been 
enough, his father’s brother, Gordon Strang, agreed to procure Roy’s father a job in 
Johannesburg, South Africa.  Any relocation is traumatic, but relocating to a completely different 
continent, thousands of miles away, is more so, particularly for a child.  Moreover, Roy’s racist 
parents were not only excited about their new prospects; they were as equally excited about 
moving to what they often referred to as “a white man’s country,” apartheid South Africa 
(Nightmares 24).  Despite knowing “fuck all about politics,” Roy quickly realized that when it 
came to his parents’ worldview, his emigrant uncle’s busines practices, and the situation in 
South Africa, “something wasn’t quite right” (Nightmares 62, 82).  Here, Roy gives us another 
tentative position.  His qualifier—“something wasn’t quite rght”—is important to keep in mind 
because, along with the other qualifier he has presented, it is symptomatic of a mindset that is 
still detached from what has actually occurred. 
Roy’s comparisons of Scottish subordination and South African subordination are astute, 
to say the least.  Here is one of dozens of such observations: 
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Edinburgh to me represented serfdom.  I realized that it was exactly the same 
situation as Johannesburg; the only difference was that the Kaffirs [derogatory 
term for black South Africans] were white and called schemies or draftpaks.  
Back in Edinburgh, we would be Kaffirs; condemned to live out our lives in 
townships like Muirhouse or So-Wester-Hailes-To or Niddrie, self-contained 
camps with fuck all in them, miles fae the toon.  Brought in tae dae the crap jobs 
that nae other cunt wanted tae dae, then hassled by the polis if we hung around at 
night in groups.  Edinburgh had the same politics as Johannesburg:  it had the 
same politics of any city.  (Nightmares 80) 
Nevertheless, he has stopped short of integrating this congregated knowledge into his being.  
Indeed, he fell in love with South Africa, despite its not being “quite right.”  His love of it did 
not directly spring from apartheid, per se, but sprang from his being accepted by a society that 
was ruled by apartheid.  He remembers, “What I had gained there was a perverse sense of 
empowerment; an ego even.  I knew I was fuckin special, whatever any of them [his family] tried 
to tell me” (Nightmares 88).  A year later, after Roy’s father was fired, the Strangs moved back 
to Edinburgh.  “I was Roy Strang,” Roy proclaims, “Maybe I had to go back, but it was going to 
be different.  I wasnae gaunny take any shite. . . .  Ah wis going to be strong.  Strong Strang.  Ah 
wis gaunny make sure every cunt kent my fuckin name” (Nightmares 88-89).  Again, he has not 
integrated the knowledge that is right before him:  a system of domination has done to others, 
such as black South Africans, what it has done to him and others like him in Scotland.  Both his 
dream world and memory world have been sending him the sammessage, but he has always 
disassociated from his own accumulated knowledge.  Not only that:  he has personally enacted 
the logic of the system that has brutalized him and fellow members of the dispossessed.  Instead 
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of incorporating the knowledge and suffering of the multitude, he has integrated the dominant 
system into his being, which further estranges him from others and himself. 
 Punctuating this disconnection is what he does to others after he has been sexually 
molested and raped by Uncle Gordon.  Roy became a sexual pred tor.  Soon after his return to 
Edinburgh, Roy sexually assaulted a female classmate whilholding a knife to her neck, forced a 
male classmate to perform oral sex on him, tormented his gay brother Bernard, and ultimately 
masterminded the brutal gang rape of Kirsty.  How he remembers the last incident makes his two 
qualifications—that his memory is practically nonexistent a d that something was not quite 
right—even more disconcerting. 
It is not until Sandy is about to blow Roy’s head off with a shotgun and not until Kirsty is 
clipping the lids off his eyes that Roy remembers that it was he—not another recurring Welsh 
character, Lexo—who had initiated the torture and rape of a woman who was actually interested 
in dating him.  Roy conflated Kirsty with a girl, Caroline Carson, he had held a grudge against 
since middle school.  Years before, Caroline had been a byst nder when he was bullied by one of 
her older male friends (Nightmares 99-101).  Roy remembers that he was aware that the two 
women were not the same person (Nightmares 261).  But he took a stance reminiscent of D. S. 
Robertson’s ultra-Calvinist slogan, “same rules apply” (Filth 5).  Roy and three of his fellow 
cashies—football hooligans known for wearing flashy clothes and expensive accessories—
drugged Kirsty and lured her away from a party.  They proceeded to tie her up, tortured her, left 
her standing on a table with a noose around her neck for a few hours, and raped her for hours on 
end after they returned (Nightmares 177-90).  Later, when the rape case went to court, Roy and 
his mates persuaded the court that they were the actual victims, their character defamed by a 
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woman who was angry at them for not satisfying her insatiable, masochistic sexual appetite 
(Nightmares 207-12). 
For over 250 pages, Roy has led not only us but himself on a wild goose chase because 
he could not integrate the knowledge he gained from his mythological world and memory world.  
In part, this is so because he has kept those worlds separat d for too long.  Just as Cúchulainn’s 
bullheadedness (not to mention Odysseus’ arrogance or Achilles’ rage) keeps him from seeing 
how other people’s lives are tied up in his, Roy’s inability to incorporate the experiences of 
others with his own keeps him from ever practically living, at least not until the final few pages 
of the novel.  However, it is not only the segregation of the two levels of his mythos-scape that 
makes him a flamingo to Kirsty’s Stork:  “It’s on the flamingo . . . tearing into it, ripping it to 
shreds, but the flamingo’s still alive, I see its dulled eyes.”  For the majority of his life, he has not 
been able to feel—he has had virtually no bond with the species-being of the potential human 
multitude. 
5.2  Integration Spool:  The Bonds of Flesh 
 With his eyelids removed and his severed penis in his mouth, Roy observes: 
She’s looking into my eyes, my lidless eyes and we see each other now.  She’s 
beautiful.  Thank God.  Thank God she’s got it back.  What we ook.  I’m trying 
to smile.  I’ve got this severed cock in my mouth and I’m trying to smile.  I can’t 
breathe and she’s showing no mercy. . . .  I understand her. . . .  I understand her 
hurt, her pain, how it all just has to come out.  It just goes round and round, the 
hurt.  It takes an exceptionally strong person to just say: no more.  It takes a weak 
one to just keep it all to themselves, let it tear them apart without hurting anyone 
else. . . .  I’m not an exceptionally strong person. . . . Nor is Kirsty. . . .  We’re 
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just ordinary and this is shite. . . .  We both understand everything.  (Nightmares 
263-64) 
That is Roy’s last astute observation before he brifly returns to his dream world to spread his 
wings as the Stork and be shot at by Sandy, and before he loses consciousness because of 
massive hemorrhaging. 
 In the first part of his observation, he stresses his attempt to smile.  This is no small 
matter.  In his so-called life before this point, Roy cnditioned himself to not express emotion.  
Even anger became more mechanical than impassioned—it was “business” (Nightmares 152, 
171).  Even more, feeling any sort of emotion became taboo for him.  He “considered that 
discretion was the better part of valour”:  “It was notgiving a fuck about anything,” just floating 
“around in a void of indifference” (Nightmares 66, 153, 201).  As a consequence, he had become 
a nihilistic automaton, for which no act was unthinkable or impossible.243 
 At least this was the case until he saw Kirsty in the courtroom: 
It became like she was the one on trial; her past, her sexuality, her behaviour.  She 
looked really strange in the court.  It was the wey she moved.  She walked like the 
centre ay balance in her body had irreversibly shifted.  It wis like the movement 
ay some cunt that had come oot fae under the surgeon’s knife and who was 
recuperating from a chronic and ultimately terminal illness.  (Nightmares 208) 
When he observed her, though, he did not feel sympathy; he was still too disconnected.  What he 
recognized was a physiological change in Kirsty that implied something else, something deeper 
                                               
243 It is in thoughts and actions of such an isolated individual that Hannah Arendt finds the logic and mode 
of totalitarianism:  “totalitarian methods of domination . . . develop and crystallize on the basis of the nihilistic 
principle that ‘everything is possible.’  And, characteristically enough, this is precisely the realm that cannot be 
limited by either utilitarian motives or self-interest, regardless of the latter’s content.  [. . .]  What runs counter to 
common sense is not the nihilistic principle that ‘everything is permitted.’ . . .  What common sense and ‘normal 
people’ refuse to believe is that everything is possible” (The Origins of Totalitarianism [San Diego:  Harcourt Brace, 
1979] pp. 440-41). 
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than surfaces and abstractions.  This something else—the sam  something else that Carl 
recognizes in Glue (445)—eludes him, but he cannot neglect it.  He is drawn towards it, which 
leads him to his suicide attempt. 
Rationalizing what proves to be a failed suicide attempt with Aristotelian ethics reduced 
to a slogan in a Hemlock Society pamphlet—“GOOD LIFE, GOOD DEATH”—Roy Strang 
finally made a real effort to connect to himself only to miss the point, both the point of 
Aristotle’s ethic and the point of integrating with himself: 
With any luck, I’d achieve half of this [maxim].  I was dying.  I knew it, I felt it.  
It was beyond transitory depression.  I wasn’t a psychopat ; I was just a fool and 
a coward.  I had opened up my emotions and I couldn’t go back into self-denial, 
into the lower form of existence, but I couldn’t go forward until I’d settled my 
debt.  For me it wasn’t running away.  That was what I’d been doing all my 
fuckin life, running away from sensitivity, from feelings, from love.  Running 
away because a fuckin schemie, a nobody, shouldnae have these feelings because 
there’s fuckin naewhair for them tae go, naewhair for them tae be expressed and if 
you open up every cunt will tear you apart.  So you shut them out; you build a 
shell, you hide, or you lash out at them and hurt them.  You do this because you 
think by you’re hurting them you can’t be hurt.  But it’s bullshit, because you just 
hurt even mair until you learn to become an animal and if you can’t fuckin well 
learn that properly you run.  Sometimes you can’t run though, you can’t sidestep 
and you can’t duck and weave, because sometimes it just all trave s along with 
you, inside your fuckin skull.  This wasn’t about opting out.  This was about the 
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only resolution that made sense.  Death was the way forward.  (Nightmares 254-
55) 
How right he is, and how wrong.  As we know, Roy does not die; he enters into a coma that 
enables him to sustain a narrative existence, including the quoted observation.  So, no, he cannot 
opt out, even though he tries.  He will have to live before he dies.  In Aristotle’s ethical theory, 
the good death is impossible without the good life—without care of the self, which includes care 
of others.244  Roy has not cared for himself or others despite retroac ively saying that he had 
wanted—intended—to.  Roy, however, did begin to move toward some version of the good life 
when he made this self-evaluation.  However, self-evaluation is only part of an emergent praxis, 
as we discovered in the previous chapter.  Even so, he failed to commit to even his own self-
evaluation, which is indicated by his self-deceptive conclusion:  suicide in his case “wasn’t about 
opting out.”   
                                               
244 Throughout The Ethics, Aristotle gradually, systematically builds his idea of the “good,” “happy,” or 
“excellent” life, stressing its dependence on life-long development and duration (The Ethics of Aristotle: The 
Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J. A. K. Thomson [New York:  Penguin, 1976]).  He asserts early on that “happiness 
demands not only complete goodness but a complete life” (81). Then, he goes on to explain how goodness is a 
praxis on which one “spends all his time, or the most time of any man, in virtuous conduct and contemplation” (83).  
Julia Annas terms such happiness “self-sufficiency,” meaning that a person’s life produces coherence through 
time—“comprehensiveness:  a final end which is self-sufficient must include all the agent’s other ends” (The 
Morality of Happiness [New York, NY:  Oxford UP, 1993] p. 41).  Put into the context of our discussion, Roy 
cannot achieve a good death because his life has been, up u til this point, void of any identifiable praxis, coherenc , 
or comprehensiveness.  Moreover, the life Roy has lived is one dominated by misery, hate, and meanness.  
According to Aristotle, one who produces a good life cannot “become miserable; because”—and this next 
qualification is key in understanding Aristotelian and much Classical ethics—“he will never do things that are 
hateful and mean” to others (84).  Expressly, personal happiness is impossible without it being directly tied one’s 
social and political situation—without caring for the self, which entails caring for others.  The latter insight becomes 
the springboard for much of Foucault’s later writing, most notably The Care of the Self:  The History of Sexuality, 
trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 3 (New York:  Vintage, 1988).  For instance, he observes in his reading of Seneca that 
“care of the self—or the attention one devotes to the car that others should take care of themselves—appears then 
as an intensification of social relations” (51, my italics).  Foucault expands elsewhere, “The carof the self is ethical 
in itself; but it implies complex relationships with others insofar as [the] ēthos of freedom is also a way of caring for 
others” (Ethics:  Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley et al. [New York:  New Press, 1997] 
p. 287).  Again, placing this into the present context, what Foucault calls “care of the self” falls under the rubric of 
emergent praxis.  In the case of Roy and Scotland, subordination is, in part, a consequence of a lack of producing a 
life.  Thus, when Roy tries to rationalize his suicide with a significant strand of Classical ethics, he puts ethical 
systems dedicated almost totally to generation into the service of destruction. 
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Roy thought that he could atone for his sins through sacrificing himself—taking himself 
beyond responsibility, out of society, and thus out of life.  Again, though, he does not die.  He is 
literally and figuratively forced to compose himself if he is ever to confront what threatened not 
only his individual, Scottish life but what still threatens human life itself.  Up to the point of his 
self-induced coma, he effectively had no coherent narrative or life history.  He was merely 
flotsam carried on the currents of a fragmented, disconnected world.  However, after his failed 
suicide attempt, these fragments begin to congregate and take on more coherent forms in his 
mythos-scape.  Then, when Kirsty greets him upon his return to consciousness, these forms and 
all that they entail begin to integrate into his being.  His dream world, his memory world, and his 
sensual world have been sending him materials and energies which he can no longer keep 
separate from each other and, more importantly, from which he can no longer disassociate. 
 It is by integrating the congregated materials and energies that he has avoided for his 
whole life that he is finally able to live, even if this means becoming one with the Marabou 
Stork, the paradoxical figure of death and life.  Perhaps the message here is:  if one can 
sympathize with one’s murderer, then one can sympathize with anyone.  It is just this type of 
unconditional sympathy that permeates the moment when Kirsty and Roy are looking into each 
other’s eyes.  It is in this moment that they share pureemotion and all that makes up human life:  
suffering, love, hate, triumph, defeat, lust, sadness, happiness, pity, commitment, betrayal, 
vengeance, redemption, and understanding.  All three aspects of knowing—mythos, pathos, and 
logos—begin to converge and integrate.  This signals that three virtues of the ethic of emergence 
are beginning to cooperate and enter into producing alternatives. 
 Where does it all go from here? 
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5.3  Emergence Spool:  Fugitive Histories 
 “She’s going,” says Roy, “don’t go Kirsty, stay with me for a bit, see this through . . . but 
no no no I hear her hastily depart” (Nightmares 264).  We cannot be too quick to pass judgment 
on Kirsty.  She, like Roy, represents us, the particular individuals of a potentially emergent 
multitude who exist in a situation ruled by the empire of late capital.  Because the world we live 
in is still one of fragmentation and estrangement—despit  br ef moments of congregation and 
integration—we cannot expect Welsh’s characters to single-handedly do what cannot be done 
alone; nor should a novelist like Welsh be asked to do all the work for us.  He weaves for us 
quite a detailed, multidimensional map, which takes us to a launching point.  Moreover, he gives 
us an unusual sort of compass:  it points to the probabilities that we already know—the bad 
sense, residual ones—so that we may ascertain what direction we need to go so that we may 
approach alternative probabilities.  All of the stories we have discussed in this study indicate this 
direction, but as Ornstein finds in “The Two Philosophers,” knowing what direction to go and 
going in that direction are not the same thing.  To use his idiom, it is not enough to know that 
unknown knowledge is a possibility; individuals must build with the materials and energies that 
they have uncovered to bring about the materialization of a probability that they have recognized 
in previously unknown knowledge.  To use Roy’s idiom, onehas to enter into “a new situation,” 
all the while realizing “that behaviour always has a context and precedents, it’s what you do 
rather than what you are, although we often never recognize that context or understand what 
these precedents are” (Nightmares 134).  More expressly, alternative probabilities—hopeful 
futures—are not possible if we, as those human individuals, do not build toward them with the 
“context” and “precedents” that have enabled our apprehension of those probabilities.  In short, 
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we have to honest with ourselves about where we have com  from and where we are before we 
can feasibly understand ourselves and break the hold of bad sense and residual force. 
On the political terrain of the 1980s and early 1990s—the era of Margaret Thatcher and 
John Major’s Tory Britain and Ronald Reagan’s Republican America—an attitude of zero 
tolerance became official public doctrine:  “Z.  THERE IS NO EXCUSE” (Nightmares 241).  
The “wars” on worker’s rights, poverty, drugs, culture, wlfare, sex, the Third World, and so 
forth were unleashed.  And as Welsh brings into focus, zero tolerance meant, in the case Britain, 
a war on the lumpenproletariat, working class, and women.  The novel, though, exceeds the 
particularity of that historical period and Scotland in scope.  Nightmares indicates that zero 
tolerance is a war waged on the world’s majority, its potential multitude:  the global South and 
peripheries, black and brown people, “white trash,” the impoverished, women, and the majority 
of workers.  This is not to mention the ecological terrorism being waged for profits and power.   
Mentioning zero tolerance today might seem to be an anachronism.  Is not everything 
tolerated now?  In one sense, everything is tolerated—if by “everything,” one means everything 
that has to do with cheapening human life by social, cultural, political, and economic 
estrangement, oppression, and exploitation.  In fact, we live in a situation dominated by the 
epicurean aftershocks of such an approach to human existence.  Zero tolerance seems passé 
because it has become naturalized:  it is the hegemonic ideology.245  Lochart Dawson provides 
some insight on what this ideology maintains:  “Families and communities have to be broken up 
further, have to be taken to where the work is, have to bedenied at all costs meaningful 
interaction with each other.  They have to live in, as our American friends call them, 
subdivisions.  They have to be economically and physically subdivided” (Nightmares 45).  Roy 
                                               
245 We have in the postmodern world the fruition of “the traditional concept of just war,” which “involves 
the banalization of war and the celebration of it as an ethical instrument” (Hardt and Negri, Empire 12). 
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shocks Dawson by elaborating further:  “The key is the increasing of choice through the process 
of subdivision you alluded to.  The increasing experiencing of leisure and sport indirectly, has 
encouraged a decrease in real participation which is direct communion.  Therefore you have the 
replacement of one or two really decent experiences with loads and loads of crap things” 
(Nightmares 45).  Even though it is a war waged primarily through city planning, mortgages, 
rent, regressive taxes, discount store chains, food aid, the distribution of pharmaceuticals, and so 
forth, this is undoubtedly a war against the collective life of human beings for the sake of profit, 
which is domination through dispossession. 
We have seen in the preceding chapters and pages of this chapter how this war is waged.  
The people who fight are not warriors loyal to a sovereignty or cause.  They, like Roy, are not 
really committed to anything, not even to themselves.  So, we must not confuse egoism with self-
reverence.  The combatants are just fragmented individuals, incoherent socioeconomic groups, 
stereotyped races and genders, and so forth, all consuming like scavenger-predators in the hope 
that some sense, some narrative, or some cause will emerg  through the act of consuming 
itself.246  The very enemies of the postmodern global state, the larg ly itinerant and provincial 
individuals of the potential multitude, are also the fodder sent onto the figurative and literal 
plains of battle to consume and be consumed.  All of this is done to benefit an amorphous, 
elusive ruling power that depends on the perpetuation of this in ernally corrupt and self-
destructive system in order to maintain sovereignty.  The individuals of the potential multitude, 
such as the diamond miners in South Africa and coal miners  Scotland, have secured the means 
for this postmodern global sovereignty, even as it requi s their mutual exclusion.  The victim, 
                                               
246 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels write in The German Ideology that this “accidental character [of the 
conditions of life] is only engendered and developed by competition and the struggle of individuals among 
themselves.  Thus, in imagination, individuals seem freer under the dominance of [capitalism] than before because 
their conditions of life seem accidental; in reality, of course, they are less free, because they are to a greater extent 
governed by material forces” ([Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1998] p. 87). 
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therefore, is also the aggressor.  In effect, the reprobate of the world—again, the potential 
multitude—create the energy to sustain the empire of late c pital, a veritable empire of death, by 
tormenting and killing one another.  They enter into “a bullshit act,” which moves them “further 
away from” what they could be (Nightmares 50).   
One of the many glaring problems with this so-called ethic of late capitalism, which is 
seamless in its duplicity, is the fact that any endurable, creative individual or collective life is 
increasingly unlikely under its particular interpretation of “liberty.”  In fact, democracy is 
impossible in such a framework.  Emergent, productive composition is strangled by static, 
nihilistic chaos.  Like a tree consumed by vines, a system that could provide for a long-
sustaining, ever-growing, and integrating life is overtaken by a parasite that exploits it for short-
term, immediate, and fragmented gains.  The effect for the tree:  fruitless self-defense followed 
by death.  The effect for the vines:  a quick rise to power at the expense of life only to fall to the 
ground and be consumed by other vines that will be consumed by more vines and so forth and so 
on.247 
What makes this situation all the more sobering, though, is t at these metaphorical vines 
sap away materials that could feed and form the metaphorical tree of the multitude.  In an 
interview Welsh gave when Glue was being published, he implies that Christianity and 
socialism, not to mention Aristotelian ethics, at onetime provided more good sense than bad 
sense, thereby empowering Scots.248  But capitalism fragmented their internal coherence and 
                                               
247 This botanical description echoes Hardt and Negri’s mechanical one:  “As [postmodern Empire] 
constructs its supranational figure, power seems to be deprived of any real ground beneath it, or rather, it is lacking 
the motor that propels its movement.  The rule of the biopolitical imperial context should thus be seen in the first
instance as an empty machine, a spectacular machine, a parasitical machine” (Empire 62). 
248 Welsh, interview.  Welsh echoes MacIntyre’s diagnosis f what has happened to morality, which really 
today is just a collection of fragmented structures and truisms disconnected from what is considered to be raw or, to 
use Giorgio Agamben’s term, “bare” life:  the “joint effect of the secular rejection of both Protestant and Catholic 
theology and the scientific and philosophical rejection of Aristotelianism was to eliminate any notion of man- s-he-
could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos.  Since the whole point of ethics—both as a theoretical and a practical discipline—
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sapped their emergent energies, leaving only incoherent, exchangeable, and consumable 
fragments.249 
In light of what we have observed about Scotland throughot this study, this situation is 
not a mystery.  From Renton, Spud, and Begbie to Bruce Rob rtson, to Ornstein and McGlone, 
and to Roy and Kirsty, Welsh has illustrated how the lumpenproletariat, the working class, and 
significant swaths of the middle class are either intentionally or unintentionally killing 
themselves and each other.  Together, competition and consumption are the mechanisms that 
vampirically and self-destructively feed capital.  Unless one is an avatar of American neo-
conservativism or British New Labour-ism, this is not what one could call a life-sustaining, 
holistically productive ethos.  Kirsty gives voice to the ethos at work when she prepares to 
dismember Roy:  “I don’t know who fucked you up, what happened to make you the sad, 
wretched excuse for a human being you are and I don’t care.  It’s not my problem.  You’re the 
problem, or rather were.  Now I’m your problem.  Might is right.  You take the right.  I’m taking 
the right Roy, taking the right to fuck you off, son” (Nightmares 261).  Today, the scapegoats 
offer up other scapegoats for sacrifice, and it seems that the more literal and figurative blood 
shed, the more the capitalist empire needs:  exponential sacrifice for the reward of “closure” that 
never really comes—never-ending death.   
                                                                                                                                             
is to enable man to pass from his present state to hisrue end, the elimination of any notion of essential human 
nature and with it the abandonment of any notion of a telosleaves behind a moral scheme composed of two 
remaining elements whose relationship becomes quite unclar.  There is on the one hand a certain content for 
morality:  a set of injunctions deprived of their teleological context.  There is on the other hand a certain view of 
untutored-human-nature-as-it-is” (After Virtue 54-55).  See also Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer:  Sovereign Power 
and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford:  Stanford UP, 1998). 
249 “What we possess . . . are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts 
from which their significance derived.  We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the 
key expressions.  But we have—very largely, if not entirely—lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, 
of morality” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 2). 
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Despite the fact that late capitalism is hegemonic—its bad sense and residual force 
practically dominating all aspects of human life—its weakness is that it is not the source of its 
power.  Roy spots this weakness while he continues his argument with Dawson about capitalism: 
But perhaps the superiority of [capitalist] terminology illustrates that sport and the 
sporting instinct are sovereign and that capitalism is just a branch of sport, a 
warped, inferior branch of sport, sport with money. . . .  Capitalism has had to 
graft on sporting culture, the culture of games, in order to make the pursuit of 
money seem a worthwhile endeavour in itself.  (Nightmares 45-46) 
The source of the capitalist empire’s power is the comm n individuals who compose the 
multitude.  By segregating those individuals, exploiting them, and turning them against one 
another, the empire of capital reigns supreme.  However, when those individuals congregate, and 
then when they appropriate for themselves the means of production, they will materialize as a 
cooperative multitude that can build toward an alternative world from materials and energies that 
already exist.  Such a world will be ruled by an ethic that negates the naturalness with which 
capitalism has attempted to paint its ethic.  The currently dominant system driven by 
fragmentation, segregation, and subordination will, despit  itself, provide the materials for a 
system based on congregation, integration, and emergence.   
5.4  Postmodern Tartan:  Emergence through Forgiveness 
Without forgiveness, though, emergence will not occur in any substantial, ongoing 
manner.  There is, as we have seen throughout this study, the constant risk of entering a cul-de-
sac (or tomb) right at the moment when emergence is most probable.  If we make a superficial 
gloss of Roy and Kirsty’s last moments together, instead of the Stork-centered one presented 
above, we can observe the possibility of another suchdead end.  Both Roy and Kirsty perpetuate 
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the very system that has destroyed them.  Not until his final moments could Roy forgive himself 
for the system of shame, betrayal, and lack of sympathy that he personified.  Ultimately, Kirsty 
cannot forgive Roy.  They can “only recognize” each other “through their pain and their thwarted 
ambitions” (Nightmares 49).  Comrades in suffering and sacrifice, they cannot connect according 
to what they need most, mutual love and forgiveness; so they perpetuate a static, destructive 
cycle.  In such a light, Roy’s final encounter with Kirsty takes the form of a sacrifice executed in 
revenge.  And Kirsty is a disciple of the vengeance that Roy forced into her during her rape.   
To forgive, therefore, is practically impossible if peole do not perceive their role in, for 
example, the cycle of vengeance and then commit to—give themselves to—an alternative 
probability:  “see this through” (Nightmares 264).  To forgive entails that humans are going to 
have to do away with sacrifice.250  In practice, sacrifice is raising death to an exclusive, sacred 
level.  Once it has achieved this height—as an abstract economy—then the lives of individuals 
and groups become mere commodities for exchange.  In such a situation, life is the currency for 
the perpetuation of death.  In a situation of forgiveness, however, life is not simply a medium; it 
is a conduit in which existing life is congregated and integrated to bring about more life.  In such 
a world, we the multitude can, as Welsh has Roy so poignantly suggest through understatement, 
                                               
250 Sacrifice has been a topic of great concern to theologians and philosophers throughout the ages.  In the 
ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, for instance, the biblical Abraham’s near-sacrifice of 
his only son Isaac is commended as the emblem of selflessness.  Derrida’s The Gift of Death is indicative (trans. 
David Wills [Chicago:  U of Chicago P, 1995] pp. 59-81).  The ethics and sacred duty of sacrifice, accordingly, is 
giving up oneself for others and, ultimately, for the absolute Other.  As much as I admire and am influenced by such 
thinkers as Levinas and Derrida, a morality based on such sacrifice is impractical, untenable, and anti-generative.  
Levinas and Derrida, nevertheless, are not the prime purveyors of the bad sense of giving-as-sacrifice, as compared 
to giving-as-generation.  One can indeed argue that Levinas, Derrida, and others are striving for the latter kind of 
gift through the obstacle presented by death-logic.  Regardless, both the victimizer and the victim are valorized, and 
in the latter’s case, autonomy is further removed, not attained in any practical, historical-material sense.  This is a 
point Badiou tersely makes:  “In his role as executioner, man is an animal abjection, but we must have the courage 
to add that in his role as victim, he is generally worth lit le more” (Ethics 11).  Less tersely, Julia Kristeva charts out 
a genealogy that connects the morality behind religious sacrifice with defusing generative powers (represented by 
the feminine) and with retribution (Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection [New York, NY:  Columbia UP, 1982] 
pp. 56-61, 70-79, 115-32). 
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“consider forgiveness” (Nightmares 122).  Moreover, as we should take to heart what Bernard, 
Roy’s brother with AIDS, advises, “Life’s good.  Hang onto life” ( Nightmares 251). 
Welsh’s Nightmares guides us to a point—or straps us to a standing stone with a strange 
bird on our shoulder—where, as a congregated, integrated, and emergent body, we can not just 
imagine but begin mapping worlds that counter the empire of d ath that lords over us.  It is at 
this point that we can see what kind of Scotland Welsh persist ntly, even though negatively, 
conceives.  It is a Scotland not divorced from Scotland, but a deeply interconnected Scotland 
after the self-destructive and subordinate Scotland of the past.  This implies that Scotland’s epic 
does not have to end in some craggy, mystic past or in some global capitalist menagerie of the 
future.  Instead, it may proceed as a dynamic, emergent subordinate in a world whose majority is 
composed of potentially emergent subordinates.   
Nevertheless, subordinate status should not be embraced but utilized.  Because 
subordinates are obviously not deliberately in control of whatever imperial power that dominates 
them, they cannot counter that power on an even footing.  Roy demonstrates this, in both his 
“dream life” and “actual life.”  He cannot overcome theactual enemy that is destroying the 
South African paradise by becoming its ally.  Therefore, he becomes the Marabou Stork.  He 
cannot counter brutality—whether in the form of sexual abuse, economic disparity, and 
imperialism—by replicating it.  So, when the subordinated multitude emerges, there will be 
risks, and there will be nothing to return to.  As Roy surmises when he glimpses an alternate 
probability, “I saw [the] limitations, the sheer vacuity of what [was] on offer against this 
alternative.  There would, I knew, be risks.  Nothing this good came without risk.  I couldn’t go 
back though.  No Way.  There was nothing to go back to” (Nightmares 237).  Nothing is 
academic about mapping alternative probabilities.  Nothing is academic about the multitude 
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reworking the materials before it and establishing fidelity to submerged materials and energies.  
The Roys and Kirstys of the world—not to mention the Rentons, Spuds, Begbys, Carls, 
Robertsons, and Ornsteins—will be at risk when they are giving each other to each other and 
themselves to themselves.  However, they are already dead on arrival without doing so:  they are 
mere fragments circulating within empire of death.   
An alternative world guided by an alternative ethic and informed by an alternative set of 
virtues would present a real challenge to today’s imperial power.  Such a world is a probability.  
With such a probability in mind, I cannot accept that Welsh’s postmodern Scottish epic—or any 
of his work for that matter—ends in self-destructive sacrifice.  Instead, it is the beginning of a 
postmodern fable of the ethic of emergence, which produces and renews forgiveness251: 
Roy, the conflicted and winged epic hero of Scotland’s past, lies on a gurney, his 
practically dead body gagging on the figural sword that infected him and 
everyone he encountered with death.  Kirsty, the incarnation of emergent 
Scotland, walks out of Roy’s hospital room, her feet solidly connecting to the
ground with each step forward.  She takes with her what life was left in Roy—not 
to inflict more vengeance on Scotland or the world, but to infect Scotland and the 
world with forgiveness. 
                                               
251 This is partly an homage and response to Lyotard, Postmodern Fables, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele 
(Minneapolis:  U of Minnesota P, 1997).  He uses “postmodern fables” to critique the world as we enter the third 






 The forty-one-year-old working-class single mother of two teenagers raised her right 
hand, and when she opened it, a message in bold, black permanent ink emerged:  “My oath is to 
the people.”252  Dressed in her best blue jeans and a gauzy halter top, Glasgow representative 
Rosie Kane took her oath as Minister of Scottish Parliament at Holyrood, in Edinburgh.  It was 
the middle of spring 2003, five years after a referendum in which 75 per cent of Scots voted for 
the establishment of a Scottish Parliament, nearly three undred years after James VI of Scotland 
took the first one with him to London.  Not only that, 63.5 per cent voted to gain control of 
Scottish taxation.253  Singing Robert Burns’s ode to equality, “A Man’s a Man for a’ That,” 
Kane’s fellow Scottish Socialist MSP, Colin Fox, joined in the carnival atmosphere of resistance 
that began to infect the 7 May 2003 swearing-in ceremony of ewly elected representatives to 
Scottish Parliament.  Members of the Green Party and Scottish Nationalist Party followed suit by 
pledging their allegiance to the people of Scotland, not to Queen Elizabeth II.  Most Labour 
members, Tories, and Liberal Democrats professed their loyalty to the Queen of England even 
though they were standing in the Scottish multitude’s house. 
 Seven months later, in January 2004, Kane went on a brief hiatus from parliament, citing 
clinical depression and the “macho culture” of Holyrood as her reasons.254  Before entering 
parliament, she had been a social worker who served scheme-dwelling teens in Glasgow; her 
financial situation was meager, to say the least.  When s  entered parliament, overdue utility 
bills and taxes meant that Kane could only receive incoming phone calls at home, had to buy 
                                               
252 Gerard Seenan, “Rosie’s Mission,” Guardian [UK] 12 May 2003, 8 Aug. 2005 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/women/story/0,,953813,00.html>. 
253 Neal Ascherson, Stone Voices:  The Search for Scotland (New York:  Hill and Wang, 2002) p. 171. 
254 Kirsty Scott, “New Members Shake Up Scottish Parliament,” Guardian [UK] 5 Jan. 2004, 8 Aug. 2005 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,,1116029,00.html>. 
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electricity for her apartment on a per use basis, and h d her wages garnished.  Moreover, her first 
days as an MSP were under the shadow of her potential arrest because of anti-nuclear protest 
activities.  (Alas, she was not arrested.)  All of this was going on while she was single-handedly 
raising two adolescent girls.   
I am not excusing her absence from her ministerial responsibilities.  No, I am 
sympathizing with her reasons for briefly stepping down, hich she did publicly.  I am 
expressing awe at her honesty.  How many other MSPs, Ministers of Parliament at Westminster, 
or Congressmen and Congresswomen in Washington, DC, would do as she did?  Moreover, she 
did not quit.  She took a break because she could be honest with herself and others about her 
limits, which were far outweighed by her strengths. 
 When she returned to parliament a few months later, sh returned with renewed vigor.  
She put herself hard to work on a number of projects to which she had been committed before 
and during her campaign for office:  these included securing rights for asylum seekers being kept 
in Guantánamo-style detention centers, providing free school lunches for children, abolishing 
prescription drug charges in the National Health Service, and improving drug treatment 
programs.255  She also became a vocal advocate for teen dropouts, derogatorily called “neds,” 
and she was a leading British voice of protest as the US and UK prepared to invade Iraq.  Then 
in 2004, the popular, photogenic leader of the Scottish Socialist Party, Tommy Sheridan, began 
politically and personally attacking her.  Divisions in what d virtually been a one-man party—
“Sheridan’s Socialist Party”—were coming to the surface, nd antagonism between Sheridan and 
Kane, along with two other female SSP leaders, was reported to have been one of the main 
causes behind rifts surfacing within the party.  Sheridan attempted to paint Kane, Carolyn 
Leckie, and Frances Curran as estrogen-crazed witches who were using “dark arts” against 
                                               
255 Scott <http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,,1116029,00.html>. 
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him.256   In truth, Sheridan had damaged the SSP’s good reputation because he badly handled 
rumors about having an extramarital affair with a party worker.  Sheridan was ultimately 
removed as leader of the party that he had helped to found in the 1990s.  Nevertheless, 
Sheridan’s right-hand man, the Burns-singing Fox, became the new leader in February 2005.  
The internecine fighting continued, which caused the SSP to only garner 1.9 per cent of the 
Scottish vote in the April 2005 elections.  As I write, the SSP is a dying party, which is certainly 
unfortunate.  Before the scandals and rifts, the general consensus in Scotland was that the SSP 
would be a strong influence in Scottish politics.  Regardless, there is still Rosie Kane, and I 
suspect that her impact on Scottish politics will have a lasting effect that exceeds the SSP’s. 
 Perhaps because my mother raised two teens (my sister and me) by herself on a social 
servant’s salary, I sympathize with Kane.  Perhaps I envy her because I was raised in American 
social studies and civics classes that trumpeted the merits of a citizen’s government, while today, 
a US government of, by, and for the people is at best a chimera.  Perhaps I hold Kane in high 
regard because of the issues that she has chosen to take n, most of which reflect her experiences 
as a working-class high school dropout, a single parent, and a social worker.  Perhaps I am 
humbled by her because she is actually a shy person who, before she entered the SSP, knew 
“fuck all about politics,” to quote Roy of Marabou Stork Nightmares.  But she has emerged from 
those limitations, becoming one of the most astute and powerful voices in recent Scottish 
political history. 
 I see Kane in the same light as I see many of Irvine Welsh’s characters—not as an icon, 
but as an “everyone.”  However, unlike in literature, she i  not an allegorical everyone; she is a 
practical everyone.  “There's thousands of people living in absolute poverty out there who didn't 
                                               
256 Paul Hutcheon, “The Scottish Socialists Vowed to Bring the Struggle to Holyrood, but Since Ousting 
Tommy Sheridan, the Party Have Only Struggled with Themselve ,” Sunday Herald [UK] 19 June 2005, 8 Aug. 
2005 <http://www.sundayherald.com/50384>. 
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even know there was an election on, who know nothing about politics,” Kane said in an 
interview after her 2003 election, “I used to be one of those people before I found my voice—
and now I've found it no one is going to shut me up. I want p rliament to be like the Big Brother 
house, where people tune in because they care about what's happening, not ignore it because it's 
full of lawyers using big words they don't understand.”257  The seasoned politician or political 
junkie—whether Left, Right, or indifferent—would probably accuse her of being naïve, 
idealistic, a crude populist, or a raving extremist.  However, th se Gramsci-haunted words from 
Welsh’s character Spud might put Kane’s political vision into perspective:  “It’s funny though, 
man, but they political gadges aw seem like they come fae posh hames, students n that.  No thit 
ah’m knockin it, but ah think, it should be the likes ay us that agitate for change” (Porno 259).   
Kane is neither a “gadge” nor from a “posh hame.”  And if she is any kind of “student,” she is a 
student of real, democratic politics, warts and all.  Most importantly, she is an “us,” a constituent 
of the multitude. 
 I accidentally came across Kane in the British press during 2003 because I was habitually 
reading foreign newspapers at the time, more habitually than I already did.  Under the tutelage of 
President George W. Bush and a Republican-controlled US Congress, the American public and, 
in all actuality, the rest of the world were being led into a war that many already knew was based 
on neo-imperial lies, fabrications, and propaganda.  Barring are exceptions, the Democrats had 
neither the will nor the desire to be an opposition party.  The so-called free media of the so-
called greatest democracy on the planet were obediently playing their role as a privately-owned, 
state-controlled Ministry of Information.  I have the bad habit of being a skeptic—thank you, 
David Hume—so I looked abroad for information about what ws really going on.  Because of 
my professional interest in Scotland and “South Britain,” I already read various online British 
                                               
257 Seenan < http://www.guardian.co.uk/women/story/0,,953813,00.html >. 
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news sites.  But at the time, my interest was peaked evn more.  Britain was embroiled in a 
number of Iraq-related inquiries, scandals, and tragedies.  Dodgy dossiers, a leaking BBC news 
anchor, and a beleaguered intelligence operative, along with his consequent suicide, were at the 
forefront of the chaos.  In the midst of all this, Scotland was trying to be something more than 
the northern frontier of the UK, and Kane emerged. 
 I tend to look at the world the way that Walter Benjamin did; in fact, his Arcades Project 
has become for me an unexpected source of inspiration and consolation.  All sorts of information 
and events are occurring at any given time, flooding my brain and sometimes overwhelming me.  
But if I stop a moment, a whole web of connections materializes.  If I can keep the moment open 
long enough, I can begin to read the web, which is inevitably squirming with possibilities that 
could become probabilities.  I have to be quick and locate a focal point to hang onto because 
such a web resists being pinned down.  What I saw when Kane emerged was a central node in 
one of those webs, and that particular web became the heart of this project, which, in one way or 
another, I had for some time been trying to write. 
 My affinity for Scotland had always been a personal one.  Since my teens, I had been 
interested in my Scottish predecessors:  Highlanders who had gone into the Lowland coal mines 
after the Clearances, and Lowland farmers scratching a living along the River Tweed.  Three 
generations removed from the ancestors who had left the mines and farms of Scotland for the 
coal and iron mines of America, I was like many Americans of Scottish, Irish, or Welsh 
descent—somewhere between being totally ignorant of my ancestors and being a hopeless 
kailyard romantic.  The two probably walk hand in hand.  The ignorance and romanticism, 
though, occur for a reason.  To become “acceptable,” my fa ily, like so many recently 
immigrated families in America, did everything it could to conceal its ethnic earmarks.  
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Nevertheless, those earmarks would bubble up.  The word “wee” made more than an occasional 
appearance in family conversations.  My great grandmother would slip up and recite the nursery 
rhyme, “Roond a Bit, Wee Little Moosie,” while tracing out the mouse’s path on my hand and 
arm until he reached his “wee little hoosie” under my arm.  And while helping her cook and 
clean, she would teach me mouth music.  Puirt-a-beul, as it is called in Scotland and Ireland, is 
an almost dead art of Celtic music, which is a type of yodel-like singing that requires 
complicated tongue movement.  Moreover, when her mining father’s copy of Robert Burns’s 
poems and songs surfaced, complete with Papa Park’s annotatio s, I knew that “pieces of the 
circumstances . . . were coming together,” to borrow words from Glue.  But I did not have 
enough to forge a deeper understanding of my genealogy.  Like so many other contemporary 
Americans of Celtic descent, I fell for everything the late-twentieth-century Celtic Revival 
industry produced.  However, it was Welsh who wrenched me from the kitsch vortex and 
grounded me with his novel Marabou Stork Nightmares.  Using Spud’s words again, it was “aw 
startin tae come thegither in my heid” and the “real characters” began to emerge.  When it came 
to writing the present study, though, I felt as Spud did when he began his history of Leith.  
Something was still missing.  I had all kinds of researched information to use, and I still had a 
hint of that kailyard romanticism to keep me inspired.  However, concretion, as Marxists like 
say, was not occurring.   
Then, in May 2003, I read a Guardian article, and I saw its accompanying photo.258  A 
working-class woman who has had more than her share of hard knocks was swearing herself to 
the people, not only with her words but also with her flesh.  Indeed, it seemed to me as if the 
people had inscribed themselves into her very being, and there s  was in a government 
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effectively born at the turn of the third millennium giving the people back to themselves.  I knew 
that by “the people,” she meant her constituents in Glasgow and Scots from the Borders to the 
Hebrides, but I felt as if she were speaking to the world.  In an inexplicable way, I felt 
transformed.  Not as a descendent of Scottish miners and farmers, but as a human being 
integrally connected to all other human beings, I recognized in her and then in myself an 
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